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Abstract 
 
What are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something 
invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations (Tarski 1966) or 
isomorphisms (Sher 1991). The first chapter is about extending “invariance” accounts of 
logicality to intensional notions, by asking for invariance under arbitrary permutations of both 
possible worlds and objects. I discuss the results one gets in this extended theory of invariance, 
and how to fix many technical issues. 
The second chapter is about setting out a better theory of logicality. I discuss the limits of 
invariance frameworks, and the need for a theory of logicality with a more solid philosophical 
ground. I believe that the concept of information can play a major role in defining what logic is 
and what logical notions are. I spell out this intuition, by designing a new test for logicality. A 
notion is logical iff it behaves in a certain way, by checking only “structural aspects of 
information”, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of its “informational inputs”.  
In the last chapter I explore some interesting features of my theory. I show how, contrary to 
standard invariance, in mine logical notions tend to stay persistent across different models of 
information. I also spell out an intermediate notion of quasi-logicality to make sense of the 
formality of “world-sensitive” notions: notions whose behaviour changes across worlds. I finally 
propose a case study: deontic modals. I discuss how one can argue for their quasi-logicality, in my 
framework. The dissertation is concluded with a technical appendix, in which I prove that my 
theory is a restriction of standard permutation invariance (at least for a class of items) when we 
model the space of information in a certain way: as a set of complete powersets of some sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER 1. INVARIANCE AND INTENSIONALITY. ........................................................................................ 4 
1.1   PERMUTATION INVARIANCE .............................................................................................................. 5 
1.2   A BETTER FRAMEWORK TO WORK ON ............................................................................................ 11 
1.3   EXTENDING INVARIANCE TO INTENSIONAL OPERATORS ............................................................. 13 
1.3.1   Problems of size ........................................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.2   Invariant modal notions .............................................................................................................. 17 
1.4   OVERGENERATION? ........................................................................................................................... 21 
1.4.1   A Lower and Upper Bound .......................................................................................................... 21 
1.4.2. Hyper-logicality ............................................................................................................................ 23 
1.5   WOMBAT-DISJUNCTION AND OTHER STRANGE ITEMS.................................................................. 25 
CHAPTER 2: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON FORMALITY. ................................................................................... 29 
2.1 What permutation-invariance is missing. ..................................................................................... 30 
2.1.1 Standard Invariance is not explanatory ................................................................................ 30 
2.1.2 Invariant items are impersistent ........................................................................................... 33 
2.2 A Way out? Information first ............................................................................................................... 35 
2.2.1 Digression: MacFarlane’s theory. ........................................................................................... 37 
2.3 The Structure of Information ......................................................................................................... 38 
2.4 Formal computability ..................................................................................................................... 42 
2.5 How to model information ................................................................................................................... 50 
2.5.1 Transformation of infons ....................................................................................................... 51 
2.6 FORMAL COMPUTABILITY-INVARIANCE ..................................................................................... 52 
2.6.1 Formal-Computability Invariance Defined ........................................................................... 54 
CHAPTER 3: APPLICATIONS OF FORMAL-COMPUTABILITY-INVARIANCE. .............................................. 61 
3.1 The object/modal system of information. ........................................................................................... 62 
3.2 A simpler system of information. ........................................................................................................ 66 
3.2.1 An objection to persistence ........................................................................................................... 68 
3.3 Quantifiers. ........................................................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.1 Objection ........................................................................................................................................ 73 
3.4 World-Sensitivity and Quasi Logicality ............................................................................................... 75 
3.4.1 Quasi-Formal-Computability ........................................................................................................ 78 
3.4.2 Quasi-Logicality defined. ............................................................................................................... 83 
3.4.3   Quasi Logical Items ...................................................................................................................... 86 
 
 
3.5 A case study: Deontic Modality and Logicality. ................................................................................... 88 
3.5.1 Standard Deontic Logic ................................................................................................................. 88 
3.5.2 Is Standard Deontic Modality Formal? ......................................................................................... 90 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 97 
Appendix A: Formal-Computability Invariance in Boolean Algebras of Infons........................................... 99 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................ 104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What is this dissertation about? 
This dissertation is about formality and logicality. What does it mean to say that logical notions are 
formal? “Formal” is not a univocal concept, and before rushing into a discussion on what formal notions 
are, one should first cut off potential misunderstandings. For formality is applied to many things: 
theories, arguments, lexical notions, properties, etc. What is more, formality comes not just in different 
kinds, but in different shades, as well: one might say, for example, that a theory is more formal than 
another.  
So, in what kind of formality are we interested in, in the scope of this work? The brief answer is this: 
in the formality of logical notions, exclusively. Thus, firstly, we take the formality we are interested in to 
apply to items of a formal language: it is “linguistic” formality. We are not interested in defining an 
attribute that applies to theories or arguments. We need to be careful, though, when making this claim, 
for a linguistic item, per se, is just a symbol without meaning. Yet, by logical “notions”, we mean a 
linguistic item that is interpreted: so, formality here applies to items in a formal language that are 
already coupled with a meaning, given through an interpretation. Before we give a meaning to it, the 
item is just a symbol, and the very question of its formality cannot be raised. The general idea is that, in 
a formal language, a demarcation should be made between notions that are logical/formal, and notions 
that are not: conjunction and disjunction are formal, for example, while proper names for dogs are not.  
Secondly, in the scope of this work, we are interested in the most formal notions: the logical ones. It 
may be that, in a language, formality is not an all-or-nothing attribute. For example, one might want to 
say that material implication is logical, while counterfactual implication is less formal, and yet more 
formal than a binary operator that takes (˹2+2 = 4˺, ˹Lemons are vegetables˺) to ˹Oranges are 
vegetables˺ and everything else to ⊥. We will say something about this topic in the last chapter but, 
generally, when we talk about “formality”, we are referring to the formality shared by all and only the 
2 
 
logical notions. This is why, maybe unwisely, I will tend to use the term “logical” and “formal” as 
interchangeable, in the scope of this work. 
Historical roots of this work. 
Formality is a complex notion with a complex history. This is not a dissertation on the history of 
philosophy, yet I believe it would be unwise to approach the philosophical discussion of some concept 
without having a grasp, first, on how the contemporary discussion on it has been shaped into its current 
form. Novaes (2011), in her cunning article, distinguishes between two main ways logic is said to be 
formal: 
i. 1-Formality interprets formal as “pertaining to forms”: logic is formal because it “abstracts 
from matter”.  
ii. 2-formality, on the other hand, interprets “formal” as “pertaining to rules”: logic is formal 
not because of what it is, but because of what it does. It is formal because it behaves formally, 
by defining the rules for reasoning.  
In this dissertation, we will mainly talk about 1-Formality, since we are “taking on” from “invariance” 
theories of logicality, which are a kind of 1-formality theories. Let us talk briefly about 1-Formality. Its 
historical root, according to Novaes, is to be traced back to Aristotle’s distinction between matter and 
form. The opposite of “formal”, in 1-formality, is “material”. Different choices of what “material” is lead 
to different interpretations of what 1-Formality means. For example, if we are focusing on the formality 
of “arguments”, and we identify the “material” with some “lexical terms”, we get to the old idea that an 
argument is formal because of the validity of its schema: the schema is the formal “structure” of the 
argument, and it is obtained when we substitute its “material” parts with place-holders (Novaes 2011, 
307). Examples of this idea are to be found in Buridan, which suggests that the “material” part of the 
sentence are all its subjects and predicates, while the “formal” are all the other syncategorematic terms, 
like connectives and quantifiers (Buridan 1976, I.7.2, pp. 30 (7–12)).  
By assuming that what “pertains to the form” are all the syncategorematic terms, Buridan is already 
making an important choice: what is the ground for it? Arguably, subjects and predicates, following the 
3 
 
Aristotelian tradition, correspond to substances and attributes. Thus, they are “material” because they 
are “too involved” with the world: they are “sensitive” to it, in a non-logical way. This suggests something 
interesting: the formality of linguistic items is not something that can be “tested” in the realm of 
language alone, but it is essentially linked to their meanings, which, in turn, are tied to what the world 
is. This “ontological” shift in the discussion on formality is even more apparent when one identifies 
“matter” with “identities of objects”. Now, formal means “indifference to particulars” (MacFarlane 2000, 
56). This is where invariance theories come into play. According to invariance theories, something is 
logical because it abstracts away from objects. To test if this is the case, we transform the objects in the 
model through which we are interpreting the linguistic term we are testing, and we check if the meaning 
of the term gets upset by some transformation. If this never happens, then the item is logical. This 
dissertation takes on from this tradition, so it is important to understand “how we got here”. We are 
following a tradition that goes from Tarski onward, and that is closely related to the model-theoretic 
account of logical consequence and the problem of the demarcation of logical constants, as we will see 
in the first section of chapter 1.  
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CHAPTER 1. INVARIANCE AND INTENSIONALITY. 
 
What are logical notions? The shape of the current debate on this issue has been heavily influenced by 
Tarski’s work on logical consequence.  Take the standard, Tarskian way of understanding logical 
consequence:  
Tarski Logical Consequence Γ⊨A iff every model that makes Γ true makes A true, where Γ is a 
finitary set of sentences of the language.  
What is a model? In a first order, extensional logic, a model is obtained when we interpret a language ℒ 
over a domain of objects 𝔇, with an interpretation function that maps each element of the language to 
an appropriate set-theoretic construction from the domain: it maps each name to an object, each 
function of arity 1 to a subset of 𝔇, each 2-place relation to a subset of 𝔇×𝔇, each unary quantifier to a 
set of subsets of the powerset of 𝔇, and so on. A language plus a domain is called a frame. For every 
appropriate interpretation function we obtain a model for that frame. In a language ℒ, Γ⊨A iff every 
model that makes Γ true makes A true.  
Now the question is: what is an “appropriate” interpretation function? Suppose Γ=P∧Q. We now want 
to say that P∧Q⊨P. To do that, we check that, for every reinterpretation of the premises and the 
conclusion, we still obtain a valid argument. That is, every model that makes the premises true makes 
the conclusion true. Note, however, that this is so only because we are keeping the interpretation of 
conjunction fixed. Connectives, however, are part of ℒ: why, then, should we keep conjunction fixed? 
Why not, for example, building a model in which conjunction is mapped onto disjunction? If such class 
of models were admissible we would end up with a counterexample to P∧Q⊨P: we just need to swap 
conjunction with disjunction and make P false. 
The standard answer to the problem is saying that conjunction is logical, along with any other truth-
functional operator, and so it must be kept constant through interpretations. This is where the logicality 
question becomes central to the model-theoretic account of logical consequence: having different sets 
of logical constants will result in having different results on what follows from what. Suppose we keep 
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every item in the language constant: then we would have just one model 𝔐. Thus, for every set of 
sentences Γ of ℒ, Γ⊨A iff either some sentence in Γ is false in 𝔐 or A is true in 𝔐. Suppose now that the 
set of logical constants is empty. Then very few arguments would be valid: for example, Γ⊨Γ, for every 
Γ of ℒ. 
 
1.1   PERMUTATION INVARIANCE 
 
Logical consequence is central to what logic is and does, but to make it work, we need an account of 
logicality. We don’t only need an elaborate, philosophical definition: we need something that is apt to 
formalization, so that we can build up a formal, precise test. This is where invariance come into play. 
When Tarski was developing his model-theoretic account of logical consequence in 1936, he was 
sceptical about the possibility of coming up with such a technical notion. However, in his famous paper 
in 1966, he provided a very elegant and precise test for logicality: permutation invariance. Although this 
idea was latter called “Tarskian”, he was not the first to put forward such an idea: we find similar 
proposals in Mautner (1946) and Mostowski (1957:13). The proposal is quite simple: a logical notion 
must be “general” and “topic-neutral”. ‘Human’ is not logical because it is sensitive to what humanity is, 
which is not something logic should be concerned with. On the other hand, ‘identity’ is general enough 
to be logical. To capture this idea, we can ask which notion remains invariant when we “swap” objects 
in the domain arbitrarily. We call logical whatever notion “survives” every such “permutation of the 
world onto itself” (Tarski 1966). The test gives plausible results: ˹Being human˺ is not logical, because 
when we swap me with my laptop, ˹Being human˺ gets assigned a different subset of the domain: one in 
which a non-human thing is present (my laptop). On the other hand, identity is logical because, no 
matter what objects we swap around, every object is self-identical, and so identity will still be mapped 
onto the set of all ordered pairs of an object with itself.  
We can make this even clearer by talking in terms of “structure”: being sensitive to “Humanity”, in a 
logical framework, can be modelled as being sensitive to the membership between a thing and the set 
of humans. This membership relation creates a boundary, a structure in the logical space, because it 
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partitions things into two equivalence classes: the class of humans and the class of non-humans. To see 
whether a notion is indifferent to Humanity, we take some transformation that does not preserve this 
structure, like arbitrary permutations, where a permutation is just a “swapping” of the world onto itself. 
If we swap a human with a non-human, for example, we will “upset” the meaning of ˹Being Human˺, 
thereby showing that ˹Being Human˺ is not formal. If a notion is permutation-invariant, on the other 
hand, then it must be insensitive to these “worldly”, boundaries of reality. The adequacy and efficiency 
of the proposal rests on the choice of transformation we look at. According to Tarski (1966), 
“permutations” are powerful enough to show abstraction from all the irrelevant “boundaries” of reality1.  
We can make the Tarski machinery more precise in this way: every item in a language ℒ belongs to a 
precise type: a unique set-theoretic construction from 𝔇. A permutation of a set X is any automorphism 
of X; that is, any function from X to itself. σ : X → X and if a, b ∈ X and a ≠ b, then σ(a) ≠ σ(b). (Lang 1970, 
7.5). Now, given a permutation σ of 𝔇, call σY the permutation of type Y induced by σ. In general, σY = 
{σX|X ∈ Y} and σ(k) = σY(k) if Y ∈ 𝔇. We can now define permutation invariance: 
PI   An item k in type Y is permutation invariant iff, for every σ, σY(k) = k.  
That is, k is invariant if permutations do not affect it. Tarski’s proposal is this: 
Tarski    A item is logical iff it is permutation invariant, in every model. 
To be fair, Tarski just says that the notion should be “permutation invariant”. Yet, I guess that 
generalizing to every model makes things clearer. For the notion should be invariant where? In the 
actual world? In some model? And if so, in which one? Usually, if a notion is permutation invariant in 
one model, it is so in every model, but we can make up items that change meaning across models, like a 
notion that is mapped to identity in some model and to ˹Loving˺ in some other: this notion is 
permutation invariant in the first but not in the second model. I suppose that Tarski believed that 
invoking models in the definition of a logical constant was not a good idea, for the point of logical 
constants was to extract the appropriate interpretation function, which in turn defines the set of models. 
                                                             
1 On the other hand, Sher (1991) and McGee (1996) think arbitrary bijections between domains may do the job. 
Feferman (1999) employs an even more powerful transformation: homomorphisms. I discuss these solutions 
later on. 
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Yet, if we use models to define logical constants, the theory would be viciously circular. This is fair, but 
I am not necessarily worried by this because, even though my discussion “takes on” from Tarski’s, we 
have different aims. Mine is not to ground what a model is in what a logical notion is, for I am just 
interested in a general definition of logicality. In fact, it seems to me that the Tarskian project will 
invariably fail, for invariance theories will ground what a logical notion is in what comes out invariant 
under some transformation of the domains of models. So, it seems clear to me that they are grounding 
logicality in model theory, not the other way around. 
Let us now assess the main results of permutation invariance. This will also help shed light on the 
proposal itself. Which item comes out logical via PI and Tarski?  
i. Individual constants.  
No zero-place function, because σ(k) = σY(k) for every such k. This is good, for we do not usually think 
that names are logical. However, names for truth-values or empty names will probably be logical. The 
firsts are logical because, as a rule, we cannot “swap” truth-values: if we have, in our language, an 
individual constant that is mapped to some truth-value, that constant is automatically logical. Empty-
names are logical because they usually get mapped to the empty-set, which is permutation invariant. 
This latter result may be problematic: what is the link between “emptiness” and logicality? Empty names 
are a can of worms I do not want to open. As a suggestion, I suppose that my favourite way to deal with 
this issue would be to take a “normative” stance, and do not allow empty names in the language2.  
ii. Unary relations.  
We can easily see that every trivial and empty unary property come out logical: they are mapped to 𝔇 
and ∅ respectively, which are the only permutation-invariant subsets of 𝔇.  
 
 
                                                             
2 This is just a suggestion, and I do not necessarily endorse it. For example, why should we curtail language to reach 
extensional adequacy? Should permutation invariance be enough to tell us that empty-names are not logical? 
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iii. N-ary relations.  
Again: every trivial or empty relation is logical. Both this result and the former are heavily discussed 
in the literature. Many think they are problematic. For example, take the predicate ˹Being a male-
widow˺: it is mapped to the empty-set, so it is invariant. Yet, it should not be logical, because it is empty 
in virtue of the meaning of the non-logical terms “male” and “widow” (Gomez-Torrente 2002, 18). We 
can build similar examples with metaphysical necessity: ˹Being a unicorn˺, if Kripke (2013) is right, is 
necessarily empty, and yet it is not logical. We will see later on how we can try to deal with issues like 
this in an intensional, more powerful framework.  
These results are interesting, in their own right, because they suggest that the reliability of the results 
we get depends on what a model is. When we are permuting objects in the domain, what are we doing, 
really? What does the domain represent? In his quite famous book, Etchemendy (1990) argued that 
models can be mainly conceptualized in two ways: either as reinterpretation of the language or as a 
change in the world we are interpreting the language on. According to the first, the “world” does not 
change: in every model, it is either the set of actual objects or restrictions of such domain. What changes 
are the meaning of the terms: for example, we obtain a model by imagining that ˹Being a dog˺ means 
˹Being a human˺. This first conception of model is inadequate for permutation invariance. For then, any 
property that is “universal”, like ˹Being actually instantiated˺ would be logical, for it would be mapped 
to the set of actual objects and any restriction of them. Yet, ˹ Being actually instantiated˺ cannot be logical: 
it is not even something that things satisfy a priori.  
According to the second conception, we keep the language fixed and change the “world” we are 
interpreting the language on. For permutation invariance to work, in this second conception models 
must somehow be “bigger” than the set of metaphysically possible worlds. For suppose this is not the 
case and suppose Kripke is right: unicorns are metaphysically impossible. Then, in each world, ˹Being a 
unicorn˺ would be mapped to ∅, and it would be invariant. Yet, it is not logical. The same goes for the 
“male-widow” issue: we need a world with male-widows, or otherwise this item will be invariant. 
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iv. Quantifiers 
Quantifiers are mapped to subsets of the powerset of 𝔇. For a quantifier is a function that takes 
propositional functions or n-tuples of propositional functions to True and False. Its extension, then, will 
be the set of all and only propositional functions taken to True. The existential quantifier, for example, 
takes every propositional function that is satisfied by at least one object to True, the rest to False. So, its 
extension will be the set of all non-empty subsets of 𝔇. The universal quantifier, on the other hand, will 
be mapped on the set of the maximal subsets of 𝔇: that is, {𝔇}. Both are invariant under arbitrary 
permutations. For take the existential quantifier: the only way to make it invariant would be to “switch” 
the empty set with a non-empty. Yet, we saw that the empty set is invariant, so this is not possible. The 
same goes with ∀: since 𝔇 is invariant, so is {𝔇}. What about other quantifiers? Well, for example, the 
complementation of ∀ and ∃ in 𝓅𝔇 are logical: the quantifier whose extension is ∅ and 𝓅𝔇 − {𝔇}, 
respectively (the ˹Nothing˺ and ˹Not everything˺). Most quantifiers are not logical, however. Take ˹At 
least one human˺: it takes all and only the predicates satisfied by at least one human to True. So, its 
extension is the set of all X⊆𝔇 that contain at least one human. This unary quantifier will not be 
permutation invariant, because we can swap some humans with some other things, like dogs: now ˹At 
least a human˺ will have, in its extension, at least one set in which no human can be found.  
Mostowski in the fifties proved that cardinality quantifiers are invariant under arbitrary bijections 
between models (1957). Cardinality quantifiers are items that are sensitive only to the number of 
elements of their extension. Examples are: ˹At least 4 things or ˹A transfinite number of things or ˹Only 
15 things˺ etc. ˹ Exactly 4 objects˺ has, as extension, the set Y = {X⊆𝔇/|A| = 4}, where |X| is the cardinality 
of set X. Arbitrary permutations in X, being the set of all automorphisms of X, are a subset of arbitrary 
bijections between domains. Thus, permutations cannot affect the cardinality of the elements of 𝓅𝔇, 
and so they cannot upset the extension of a quantifier that is sensitive only to the cardinality of sets. 
There has been a great deal of discussion on cardinality quantifiers. In his 1999 paper, Feferman puts 
forward a list of accusations to bijection-invariance (that applies to permutation-invariance, as well). 
Two of his points are especially useful to our discussion: 
I. The thesis assimilates logic to mathematics, specifically to set theory. 
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II. No natural explanation is given by it of what constitutes the same logical operation over 
arbitrary basic domains (1999, 37). 
The first accusation is related to things like cardinality quantifiers. According to Feferman, if cardinality 
quantifiers are logical, then the theory results in a confusion between logic and mathematics. Now one 
can “express the Continuum hypothesis and many other substantial mathematical propositions as 
logically determinate statements” (1999, 38). Bonnay (2008) shares similar worries3.  
Continuum Hypothesis the Continuum hypothesis (CH) states that the there is no set that is strictly 
“bigger” than the set of Integers and strictly “smaller” than the set of Reals. That is, there is no set 
X such that |ℤ|<|X|<|ℝ|, where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. As well know, it was proved by 
Godel (1940) and Cohen (1963, 1964) that the standard Zaermelo-Frankel theory, together with 
the axiom of choice, does not entail either the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) or its negation.  
What does Feferman mean when he says that the CH can be expressed as “logically determinate”? The 
choice of words is poor. As discussed in Griffiths & Paseau (2016), the threat may be that one will 
overgenerate logical truths. It is known that one can express CH in purely second-order logic 
vocabulary4. Feferman shows how one can turn a second-order quantifier into a first-order like 
operation across domains that is bijection-invariant (and thus permutation-invariant), and that is 
“cardinality-quantifier-like” (1999, 37-8). Consequently, so Feferman seems to think, CH will turn out 
logically true if true and logically false if false, and this proves that PI has conflated logic with 
mathematics5.  
The second point hinges on cardinality, as well: it is unclear “what constitutes the same logical 
operation over arbitrary basic domains”, because logical notions that act differently in domains with 
different cardinality are bijection invariant and thus logical, according to Tarski (and to “bijection-
invariance theorists, like Sher (1991)). So, for example, a quantifier that is mapped to ∃ when |𝔇|>5, 
                                                             
3 Bonnay’s proposal is invariance under “potential isomorphisms” (2008). The test makes finite cardinality 
quantifier logical, but not higher quantifiers, so the Continuum Hypothesis problem is avoided. 
4 See, for example Shapiro (1991, 100-106). 
5 Griffiths & Paseau (2016) discuss thoroughly this claim, and try to deflate the issue. Also, if someone is a logicist, 
she may not be too unhappy with this result. 
11 
 
and to ∀ otherwise would be logical, on this view. This example makes explicit that cardinality, in 
bijection-invariance and in permutation invariance theories, is “logical structure”: the quantifier above 
is clearly sensitive to it, and it turns out logical6.  
 
1.2   A BETTER FRAMEWORK TO WORK ON 
 
Most of the standard examples of logical notions have been left out of our analysis: negation, 
conjunction, disjunction, implication etc. The problem is that it is harder to see what their extension is, 
when we see extensions as set-theoretic constructions from 𝔇. We can get around this in many ways. 
For example, one way is Lindstrom’s (1966), quoted by Sher (1991, 68-71), in which connectives are 
general quantifiers, where a quantifier is a class of sequences consisting in the domain 𝔇 and a series of 
set-theoretical transformations on it. Lindstrom postulates that the only two 0-place relations are Truth 
T and Falsity F. So, for example, negation becomes the class of all sequences ⟨𝔇, F⟩. The (classical) truth 
operator ˹It is true that˺, on the other hand, would be ⟨𝔇, T⟩. Boolean connectives are sequences of form 
⟨𝔇, S1, S2⟩, where Sn is any sentence of the language. So, for example, a disjunction is the class of 
sequences ⟨𝔇, S1, S2⟩ such that either S1 or S2 is true (sentences are mapped either to T or to F). As far as 
permutation-invariance goes, it is just assumed that truth-values are “fixed” and not “swappable” by 
permutations, so every Boolean connective, and indeed any sentential operator in general, will turn out 
automatically logical (more on this later). 
The system works fine as long as we are in an extensional language, but it is unfit to model intensional 
notions, unsurprisingly. Since we will be dealing with them, I prefer to work in a type theoretic 
framework, with a categorial grammar, in the style of Van Benthem (1989) and MacFarlane (2000). In 
this framework, each type is a function from one type to another. In an extensional language, we start 
                                                             
6 My stance on these complex issues will be clearer after having sketched my theory, in chapter 2. I can say now 
that cardinality quantifiers are probably not logical, in my theory, and cardinality is not “logical structure”, unless 
we state it explicitly. 
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with two basic types, O and V. O is the domain of objects, V is the set of truth-values. In general, we may 
define the set of all types inductively, as the smallest set 𝕋 such that: 
i. 〈O,V〉∈ 𝕋. 
ii. if X, Y∈ 𝕋 then ⟨X,Y⟩∈ 𝕋. 
The interpretation of each typed item is this: elements of O are objects of the domain; V are truth-
values; elements of type ⟨X,Y⟩ are elements of YX (functions from X to Y). O and V combine to form more 
complex types. Examples: 
i. ⟨O,V⟩ are one place predicates, that yield a truth-value when given an object. 
ii. ⟨⟨O,V⟩,V⟩ are unary quantifiers, that yield a truth-value if fed with a predicate. 
iii. ⟨V,V⟩ are unary sentential operators: functions from sentences to sentences. 
With relations of arity n>1 we have different possibilities (MacFarlane 2000, 178). Take a binary 
relation R: it is a function from tuples to truth-values. We can either complicate the system, by adding a 
primitive way of chaining types (x, y), and take R to be of type ⟨(O,O),V⟩. The other alternative is to 
analyse R as a relational, unary property. It is of type ⟨O,⟨O,V⟩⟩. This is the most popular option because 
we would have ⟨O,⟨O,V⟩⟩ in our set of types anyway, and we can always transform a function from n-
tuples to truth-values to a unary function. Take ˹Love(x,y)˺: when it is given an object a, it “gives out” the 
unary property ˹Loving-a˺. We can do the same for every n-ary function: in general, a function of arity n 
is equivalent to a unary function whose value is a function whose arity is n-1. I will take this second 
option. 
With this system in place, we can ask which item is logical. Tarski’s proposal, for instance, is to call a 
notion logical iff it is permutation invariant. In our type-system, this amounts to arbitrary permutations 
of O: 
PI     Let σ be a permutation of type O, and let σy be the transformation on type Y induced by σ. An 
item k in Y is permutation-invariant iff for every permutation σ of O, σy(k)=k.  
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We can define the transformation of Y induced by σ inductively, on the complexity of Y. MacFarlane 
(2000, 183) offers an elegant definition: 
• if Y=O, then for all k∈Y, σY(k) = σ(k)  
• if Y=V, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= k  
• if Y=⟨X,Z⟩, for any types X, Z, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= σZ ∘ k ∘ (σX)-1. 
Here ∘ is composition: f ∘ g (a) = f(g(a)), for any f, g and a. f-1 is the inverse of function f: f(a) = b if and 
only if f-1(b) = a. Now, since this definition is not that obvious, let us check it with an example. Take an 
arbitrary permutation of O: σ(a) = b. We want to know what is the induced permutation in type 〈O,V〉. 
Take an item k in 〈O,V〉 such that k(a) = T. Following the inductive definition above, σ〈O,V〉(k) is the 
composite function σV ∘ k ∘ (σO)-1. So, it is a function O → O →  V → V. In particular, (σX)-1(b) = a, so it will 
go from a to b; then, since k(a) = T and σ(T) = T, it will end up in T. So, correctly, k goes from a to T, and 
its transformation goes from b to T: we have swapped ‘a’ with ‘b’ in k. 
 
1.3   EXTENDING INVARIANCE TO INTENSIONAL OPERATORS 
 
How do we treat sentential operators? For we have already said that paradigmatic examples of 
logicality, such as negation and conjunction, are sentential operators. Since their form has no occurrence 
of type O, they are all trivially invariant and thus logical. This is fine, as long as we confine ourselves in 
an extensional language, because in such a system the only sentential operators one can model are the 
truth-functional, which are all plausibly logical. Yet, what happens if we want to say something about 
more complex sentential operators, i.e. non-truth functional operators? Well, there are operators that 
are not truth-functional, and not logical, at all. For example, take 𝒵: it is a unary sentential operator that 
takes P: ˹Pizza is healthy˺ to ⊥ and everything else to ⊤. 𝒵 is too complex to be modelled in our system, 
so the theory is just silent on such items. Yet, if we try to model it, it would come out trivially invariant, 
because it would be of form ⟨V,V⟩. Another example: 𝒳 takes every sentence S to its ‘conjunction-
operator’ ˹∧S˺, with the exemption of P’: ˹Oranges are vegetables˺; here, the output is the ‘disjunction-
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operator’, ˹∨S’˺7. 𝒳 is not to be modelled in our extensional system; yet, again, we would like to say that 
it is not logical. Yet, if we do model it, it turns out trivially invariant. By “trivially” I mean that the test 
gives its verdict not because 𝒵 or 𝒳 are somehow “special” operators, but only because they are 
sentential operators.  
The problem is that operators like 𝒳 and 𝒵 are sensitive to the identity of propositions in a non-logical 
way. Yet, the system, being extensional, equates every proposition with its truth-value, making true (and 
false) propositions undistinguishable. This is not a feature of our system only: it is usually just harder 
to acknowledge, given the popular construction of sentential functions as generalized quantifiers. For 
example, in Lindstrom’s framework (1966), we are forced to “respect” the identity of truth-values, and 
the system identifies sentences extensionally.  
Of course, this does not show that standard invariance theories make things like 𝒵 or 𝒳 logical, but 
rather that they are just silent on those items, and structurally unfit to deal with them. If we take 
invariance as a theory whose only aim is to give a technical notion of logicality, designed for the 
restricted domain of extensional languages, then its inability to handle non-extensional operators 
should not worry us. Yet, it should worry us if we see invariance as a sound, philosophical theory of what 
logical notions are, for the concept of “logical notion” is not restricted to extensional logics: it is far more 
general. We have just showed how two non-extensional items, 𝒵 and 𝒳, are not logical.  
Granted that one wants invariance to be a general theory, we need a way to model intensionality in 
our framework. To do so we need more “structure” and complexity. Semantics for non-extensional 
operators “extensionalize” them, by interpreting these notions over some algebraic structure, like a set 
of worlds/times and some relations on them. How does this work in type theory? I will show how to 
model modal notions, but similar results can be obtained for other class of items, like temporal operators 
in tense logic. First, we change the inductive definition of types: 
i. O,V are types. 
ii. If X and Y are types, then ⟨X,Y⟩ is a type.  
                                                             
7 MacFarlane (2000, 207-9) makes similar examples. 
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iii. If X is a type, then ⟨W,X⟩ is a type. 
‘W’ is “worlds”. It is not a type by itself. The only basic types are still O and V. In this way, we do not 
create funky items like ⟨⟨O,V⟩,W⟩, that we do not need8. We can now accommodate richer notions in our 
theory:  
• ⟨W,V⟩ are propositions: functions from worlds to truth-values. 
• ⟨W,⟨O,V⟩⟩ are predicates that may change extensions across worlds. 
• ⟨W,O⟩ are individual concepts: for each world, they yield an object. 
Now, a second problem comes for standard invariance theories. Before, we said that items like 𝒵 or 𝒳 
are simply non-representable, so it was best to say that the theory was just silent on their formality. 
Now, however, we do have a mean to model non-truth-functional notions. And yet, if we follow standard 
invariance and permute objects arbitrarily, 𝒵 and 𝒳 do come out logical. The reason is that their form is 
〈〈W,V〉,〈W,V〉〉 and 〈〈W,V〉,〈〈W,V〉,〈W,V〉〉〉: O does not appear in it, and so they are both trivially invariant. 
To fix this, the first requirement that comes to mind is that logical notions should be invariant under 
permutations of worlds, as well (McCarthy 1981; Van Benthem 1989).  
The way we define permutations on worlds and objects is just an extension of the old definition: for 
any k of type Y, the permutation induced in k is defined like this: 
• if Y=O, then for all k∈Y, σY(k) = σO(k)  
• if Y=W, then for all k∈Y, σY(k) = σW(k)  
• if Y=V, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= k  
• if Y=⟨X,Z⟩, for any types X, Z, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= σZ ∘ k ∘ (σX)-1. 
The new definition of permutation invariance is: 
PI2    Let σO and σW be some permutations of O and W respectively, and let σy be the transformation 
on type Y induced by such σO and σW. An item k in Y is permutation-invariant iff for all σO and 
σW, σy(k)=k.  
                                                             
8 This is in the style of Montague’s universal grammar (1970, 1973). The other way is to take O, V and W as basic 
and to have just one formation rule: you then simply disregard the items you do not need (e.g. Gallin 1975). 
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1.3.1   Problems of size 
 
Things get messy, however, when we consider worlds with restricted or augmented domains. Take the 
logical predicate F: ˹Being something˺. It is an element of ⟨W,⟨O,V⟩⟩. Take two worlds w1 and w2 with 
different domains 𝔇1 and 𝔇2, respectively. When given w1, F yields the ⟨O,V⟩ whose extension is 𝔇1. 
Define a permutation σw(w1) = w2. Now for w1, F yields the ⟨O,V⟩ whose extension is 𝔇2. F is not invariant 
and not logical, via PI2. The same argument can be run with ∀: ∀ in w1 is the element which takes every 
predicate whose extension is 𝔇1 to True, and everything else to False. In w2, it takes every predicate 
whose extension is 𝔇2 to True, and everything else to false. By swapping w1 with w2, we show that ∀ is 
not invariant.  
The issue stems from the fact that O, in modal settings, is the set of all possible objects, and worlds may 
have non-trivial subsets of O as domains: thus, logical items lose their “universality”. We need to be 
careful here in distinguishing between two kinds of issues. The “extensional” universal quantifier ∀ and 
the “extensional” logical predicate ˹Being something˺ are still logical, and their logicality is not called 
into question. What is at stake, here, is rather the logicality of their intensional, modal counterparts of 
type 〈W, 〈〈O, V〉, V〉〉〉 and 〈W, 〈O, V〉〉, respectively. For example, with quantifiers, we are asking whether 
some “intensional quantifier” is logical. Such items, in modal logics with variable domains, will not 
logical via PI2. This is bad because the logicality of at least a class of intensional quantifiers is desirable, 
even though not all of them are logical. For example, take the modal ∀ defined over the set of worlds in 
which there are purple cows9. It is unwise to let this quantifier be logical, because it is indirectly sensitive 
to purple-cow-ness: when we swap a purple cows world with a world with no purple cows, we are 
arguably upsetting this quantifier. On the other hand, it seems sensible to suppose that the modal ∀ 
defined over the set of all and only logically possible worlds is logical. Yet it will not be, along with any 
other modal quantifier, if we let PI2 in place and we let domains vary.  
                                                             
9 Here I am assuming that, if an item k is defined only over some set X, it is undefined for every set that contains 
some y ∉ X. So, if we swap an x ∈ X with some y ∉ X, we always upset k. 
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Having said that, let us look at how to amend this. I can see three options, here: (i) we keep the domain 
fixed across worlds (very inelegant, yet suitable for “necessitists”10), (ii) we restrict the definition of 
types, (iii) we disregard permutations that upset the membership of an object to a world. I will follow 
the latter way. PI2 becomes: 
PI3    Let σW be a permutation between worlds with the same domains, σO a permutation of O that 
respects the membership of objects to worlds, and let σy be the transformation on type Y 
induced by such σW and σO. An item k in Y is permutation-invariant iff for all σO and σW, 
σy(k)=k.  
Basically, now we just look at arbitrary permutations of worlds with the same domain and, for each 
world, all and only the permutations of objects that exist in that world11. PI3 takes care of items like 𝒵 
(just swap ˹Pizza is healthy˺ with some other proposition). 
1.3.2   Invariant modal notions 
 
What modal operators are invariant under PI3? Let us focus on unary operators, for simplicity. The 
only invariant elements of ⟨W,V⟩ are the true in every world and true in no world, which we label ⊤ and 
⊥, respectively. We can build up this table: 
Argument                                                                      Value 
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ 
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤ 
⟨W,V⟩−{⊥,⊤} ⊤ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥ 
Interpretation ¬□ ¬◊ Trivial ¬Conting Conting Empty ◊ □ 
Table 1 
 
                                                             
10 People that think that necessarily everything is necessarily something (Williamson 2013). 
11 I feel like I should say more on this artificial restriction on the group of permutations. What is its philosophical 
justification? I must admit that I do not have any reasonable answer to this worry. It seems clear to me that 
something should be done to stop the failure of logicality for universal quantifiers defined over the set of logically 
possible worlds. This is a way to do it. I am not sure about the philosophical consequences we can extract from 
this choice, and I do not know if this is to be taken as a philosophically deep fact or just as a glitch in the system.  
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⟨W,V⟩−{⊥,⊤} is every element of type ⟨W,V⟩ except ⊤ and ⊥. The first column sets the input (the first 
⟨W,V⟩), each other column is one full combination of outputs. The first line explains the meaning of the 
results: “conting.” is contingency. In a Kripke relational semantics, Conting., □ and ◊ would be the modal 
operators obtained from an accessibility relation R:w→w that is “universal”: such that, for every 
w,w’∈W, R(w,w’).  
Definition of Kripke Model. A Kripke frame is a tuple 〈W, R〉, where W is a set of worlds and R ⊆ 
W×W. Let language ℒ be the smallest set generated from a set of atomic sentences plus Boolean 
connectives, enriched with an operator □. Let 𝒱 be an “atomic” valuation function that maps each 
atomic formula to a subset of W. 〈W, R, V, ⊨〉12 is a Kripke model for ℒ, where ⊨ is a relation from 
W to ℒ defined inductively: 
i. w⊨ A iff w ∈ 𝒱(A), where A is atomic 
ii. w⊨ ¬φ iff w⊭ A 
iii. w⊨ φ ∧ ψ iff w⊨ φ and w⊨ ψ. 
iv. w⊨ φ ∨ ψ iff not both w⊭ φ and w⊭ ψ. 
v. w⊨ φ → ψ iff either w⊨ φ or w⊭ ψ. 
vi. w⊨ □φ iff ∀w’(Rww’, w’⊨ φ) 
 A formula A is valid in 𝔐 iff for all w ∈ W, w⊨ A. One can show that any Kripke model will make 
valid some theorems and rules, like: 
• K : □(P → Q) → (□P → □Q) 
• Necessitation: ⊨ A then ⊨ □A. 
• Distribution of □ over conjunction: □(A ∧ B) → (□A ∧ □B) 
                                                             
12 It is also common to remove 𝒱 and let ⊨ make the atomic valuation. 
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For modal logics that do not have these axioms, the so called “non-normal” modal logics, one needs 
a different semantics, like Neighbourhood semantics or Algebraic semantics13. To have more 
axioms, on the other hand, one can add properties to R.  
In general, we obtain four invariant operators for every permutation-invariance operation. Example: 
the identity operation is permutation-invariant. Call ‘=’ the output of the identity operation: 
Argument  Value   
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥ 
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤ 
⟨W,V⟩−{⊥,⊤} = = = = 
Interpretation    Identity 
Table 2 
 
The last line says that every element of ⟨W,V⟩−{⊥,⊤} is mapped onto itself. The last column is identity, 
the others are invariant combinations obtained from identity. “Identity” corresponds to the truth-
operator ˹ It is true that˺, at least if the semantics is classical. The fact that such operator is logical is good, 
for we usually think that “Truth” is essential to logic. In Frege’s words, “Logic has much the same relation 
to truth as physics has to weight or heat” (Ged. 58). 
“Cardinality operators” are items like ˹In at least five worlds˺ or ˹In 25≤n≤60 worlds˺. Such operators 
are sensitive only to the cardinality of the extension of the proposition they receive as input. E.g. ˹In at 
least three worlds˺ takes every A whose extension X has cardinality |X|≥3 to ⊤, and everything else to 
⊥. As already said, Mostowski (1957) proved that cardinality is invariant under isomorphic structures, 
and the group of all permutations are a subset of all isomorphic structures (they are all the bijections 
from a set to itself), so cardinality is permutation-invariant, as well. Thus, for every such operator, there 
will be four invariant-operators. ˹In at least three worlds˺, for example, takes ⊥ to ⊥ and ⊤ to ⊤ (granted 
that |W|>3). So, as before, we obtain three different variations, switching the output ⊥ with ⊤ and vice-
                                                             
13 See Pacuit (2017) for a discussion on Neighbourhood Semantics and Chagrov & Zakharyaschev (1997) for 
algebraic semantics. 
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versa. These variations correspond to Boolean combinations of cardinality operations (e.g: if we change 
the output of ⊥ into ⊤ in ˹In at least three worlds˺, we obtain: ˹In at least three worlds or in none˺).  
Benthem has this suggestion:  
Benthem’s Proposition. “Among n-ary operations on sets, the only permutation invariant ones are 
those defined at each tuple of arguments by some Boolean combination” (1989, 318).  
He does not have a detailed proof, but a sketchy one: when one tries not to follow any Boolean 
combination, one can easily come up with a permutation that upsets the operation. So, for example, take 
this diagram:  
 
 
Image 1 
 
Take a binary operation F(X,Y) that is not defined through some Boolean combination. Then, you could 
have, for example, that F(X,Y) contains u ∈ X∩Y and yet lacks v ∈ X∩Y. Yet, we can now define a 
permutation σ(v) = u. σ〈W,V〉(X) = X and σ〈W,V〉(Y) = Y, and yet σ〈W,V〉(F(X,Y)) ≠ F(X,Y)14.  
I would like to suggest that the inverse of Benthem’s proposition is less controversial: all Boolean 
operations are permutation-invariant. 
Inverted Benthem’s proposition. Among n-ary operations on sets, those defined at each tuple of 
arguments by some Boolean combination are permutation-invariant. 
If we model propositions as sets of possible worlds, we can model the intensional counterparts of 
extensional Boolean operators as operation defined on sets of worlds (while the extensionals are 
defined over truth-values): disjunction is union of sets, conjunction is intersection, negation is 
complementation. These are clearly permutation-invariant. Thus, the “intensional” counterpart of the 
                                                             
14 Benthem makes an example with X−Y (1989, 319). 
Image 1 
X 
Y W 
u 
v 
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extensional ∨, ∧ and →, along with any other Boolean combination of Boolean operators one can devise, 
are all invariant under PI3.  
 
 
1.4   OVERGENERATION? 
 
The new intensional system may still be susceptible to counterexamples like 𝒵, in which operators 
behave differently when given necessary/impossible propositions. Take ℋ: it yields ˹2+2=4˺ when 
given ˹Socrates is human˺, ˹2+2=5˺ otherwise. Granted that all these propositions are equated to ⊥ or 
⊤, ℋ will be invariant. These issues rely on the assumption that W is the set of all 
metaphysically/mathematically possible worlds. If so, the system equates every 
metaphysically/mathematically necessary and impossible proposition with their intensions, making 
them invariant. To deal with items like this, one needs to make them not invariant. One very intuitive 
way to do that is to extend W enough so that the truth-sets of such propositions come out different. One 
then demands invariance under arbitrary permutations of this extended W. Yet, how big should W be? 
1.4.1   A Lower and Upper Bound 
 
We need W “bigger” than the set of metaphysically possible worlds, for two reasons. First, now the 
item in 〈W, V〉 that takes every w to True, namely ⊤, is logical. If W is the set of metaphysically possible 
worlds, any metaphysical truth would be logical. This seems wrong: intuitively, what we want is that ⊤ 
(which is mapped to W) represents a logical truth, because ⊤ is a formal notion (it is invariant). The 
second reason is that, otherwise, the account over-generates. Suppose the physicalist is right: it is 
metaphysically necessary that everything is physical. Take the unary function G: ˹Being physical˺. If W 
is restricted to metaphysical possibility, and the physicalist is right, then G would be logical, because 
regardless of how we permute objects or worlds, G will be invariant (it will be mapped to the function 
from any world to the domain of that world, which is invariant under arbitrary, domain preserving 
permutations). Yet, do we want ˹Being physical˺ to be a logical notion? I don’t think we do. 
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MacFarlane claims that operators defined through a “universal” relation between worlds, in a Kripke 
relational semantics, are invariant (2000, 217). MacFarlane is right: if R = W×W then, no matter how 
we permute W, we will never upset R. There are other invariant modal operators: modal operators 
definable through (i) an empty accessibility relation (empty extension), obtainable by adding axiom □⊥, 
or (ii) a “solipsistic” accessibility relation (R is just reflexive), obtainable when we add axiom □A↔A. 
(Novaes 2014, 92): now both possibility and necessity collapse into the identity operation described in 
table 2. How one should interpret these results? Novaes (2014) complained that this new account 
discards S4-operators, which are widely used in logic and do not necessarily seem less “formal” than S5 
operators. This is a first worry, which however I will not dwell upon, for the moment (more on this in 
section 3.4). What about S5 operators? Well, S5-□ just means that the accessibility relation through 
which we define □ is an equivalence relation. Such equivalence relation will be invariant only if it is 
“universal”, and mapped to W×W. So, instead of asking: “Are S5 operators logical?” we should ask 
“Which S5 operator, if any, is logical?”. The answer depends on which set is W. It is sensible to suppose 
that at least the “logical” S5-necessity should be logical15. To ensure its logicality we should have, as a 
rule, that the elements of W are all and only the logically possible worlds: in this way the only invariant, 
“universal” S5-necessity is logical necessity, and thus we achieve a lower and an upper bound for W. 
This move takes care of the ˹Being physical˺ problem since, unless we think that ˹Everything is 
physical˺ is a logical truth: now we will now have, in W, a metaphysically impossible and yet logically 
possible world in which something is not physical. It is also effective against counterexamples like ℋ, 
unless they are not counterexamples: if mathematical truths are logical, then we can build ℋ-ish 
invariant connectives that change meaning when given different mathematical truths. Yet, if 
mathematical truths are really logical truths, I don’t see why such items should not be logical, as they 
will be sensitive only to the identity of logical truths. If they are not logical truths, then there will be a 
world that falsify them. If we equate W with the logically possible worlds (WL), then we can also take 
care of some other objections to invariance, like the “male-widow issue” discussed in section 1.1. 
                                                             
15 I am assuming that logical necessity is an S5-operator. For a defence of this, see Burgess (1999). 
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Proof 1.1: ˹ Being male-widow˺ is of form ⟨W,⟨O,V⟩⟩. ˹ Nothing is a male-widow˺ is not a logical truth, 
so there is a wk in W such that ˹Being a male-widow˺ (BMW) has a non-empty extension X. Define 
a permutation σw(wk)=@. In the actual world there are no male widows so, when fed with @, 
BMW gives out a predicate whose extension is ∅; yet σ〈W,〈O,V〉〉(BMW), when given @, yields a 
predicate whose extension is X ≠ ∅. So σ〈W,〈O,V〉〉(BMW) ≠ BMW. 
I suppose that setting W as the set of logically possible world is somehow disappointing. For it solves 
all the issues by fiat, so to speak. It also makes impossible to ground what is logically possible in what 
logical notions are, for we are grounding what comes out as logical notion in what is logically possible. 
Yet, we are not trying to do that. In fact, I believe that this result comes with no surprise: we should 
expect that what is logical in the modal space depends on the boundaries of what is logically possible. 
We have a strong corroboration for this upper-bound: we cannot extend W beyond WL for otherwise 
the system heavily under-generates16. Take for example the intensional, “objectual” identity defined 
over the set of logical possibilities: this item is sensibly a good candidate for logicality. Yet, if we add 
some logically impossible world wi to W, in which something is not identical to itself, logical identity 
would not be invariant.  
Proof 1.2. Take the element in type ⟨W,⟨O,⟨O,V⟩⟩⟩ that is logical identity (=L), and suppose wi ⊨ 
a≠a. When fed with wi and a, =L yields the ⟨O,V⟩ whose extension is ∅. Define a permutation 
σO(a)=b, where b is such that b=b in wi. When fed with wi and b, =L now yields the ⟨O,V⟩ whose 
extension is {b}. So, there is some permutation for which σ⟨W,⟨O,⟨O,V⟩⟩⟩(‘=L’) ≠ ‘=L’. 
1.4.2. Hyper-logicality 
 
To be fair, we have two ways of ensuring the logicality of =L: we can let W be as big as we want and 
restrict the permutations we look at to all the permutations “inside” WL, or we can restrict W to WL. Both 
ways ensure the logicality of logical necessity. In fact, the two solutions are equivalent for items defined 
strictly in WL, and yet they come apart when we look at the logicality of items defined over some strict 
                                                             
16 One might say that there are no impossible worlds, so the problem does not arise. I want to stay neutral on this. 
For a defence of impossible worlds, see Priest (2005). For a discussion, see Berto (2013). 
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superset of WL. Let us call these notions “hyper-logical”. If we restrict W to WL, then hyper-logical notions 
are simply not representable in our system; in such a situation, it is up to us to decide what to make of 
their logicality. We have two options: 
i. PI3 is simply silent on hyper-logical items. 
ii.  PI3 can say something on Hyper-logical items: they are logical iff their partial image in WL is.  
If, on the other hand, we decide to restrict the group of permutations, we can represent hyper-logical 
items and test their logicality directly. The sensible option then is: 
iii. PI3 is effective for hyper-logical items. 
We can easily show that options (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. Suppose we take route (iii). Take all the 
admissible bijections σ: WL→WL and all the admissible permutations of objects (that is, all the domain-
preserving permutations of WL and all the permutations of objects inside each w in WL). Call invariance 
under such group of permutations invarianceWL. Options (iii) says that hyper-logical items are logical iff 
they are invariantWL. Suppose now that we take option (ii): WL=W. Take some hyper-logical item k: such 
item must have form 〈WN, Y〉, with WN ⊃ WL. The image of k under WL is the result of restricting the 
function f: WN→Y to WL → Y, where the restricted function f’ is such that f’(w) = f(w) for all w in WL. This 
image is invariant iff it is invariant under all the domain-preserving bijections WL → WL and under all 
the admissible permutations of objects in WL. Unsurprisingly, these is exactly invarianceWL. Thus, the 
image of k under WL is invariant iff k is invariantWL.  
The real difference, then, is between options (i) vs options (ii) and (iii). What is the best route to take? 
Take the modal identity =PC defined over WPC, where WPC is the union of WL and the set of logically 
impossible yet conceivable worlds in which there are purple cows. Such =PC is indirectly sensitive to 
purple-cow-ness: if we swap some logically impossible world with purple cows with another impossible 
one with no purple cows, we would upset =PC17. WPC is a superset of WL, and its image under WL is the 
invariant and logical =L, so =PC would be invariant, if we follow option (ii) or (iii). Thusly, my suggestion 
                                                             
17 Since they are impossible worlds, it may be that, in them, there are and there are not purple cows. I am assuming 
that such worlds will not make both ˹There are purple cows˺ and its complement true. 
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is to follow route (i) and admit that invariance is silent on hyper-logical notions. So again, it is best to 
equate W with WL. 
 
1.5   WOMBAT-DISJUNCTION AND OTHER STRANGE ITEMS 
 
In the literature, permutation invariance has been debated a lot. One popular objection is that 
“permutations” are not powerful enough to show that an item is not sensitive to some logically-
extraneous structure. Take the “wombat-disjunction” (WD) example: 
Wombat-Disjunction =df ∨ iff there are wombats in the domain, ∧ otherwise18. 
 Wombat-disjunct satisfies permutation-invariance, but we don’t want it to be logical, because it is 
sensitive to “wombat-ness”, which is not a logical structure (McGee 1996). The problem with wombat-
disjunct is that every permutation will rearrange the objects within the domain, without allowing 
comparisons across domains. So, it does not matter if we swap all the wombats with some dogs: the 
operator will still be assigned disjunction, because the rule through which it is defined forces us to look 
at the domain in general, and the fact that we have swapped every wombat with some dog does not 
make the wombats “go away”: they are still in the domain of the model. Similar issues can be built for 
any type of item in the system:  
Wombat-quantifier =df ∃ iff there are wombats in the domain, ∀ otherwise. 
Wombat-relation =df R iff there are wombats in the domain, G otherwise, for some permutation 
invariant n-ary relations R and G. 
The standard solution, embraced both by McGee (1996) and Sher (1991), is to look at some stronger 
transformation: all isomorphic transformations between domains. In our case, these are all and only the 
bijections between domains, and therefore the stronger test is usually called “bijection-invariance”. In 
general, two models 𝔐 and 𝔐’ are isomorphic iff there is a bijection f: 𝔇𝔐→𝔇𝔐’ satisfying: 
                                                             
18 Here we are assuming that domains vary between models, for extensional languages. Otherwise, we would get 
that, if the cardinality of 𝔇 is n, ˹There are n things˺ would be logically true (Etchemendy 1990).  
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i. For each n-placed relation R of 𝔐 and the corresponding relation R’ of 𝔐’, R(x1 ... xn) if and 
only if R’(f(x1) ...f(xn)), for all x1 ..., xn in 𝔇𝔐.  
ii. For each constant x of 𝔐 and the corresponding constant x’ of 𝔐’, f (x) = x’. (Chang & Keisler 
1990, 21). 
Now, the WD issue is solved: take a model 𝔐1 with a domain with wombats 𝔇1. WD is assigned 
disjunction. Define a bijection between 𝔇1 and an equinumerous domain 𝔇2 of some 𝔐2 in which every 
wombat is replaced with some wolf. Now wombat-disjunct in 𝔇1 is assigned a different item: 
conjunction, and thus it is not invariant.  
Bijection invariance   Where π is a bijection from X to Y, where X and Y are arbitrary domains of 
the same cardinality, call πZ the variation of type Z induced by π. An item k in 
Z is logical iff for every π, πZ(k)=k. 
My suggestion is that WD is quite ambiguous: to which domain is it referring? In extensional 
frameworks we have just one domain for each model, but in our intensional systems we have plenty. If 
we understand “in the domain” as “in a domain of some world”, then the problem with WD is that its 
interpretation-rule is such that it does not have the same output for every world one is valuating it from: 
if one is valuating it from a world that is an element of the truth-set of ˹There are wombats˺, then the 
output is disjunction; it is conjunction otherwise. So, WD is not invariant: we just need to swap a world 
with wombats with another without wombats.  
In this way, we also end up with a theory that may be more powerful than Bijection-Invariance. Take 
this item:  
𝔘: ˹More than the number of humans˺.  
This is a quantifier, whose extension is {XX⊆𝔇: |X|= number of humans}19. Do we want this quantifier to 
be logical? After all, it is sensitive to how many humans there are, which is hardly relevant to logic. Yet, 
it is bijection-invariant, being sensitive only to cardinality. Yet, if there had been more humans, it would 
                                                             
19 Similar examples are presented in McCarthy (1981, 1987) and Hanson (1997). Sher (1991) criticised them. For 
a recent discussion, see Sagi (2015). 
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have had a different extension: logical operators should not be “contingent” in this way. In our 
framework, on the other hand, since the number of humans is contingent, there will be a logically 
possible world with another number of humans, so the quantifier is not PI3 and not logical. 
To avoid a potential misunderstanding here, it is quite essential to make a distinction: when we are 
dealing with models for extensional languages, we should not confuse Wombat-disjunct with another, 
similar operator: 
Wombat-disjunct2(WD2) =df ∨ iff there are (actually) wombats, ∧ otherwise. 
This second operator is different: its meta-language is talking about the presence of wombats in the 
actual world, not in the domain of some model. WD2 is indeed bijection-invariant: it is disjunction in 
every “extensional” model. The “original” wombat-disjunct, on the other hand, is defined through a rule 
that talks about models and domains: WD is disjunction if there are wombats in the domain. A similar, 
subtle distinction is to be made between 𝔘: ˹More than the numbers of humans˺ and 𝔘2, defined as  
𝔘2 =df {XX⊆𝔇: |X| > number of humans in 𝔇𝔐}.  
While the first quantifier is bijection-invariant, in Sher’s system, this second is not, because the number 
of humans is not.  
Proof 1.3. Take a model 𝔐 with domain 𝔇0. Take A0 = {x/ x ∈ 𝔇0 & x is human}. For any domain 
𝔇 of any model, 𝔘2 is mapped in that model to {XX⊆𝔇: |X| > |A0|}. Define a bijection π(𝔇0) = 𝔇1, 
with A1 = {x/ x ∈ 𝔇1 & x is human} and |A1| ≠ |A0|. Now 𝔘2 is mapped to {XX⊆𝔇: |X| > |A1|}. So, 
π〈〈O,V〉,V〉(𝔘2) ≠ 𝔘2. 
We may take 𝔘 and 𝔘2 and WD and WD2 to have different ways of being “contingent”: 𝔘 and WD2 are 
“world” contingent, while 𝔘2 and WD are “model” contingent. The first two change extensions across 
worlds, the seconds change extensions across models. Now, this distinction may be empty, if we take 
models to be worlds, for example. Something similar is mentioned in relation to 𝔘 by Sagi (2015). She 
rightfully highlights the fact that the satisfaction-conditions for these items are not clear: are these 
conditions defined in the “object language”? That is, in the signature of the model? If so, it must be 
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valuated through models, and will be invariant only if “the number of humans” is, which clearly is not. If 
they are not defined in the object language but in some meta-language, then we must be more precise: 
are we talking about what might be the case, what is actually the case or what is the case in the model 
we are handling?  
The conclusion I want to draw is this: my impression is that the distinction between 𝔘 and 𝔘2 and WD 
and WD2 may stop being relevant, when we make the language powerful enough to handle 
intensionality. For, in our system, we can model modal notions. 𝔘 is not permutation invariant now, 
because the number of humans is not the same across worlds. A similar argument works for WD, as we 
saw. So, the system may be able to handle them without resorting to bijections. Having said that, we 
could still build up a Wombat-Disjunction-ish item that survives arbitrary permutations in our 
intensional type theory: 
Wombat-Disjunction3 =df ∨ iff, in 𝔐, ˹There are wombats˺ = ∅; ∧ otherwise. 
Here wombat-disjunction3 is mapped to disjunction if wombats are logically impossible. Now, it might 
be that in no model wombats are logically impossible. Yet, do we want this item to be logical? After all, 
it is sensitive to wombat-ness, in an indirect way. Yet, it is PI3 invariant. One might say that this item is 
hyper-logical, and thus the theory is silent on it. I would rather conclude that this seems like a glitch in 
the system, rather than a big objection. Yet, it still suggests that it would be better to switch to a bijection-
invariance framework. I will still stick to permutation-invariance, however, for two reasons: it is 
technically easier, and it has the same results, for items that do not weirdly shift interpretation across 
models like this one. 
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CHAPTER 2: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON FORMALITY. 
 
This chapter is about the limits of standard permutation invariance and how to fix them. I will try to 
sketch a novel theory of logicality, with a better philosophical foundation. 
In section 2.1 I will discuss the limits of standard invariance as a way of spelling out what formality is. 
I put forward two main criticisms. The first is that invariance tests are not explanatory: the fact that an 
item is invariant is usually not a reason, by itself, to explain its logicality. Rather, the authors tend to 
draw from some external, independent theory of logicality the justification for the results they reach. 
The second criticism is that what comes out invariant will invariably depend on the algebraic structure 
of the system at hand. Different semantics will result in different invariant items. Yet, logical notions 
should not vary across different systems in this way. 
In section 2.2, I will introduce my theory. The general idea is that the concept of information can play 
a major role in defining what is logical and what is not. Logical notions are notions that are sensitive 
only to structural aspects of information. To be logical, they must satisfy two requirements:  
I. They must perform an operation that checks only structural aspects of information. I call 
this “formal computability”. 
II. They must preserve formal computability under arbitrary permutations of their inputs. 
In the remaining sections I set out my theory in the following steps: in section 2.3 I define the concept 
of formal operation, where a formal operation is an operation that is sensitive only to structural aspects 
of information. I will put forward some candidates. In section 2.4 I set out the technical system for 
“formal computability”. In section 2.5 I define what is the basic formal system for describing information, 
and how to transform it. In section 2.6 I finally suggest two different versions of “formal-computability 
invariance”. I argue that something is a logical notion iff it is formal-computability invariant. The next 
chapter will show the usefulness of the new theory, and its ties to the “old” permutation invariance. 
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2.1 What permutation-invariance is missing. 
 
Why should we think that permutation-invariance is a useful test for formality? What is its implicit, 
philosophical ground? What Tarski (1966), Mautner (1946) and Mowstowski (1957) had in mind, 
probably, was a technical way of implementing a popular and old idea: logic is concerned with the most 
abstract and general concepts, and thus logical notions must be the most abstract and general notions. 
So, if a notion is sensitive to some specific “structure” of the world, then it is not “general” enough to be 
logical. Arbitrary auto-morphisms of the universe will ensure that all such extraneous “sensitivities” are 
discarded. At least, this was the initial idea.  
The following popular improvements did not change the core presupposition of the theory: that logical 
notions “abstract” away from matter. This is clearly reflected by the way the Tarskian account has been 
revised over the years: the main issue was that its choice of transformation may not ensure enough 
abstraction: bijection invariance takes care of even more “extraneous structure”, and it is better suited 
as a test for logicality (Sher 1991), even though, again, it may not be powerful enough (McGee 1996). 
Strong-homomorphism invariance is even a stricter test, and it was designed to abstract away from 
cardinality, as well: logic should be even more general than mathematics (Feferman 1999). In this way, 
identity goes out of the picture, as well, because it is not homomorphism-invariant: it is not abstract 
enough. 
2.1.1 Standard Invariance is not explanatory 
 
The best way to show the limits of standard invariance accounts is to show the limits of the picture we 
have just drawn. For it may be true that logic is the most abstract subject of all, but it is still about 
something, in some sense. By that, I mean that logic is still concerned with “structures” of reality: it is 
not the absence of structure. Thus, a more powerful test may not mean a more accurate one. Intuitively, 
the test should not just “abstract away” from everything, but from all and only what is not relevant to 
logic. And what is not relevant to logic, if not what is not logical structure? Therefore, the test should 
check that a notion is sensitive only to logical structure, by abstracting away from all and only non-
logical structures. Yet, how can we be sure of the accuracy of the test? Well, we first need a theory that 
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tell us what logical structure is. Then, we need to build up a test that mirrors this theory. In this way, the 
very fact that an item “passes” the test is a sufficient justification for its logicality.  
Do we find such strategy in the literature on invariance? Not quite. Invariance theorists do not usually 
give any such explanatory test. Rather, what they seem to do is this: they take an independently obtained 
extension as desideratum, and “build up” the invariance test so that it happens to roughly pick out the 
extension they have chosen “before-hand”. So, for example, Lindenbaum & Tarski (1935) show that the 
standards connectives definable in simple type theory (that of Principia Mathematica) are all 
permutation invariant. McGee (1996) generalized this result and proved that an operation is 
permutation invariant if and only if it is describable in a language with, as only primitives, 
paradigmatically logical items: identity, substitution, disjunction, negation and existential 
quantification. So, these authors have already a rough idea on the what the results of the test should be, 
and they seem to “swap around” the order of explanation: it is not that what passes the test is logical 
because it passes the test, but rather the test is accurate because it gives out the “right” results, that we 
already know to be right from independent sources. The same goes with Feferman (1999); at the very 
beginning of his paper he says: “I have been moving more and more to the position that the first order 
predicate logic has a privileged role in our thought” (31-2). He has an objective in mind: making logical 
all and only first order predicate notions. This objective is independently motivated, and its ground is 
not in homomorphism invariance. He then builds up the test so that it happens to pick out, roughly, only 
first order predicate notions, identity excluded. Even in the most recent debates we find something 
similar: Bonnay (2008) takes partial isomorphisms as the “right” transformations to look at, because 
they avoid the Continuum Hypothesis problem, by making logical only “finite” cardinality quantifiers. 
There is no special story about why logicality should be reflected by partial isomorphisms invariance. 
Rather, there is a problem that is quite independent of invariance: we want logical notions not to include 
a particular class of items. We then devise the test “bottom-up”, so that it does not pick out that class. 
Again, it is not that what passes the test is logical because it passes the test, but rather the test is accurate 
because it gives out what we planned to be the right results. 
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The problem with this strategy, as rightly noted by Novaes, is that it is a kind of “reverse engineering” 
(2014, 87). There is a price to pay, if one devises a test by reverse engineering the already obtained 
results: one loses explanatory power. A theory of logicality should not just be extensionally adequate, 
but also explanatory: it should tell us why these are exactly the right notions to pick out. Yet, if one starts 
from the results already, no test will tell you that. Suppose I disagree with Feferman: first-order logic is 
not the only “genuine” logic, and cardinality quantifiers are logical. Feferman will reply with some 
objections, like the issue with the Continuum Hypothesis discussed in section 1.1. Yet, none of the 
arguments he will offer will hinge upon homomorphisms. That is, he will never say that his are the 
“right” logical notions because they are homomorphism invariant. There is not “special”, explanatory 
link between homomorphisms and logicality: they just happen to pick out what Feferman already 
thought to be the right extension for logical constants, in the first place.  
This issue becomes even more serious in intensional frameworks, where our intuitions on what counts 
logical are less clear-cut. Again, Novaes made a good point about S4 operators: they are not permutation 
invariant, and yet why should they be not logical? 
The point is not that the S4 modal operators should necessarily be counted as logical; rather, the 
point is what independent motivations would justify that the S4 modal operators do not count as 
logical, whereas their counterparts interpreted on universal frames do. What is the fundamental, 
philosophical difference between these two cases besides the fact that they are interpreted on 
different structures? (2014, 94). 
I am inclined to agree. Given that the test itself does not reflect and it is not “build up” from a criterion 
of logicality, it is not persuasive to say that S4 operators are not logical because they do not pass the test. 
Why should we trust that permutations or bijections or homomorphisms will “take care” only of non-
logical structure? Maybe they undergenerate. After all, these tests have been devised through “reverse 
engineering”, so that the test itself is not really part of the explanation of why its results are logical. 
Moreover, the extension the test was designed to pick is usually specific to a particular logical 
framework: extensional logic. With such conditions in place, how can we be sure that, when applying 
the same test in intensional frameworks, the results will be adequate? Thus, here comes the question: 
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what independent ground do we have for making S4 operators not-logical, if invariance is not per se 
explanatory? 
To sum up: if invariance theories are theories of what logical notions are, they need to tell us two 
things: which notion is logical and why. Invariance theorists usually have already in mind a rough idea 
of the extension of logical notions, and they build up the test “bottom-up”, so that it gives out that 
extension. This is problematic, because now the test is not explanatory. What one should do is rather 
this: she should first argue for an independently motivated theory of logicality, and then build up a test 
that mirrors the theory, and see what results she gets. Any result will automatically have a better 
philosophical ground, given that the test itself mirrors the underlying theory: the fact that the item 
passes the test is itself a corroboration for its logicality. Moreover, we can be more confident that, when 
we apply the test in different frameworks, we will get plausible results. 
2.1.2 Invariant items are impersistent 
 
I believe it is desirable that something should “come out” logical regardless of the semantic system we 
choose to model it. Call this characteristic “persistence”: 
Persistence. An item is persistent if and only if its logicality persists across different semantical 
systems. 
Logical items, in the standard invariance theories, are helplessly impersistent: their logicality strictly 
depend on how we model our notions, and on the formal properties of the system at hand. For obviously, 
what is invariant under arbitrary transformations of a system depends on the features of the system. I 
will give an example of such behaviour. Suppose that, when we model propositions, instead of using 
types W and V, we take them as elements of a primitive type P of propositions. We then define arbitrary 
permutations on P. Take conjunction: it takes every two true propositions to their meet: the smallest 
proposition that makes them both true. In this “propositional semantics” conjunction is not permutation 
invariant: we just need to swap their meet with some other proposition. We can do it because elements 
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in P are “primitive”20. Thus, if we apply permutation invariance in this new system, we upset what is 
invariant, and thus we change what is logical. This should not be: what is logical should be more 
independent of the semantics choices we make, and the test should ideally “track” what is logical across 
different semantics. 
Sher realized this problem, when she says: 
When it comes to sentential connectives, we can regard their formality as based on "not 
distinguishing the identity of propositions." Intuitively, sentential connectives are formal iff they 
distinguish only patterns of propositions possessing truth values and nothing else. The 
interpretation of logical connectives as (denoting) Boolean truth functions reflects just this 
intuition (1996, 678). 
Sher seems to have in mind a model like our P. However, she also seems to be contradicting herself: first 
she says that formal notions should not distinguish the “identity of propositions”, suggesting that we 
should set arbitrary automorphisms of P, at least. Immediately after, however, she says that sentential 
connectives are formal/logical if they do distinguish something: the “alethic structure” of P. So, they are 
not invariant under arbitrary permutations of P. So, what should we do? Maybe Sher is suggesting that 
we should limit the transformations the test is looking at: we should not “upset” the alethic structure. 
Yet, why is that? If we decided that permutation/bijection invariance is the “right” test, and we apply it 
in this system, we should not preserve alethic distinctions, because alethic distinctions are not 
preserved under arbitrary permutations of propositions. This very fact should be evidence that alethic 
distinctions are not logical structure, since we trusted that the test itself should preserve all and only 
logical structure. Yet, again, given that bijection invariance is not really part of the explanation of the 
logicality of the results, Sher is happy to limit the class of transformations one should look at. Her 
justification is that we have the intuition that logical connectives are Boolean functions. Again, as 
invariance theorists usually do, she is taking before-hand a favourite set of logical notions and she is 
reverse-engineering the test so that it picks out that extension. 
                                                             
20 I discuss this in more details in section 3.2. 
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To sum up: in a “propositional” semantics like the one just described, permutation invariance, along 
with any stricter test, heavily under-generates, while in a modal semantics we saw that it has some 
plausible results. Yet, why should we “prefer” a modal semantics to a propositional, when we apply a 
test for logicality? Since logical notions are logical independently of the system we choose to model 
them, the results of the test, too, should be persistent across different semantical systems. Failure of 
persistence is also tied to the fore-mentioned problem of “trusting” the test when we apply it to 
intensional notions. If one reverse-engineers the test in a particular semantics, then the test will 
probably have “plausible” results only in that semantics. When we “switch” to another system, we may 
be forced to make additional assumptions to force the right results, for example by limiting the class of 
permutations. 
 
2.2 A Way out? Information first 
 
My idea is that we can ground invariance theories only after we have discussed what logic is. One 
should start from a criterion of logicality, and build up the test so that it clearly mirrors the criterion. 
The first thing to do, then, is asking: “What is logical structure?”. Now, it seems clear to me that one 
cannot tell what logical structure is if not by sketching first what logic is. Only then, she will be able to 
suggest some plausible candidates. What is logic, then? This is a question that is so complicated and, at 
the same time so important, that it surely deserves another dissertation. And yet, I somehow have now 
to answer it, if I want to conclude this one21. In some sense, I find myself in a conundrum, and the only 
way out, as far as I can see, is to make some assumptions. I need to assume a particular stance on what 
logic is, and build up from there. If someone has a radically different view, she will be rightfully 
disappointed. I hope that there will be some “overlapping consensus” on what logical structure is, even 
though everyone starts from different perspectives on what logic is.  
The general framework I will be assuming for my theory can be summarized as follows: logic is about 
information, in a special way. Logic is the most abstract study of “controlled” information exchange. 
                                                             
21 I am sure I will be able to discuss this more thoroughly in my future doctoral research. 
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Information is everywhere, and in some sense, everything is “about” information. Biology is about a 
specific kind of information: information about biological structures. Medicine, too, is about a specific 
kind of information: information about how our bodies work, and maybe about how to make them work 
properly. Yet, logic is somehow special in this respect, because it pays attention only to the structural 
aspects of it. For example, the fact that a piece of information is “contained” in another piece of 
information, or the fact that two pieces of information have some information in common. From this 
point of view, logic is blind to most specific properties of information. For example, it does not “pay 
attention” to the fact that a piece of information is about dogs, while another is not; or to the fact that a 
piece of information is believed by a certain person, and not by some other; or, again, to the fact that a 
piece of information is critical to my survival, while another is entirely useless.  
Logic is insensitive to what information is about. However, this does not entail that logic is not 
concerned with something: it is about the structural aspects of information. If information conveys 
content, one can put it in this way: logic is not about the content of information, but about information 
itself. Let us give an example. Take the information conveyed by the proposition ˹Fido is a black dog˺ 
and that conveyed by ˹ Fido is the dog walking down the street˺, call them infon1 and infon2, respectively. 
They have many properties, like being about the same object, and being about Fido. Yet, logic is totally 
blind to that: the only thing it registers is, for example, that infon1 and infon2 have some information in 
common, whatever that is. Logic abstracts away from what they have in common, and from what they 
are about (their content); what is left is their mere structure: the fact that there is a communality of 
information between them. 
To sum up, I will argue that a notion is logical iff it shares the same sensitivities and insensitivities that 
logic, as a whole, possesses. What logic is sensitive to are all and only the structural aspects of 
information. Thus, a notion is logical iff it is sensitive only to the structural aspects of information. For 
example, a notion that is “sensitive” to usefulness to survival cannot be logical: not having this property 
is necessary for logicality. On the other hand, a notion that is sensitive only to communalities of 
information is logical: this is a sufficient condition for logicality. Formal notions are “formal” for two 
reasons:  
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i. Because they behave formally: they handle information only by testing its structural 
aspects. 
ii. Because they abstract away from the non-structural aspects of information. 
The first is a sort of 2-formality requirement: logicality is about what logical notions do. The second is 
more like a 1-formality requirement: logical notions are formal because they abstract away from matter. 
In my theory, these two reasons are mirrored by the two requirements for logicality I will spell out: 
logical notion must behave in a certain way, and they must behave in that way regardless of the pieces 
of information they are fed with. The first bit will be implemented by suggesting some basic 
“computation” that we may take as describing a “formal operation”. The notion’s behaviour must be 
describable through a combination of such basic computations. The second bit will be handled by 
transforming arbitrarily the information content the notion is taking as input for its computation: the 
notion must be computable by a formal operation under arbitrary permutations of inputs. 
2.2.1 Digression: MacFarlane’s theory. 
 
MacFarlane (2000) builds up a theory that shares some similarities with mine. His proposal consists 
in defining a set of structures that we take as “intrinsic”22 and should not be disrupted by permutations. 
We “save” the structure by delimiting the group of permutations we look at, for each type: all and only 
the intrinsic-structure preserving permutations. His general definition is: 
MarcFarlane PI A semantic value k in type Z is permutation-invariant iff for all intrinsic structure-
preserving permutations σA , σB , σC , etc., of the basic types A, B, C, etc., σZ (k) = k 
(2000, 210). 
I do agree with MacFarlane on the limits of standard invariance accounts. I also partially agree on the 
solution: I agree on the necessity of specifying a set of “intrinsic/logical” structures. Yet, I am not sure 
this will be sufficient. MacFarlane, on the other hand, shares with standard-invariance theorists the 
opinion that our chosen transformation-invariance will also identify the logical behaviours: all and only 
                                                             
22 I don’t like the label because “intrinsic” does not seem relevant. In what sense the partition between human and 
non-human things is not “intrinsic” to type O? Yet, it is not logical. I prefer to call it by its obvious name: “logical 
structure”. 
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the transformation-invariant ones. My strategy may be more complicated, but I think it checks in a more 
reliable way if the item is performing some logical operation, and it has therefore more explanatory 
power. For my theory is two-fold: there is a “logical-behaviour” bit and an “abstraction” bit. The “logical 
behaviour” bit should be done by specifying a set of “acceptable” formal behaviours. Then, the 
“abstraction bit” is done by ensuring that such behaviour is not “by chance”, but really general: the 
operator should act formally under arbitrary permutations of informational inputs. This have 
consequences: for example, in my theory cardinality quantifiers are not logical, because they fail to 
represent a formal operation (more in section 3.3). In MacFarlane’s, they are logical simply because they 
are invariant.  
 
2.3 The Structure of Information 
 
The theory I will sketch in this dissertation puts information first and tries to extract logical structure 
from information-structure. Logic is the study of controlled information exchange. Logical notions are 
all and only the notions that are sensitive only to the structural aspects of information. This is tested in 
two steps: the notion must check only structural aspects of information, and it should do so under 
arbitrary permutations of the information-content it receives as input. To make clear how we are going 
to implement this idea in our system, we need to specify first what information is, by putting forward 
some candidates for “structural aspects of information”. These candidates will determine what 
operations formal notions can perform, and define what “formal-computability” means.  
What are formal operations, then? I will write down a list of them. The list will inevitably be 
incomplete. Since logic is about the structural aspects of information, an operation is formal iff it can be 
performed by being “sensitive” only to structural aspects of information. So, for example, the operation 
that takes every sentence about humans to truth and everything else to false is not a logical operation 
because, to perform it, the notion must be “aware” of the non-structural partitions, in the space of 
information, between what is human and what is not. The question then is: what are the structural 
aspects of information? The followings seem to me interesting candidates, worth discussing: 
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i.  “Information-containment”.  
There is a clear enough sense in which information is ordered by a notion of “containment”: an infon 
contains another iff it conveys all that the other conveys. So, for example, the information ˹There are red 
and blue roses˺ conveys the information that ˹There are red roses˺. “Containment” is probably just a 
metaphor: it is not essentially set-theoretic, but we call it “containment” because it helps us understand 
what is going on. Formally, this relation is a partial order in the space of information: it is reflexive, 
transitive and antisymmetric. It is reflexive, because every infon contains all the information it has. It is 
antisymmetric because if two infons “conveys each other”, they must contain the same information, and 
if so, since infons are nothing but clusters of information, they are just the same infon. Transitivity is 
reminiscent of the so called “Xerox principle” (Dretske 1981, 57): if α carries some information β, and β 
carries some information γ, then α carries γ, as well. This seems to be inherent and essential to our very 
concept of information. “Containment” goes by many names. In situation-theory, for example, it is called 
“persistence” (Barwise and Perry 1983).  
The corresponding operation for “containment” is, maybe unoriginally, the “information-containment-
operation”: the operation that checks if one piece of information conveys another. Containment, even 
though it is not essentially set-theoretic, will usually be modelled as the subset relation, in the scope of 
this dissertation. For example, a proposition P contains proposition Q iff ⟬Q⟭ ⊆ ⟬P⟭, where ⟬X⟭ is the truth-
set of X. In set-theoretic terms, containment is always the subset relation and not the membership-
relation (more on this in section 3.1). 
ii. Trivial and Empty information.  
In the system of information, we usually assume that there is a minimum and a maximum for every 
“type” of information, defined by containment ⊑:  
• k is the maximum of a certain type of information Y = k is the element such that ∀x∈ Y(x ⊑ k &  
∀z∈Y(k ⊑ z → k=z))  
• k is the minimum of Y = k is the element such that ∀x∈ Y(k ⊑ x & ∀z∈Y (z ⊑ k → k=z)).   
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Information may come in different types and, always, elements in different types are not linked by 
containment. For example, if infon(a) answers the question “Which number is even?” and infon(b) 
conveys the information: “There are roses”, these two infons do not bear any containment relation: one 
is about objects, one is propositional. One may be modelled as a set of objects: the set of even numbers, 
and the other, being propositional, may be modelled as a set of worlds. Yet, each of them has a unique 
maximum and minimum, in their type: a “trivial” information that contains every other infon of that 
type, and a null information that is contained in all the infons of that type. These are structural aspects 
of the space of information, and we will usually refer to them as 1 and 0. What they mean depends on 
the kind of information we are representing, in general. For example, in the set of truth-values, they are 
Truth and Falsity, in the modal space, they are WL and the empty set; in the “objectual space”, the set of 
all objects O and the empty set. This structural aspect is linked with the popular importance of alethic 
distinctions in logic. Truth matters to logic: in my theory, this is reflected by the fact that Truth and 
Falsity are structural aspects of information, being the maximum and minimum of the alethic space. The 
corresponding operation a formal notion can perform is this: at any point of the computation, it can 
“write down” 1 or 0, whatever they mean. 
iii. Communalities of information. 
Logic registers what is common between two infons, in the most abstract sense. That is, it does not 
register how two pieces of information have something in common: it does not say, for example, whether 
they are both about cats. It just says that they have some information in common, whatever that 
information might be. This “structure” in the logical space is fundamental enough, and a plausible 
candidate for logicality. The main formal operations mirrored by such structure are two. The first is the 
operation that takes a set of infons Σ and gives, as output, the meet ⋀Σ (the infon that has all and only 
the information common to every member of Σ). The second is the operation that takes a set of infons Σ 
and gives, as output, the join ⋁Σ (the smallest infon that has all the information of every member of Σ). 
This structure is probably reducible to containment, since we can define meet and join through it: 
• ⋀{x, y} = z∈ ℐ/z ⊑ x & z ⊑ y & ∀i∈ ℐ((i ⊑ x & i ⊑ y) → (i ⊑ z)). 
• ⋁{x, y} = z∈ ℐ/x ⊑ z & y ⊑ z & ∀i∈ ℐ((x ⊑ i & y ⊑ i) → (z ⊑ i)). 
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Meet and join are the intensional counterpart of conjunction and disjunction, respectively, when we are 
modelling information as sets of possible worlds23. However, meet and join can take on different forms 
when the space of information is not Boolean.  
iv. The place of an infon in the space of information. 
This is one of the most structural aspects of information. The correlated formal operation is 
complementation: the operation that takes an infon α to the largest infon it excludes: αC. The idea is that 
to understand what an infon carries is to know what it excludes. It is tightly correlated with 
containment: αC contains everything that is excluded by α. 
v. Compatibility of information. 
Compatibility is one of the most general boundaries in the space of information. It is related to 
complementation: the complement of an infon is the biggest infon incompatible with it. Its 
correspondent operation checks whether two infons are compatible with each other. Usually, 
compatibility is reducible to other structures. So, for example, α is compatible with β iff their meet is not 
empty, or if the complement of α does not contain β. 
So, to sum up, the hypothesis I will entertain is that the behaviour of a formal item will be describable 
by a combination of the formal operations just mentioned. The most important structure is containment. 
The list is provisional and up for upgrades. In the scope of this dissertation, I will focus just on those 
candidates. We can already gain insights on the reasons why some of the most striking examples of 
logical notions are logical. Take disjunction and conjunction, for example: why are they formal? The 
information-theory explains this by saying that they are logical because they are sensitive only to 
“communalities of information”. We can check this by looking at the operation they perform: it is one 
instance of the information-structural operation that takes two pieces of information to their join and 
to their meet, respectively. Of course, we are still lacking the “abstraction” part: we want to be sure that 
                                                             
23 In extensional languages, the information in a proposition is either T or F. Thus, for example, conjunction is 
still the meet, because it checks what is the information common to some propositions: either all of it or none. 
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disjunction and conjunction perform the information-structural operation regardless of the 
informational inputs they receive. This will be developed in section 2.6.  
 
2.4 Formal computability 
 
We said that the behaviour of a logical notion should be describable by a combination of formal 
operations. To make all of this more precise we need a clear definition of “being describable by formal 
operations”. Call this characteristic “formal-computability” (FC). When is a notion formally-computable? 
First, let us do it in the “informal” way. We can describe a formal operation by specifying its inputs and 
its rules of transformation. Inputs, intuitively, are countable sequences of infons (α, β, γ, δ, …) called 
input-sequences. When we define an operation we also specify the length of the sequences it takes as 
input. We will label |s| the length of a sequence s: if we take a sequence to be a function from natural 
numbers to the set of elements of the sequence, then |s| is the cardinality of the range24. Where x, y and 
z are variables for infons in the input sequence, the basic rules of a formal operation are the following: 
1. Check x ⊑ y 
2. Calculate ⋀{x, y, …, z} 
3. Calculate ⋁{x, y, …, z} 
4. Calculate xC 
5. Check βC ⋢ α. 
6. Write x, where x is an element of the input sequence.  
The first rule-type is “information-containment”. Rule (2) and (3) are operations that register 
“communalities of information”: meet and join. Rule (4) is about what a piece of information 
excludes: it takes you to the relative complement of x in the type of information of x. (5) is 
compatibility. Rule (6) “recalls” the inputs. 
                                                             
24 In the scope of this dissertation, by “range” I always mean the image of the domain in the codomain, and not the 
codomain as a whole. 
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Definition 1 A formal-operation is whatever deterministic computation with a unique output can 
be done by taking as input sequences of infons, and setting any appropriate sequence of 
rules of type (1) … (6). 
The F-operation must have a single infon as output, for every fully specified input. The F-operation, 
thus, will be a function. To compute relations, we can have, as a rule, that an n-ary relation R is formal 
iff its unique valuation 𝒱R is, where its valuation is the function 𝒱R: (A×B×, …, ×N) → {0, 1} such that 
𝒱R(a, b, …, n) = 1 iff (a, b, …, n) ∈ R, 0 otherwise.  The sequence of rules must be “appropriate”, in the 
sense that it must picture a meaningful operation, and not just a bunch of actions that are not related to 
one another (more on this later). The F-operation must be deterministic, as well: there is only one 
possible output. So, the following cannot be an F-operation: 
Fake F-operation Input: sequences of type (0, 1, α, β).  
Rules:  
i. check α⊑β.  
ii. If yes print 0 or 1.  
This is not admissible, because the operation can “choose” to follow one disjunct or the other. This also 
takes care of potential trivializations, as we will see: we want logical items to act always in the same F-
computational way, regardless of the infons they receive as input. Suppose some k is F-computable by X 
only when it takes as arguments (a, b, …n) and by Y only with arguments (o, p, …, z). Then k is arguably 
“aware” of the specific identities of the arguments and should not be logical. Yet, using indeterministic 
operations, one could just make up the new formal-operation X ∨ Y to describe the behaviour of k, 
bypassing the uniqueness requirement.  
Now we can have a first, rough definition of F-computability:  
Definition 2. Take an item k and a formal operation Χ. k is computable by X iff, for any tuple (s,y) 
∈ k, there is a tuple (s’, y) ∈ X, where s and s’ are sequences, and s has only elements of s’. 
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Basically, for some item k to be computable by an operation X, it must be that, for any instance of k, there 
is an instance of the formal operation (FO) that takes, as input, the argument k has taken and maybe 
something else, and gives out the same output. More technically, there must be a “composition function” 
Comp: FO-1 ∘ k such that Comp(s) = s’ iff k(s) = FO(s’) and s has only elements of s’. 
A first problem with this definition is that some operation may compute k in non-formal ways. That is, 
it may be that, even though the formal operation can simulate k, it does so in a way that is sensitive to 
some irrelevant structure. For example, take a quantifier like ˹Every dog˺. It takes predicates true of 
every dog to 1 and everything else to 0. “Dog-ness” is not a structural aspect of information, but we can 
still “sneak it in”, in the way we let a formal operation compute the quantifier. Take Compatibility, for 
example: for every X such that (Every dog)(X) = 1, set Compatibility (X, O). For every other Y, set 
Compatibility (X, ∅). Now ˹Every dog˺ is computed by compatibility: whenever the output is True, we 
are checking the compatibility of the predicate with the trivial predicate, and whenever the output is 
False, we are checking the compatibility with the empty predicate (that is never satisfied). To avoid this 
trick, we can ask that the FO does the same thing, for every instance of the computation. A way to ensure 
this is by complicating the requirements for the composition function to hold.  
Definition 2’. Take an n-ary item k and a formal operation Χ. K is computable by X iff there exists a 
function Comp: X-1 ∘ k such that:  
a) For every s and s’, Comp(s) = s’ iff k(s) = X(s’)  
b) For every s, Comp(s) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)s and (bm)m>n = k, where (ax)s 
is the x-th element of s. 
The definition says that the FO, in order to compute some K(a, b, …, n), must take a sequence that is the 
exact copy of (a, b, …, n) up to n, and then, if it takes more elements, these are constants: they are the 
same for every instance of the computation. Now the trick we used before is not available, anymore: the 
FO cannot check the compatibility with the empty set for some elements, and with the trivial set with 
some others.  
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There are more complications ahead, however. We can show that, using only rules of type (6), any  
n-ary function whose output is some constant k is F-computable. 
Proof 2.1. Let K be an arbitrary n-ary function whose range is a singleton. Define this formal 
operation U (Universal-operation): 
i. inputs: any sequence of length n+1.  
ii. Rule: write (an+1).  
Suppose K(a, b, …, n) = p, for any (a, b, …, n). U(a, b, …, n, p) = p, because (an+1) is p. Moreover, (a, 
b, …, n, p) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (a, b, …, n) and (bm)m>n = p, for any argument of 
U. So U computes K for any (a, b, …, n).  
This is not as catastrophic as it looks, for the fact that such items are formally computable does not entail 
that they are so regardless of the specific content they are fed with. Thus, the theory is not bluntly 
trivialized by this result. In fact, when we introduce the invariance part, we can show that such items 
will never be logical unless their output is 1 or 0 (the maximum or the minimum of the type of 
information their inputs have, respectively).  
It is time to implement a better framework to work on. For we have still no clear and precise idea about 
what counts as an “admissible” formal operation: what does it mean, exactly, that the sequence of rules 
should be “admissible”? We just need to make our framework more precise. For that, I need some very 
simple automata theory. I will use Turing machines, even though they may be an overkill here, since I 
suspect that the computation we are after can be done by simpler automata25.  
Definition of a Turing Machine 26(Hopcroft et al. 2001: 8) A Turing Machine can be informally 
described as an infinite tape with a head that can read what is written in each cell of the tape. The 
head can read a symbol on a cell, move to the next cell, (over)write something on it, and move 
either left, right or not move at all. Mathematically, it is defined with a tuple of seven elements 〈S, 
                                                             
25 I am inclined to think that pushdown automata, which are less powerful automata, can do the job. Finite state 
automata may not be enough, though. 
26 There are other equivalent definitions of Turing Machines, with slightly different instructions. For example, 
Turing himself used instructions like “In tuple 〈s,a〉, print symbol b and move right/left/null (1937). 
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Σ, Γ, δ, s0, b, F〉. S is a set of linearly ordered states: the “cells” of the tape. Σ is the input alphabet of 
the machine: the set of symbols the automaton can write. Γ is the set of tape symbols: it is always 
a (sometimes improper) superset of Σ. s0 is the initial state. F is the set of final states, with F⊆S. 
“b” is the blank symbol: the initial symbol written on any cell. Finally, δ is the transition function 
S×Γ → S×Σ×D. It defines the instruction the Turing Machine can take. D means “direction”: it can 
be left, right or null, usually referred to as -1, +1, 0. Informally, the instructions have always this 
meaning: when in state s you read x, go in the next state q, write y and move right/left/don’t move. 
A Turing Machine is deterministic iff for any tuple S×Γ, there is only one instruction.  
It is important to make something clear from the start: for our purposes, we do not need to make the 
Turing Machine do the actual work (it may probably be not even possible). By that, I mean that it is not 
up to the Turing machine to actually check whether α is contained in β, or to calculate the meet ⋀{x, y, 
…, z} of infons x, y, …z. What we will need the machine to do is just register the result of the test, and act 
accordingly, by finally printing the right output. So, technically, it is more correct to say that there are 
three actors in play, here: the item whose formality we are testing, a formal operation and a Turing 
machine that registers what the formal operation is doing. However, to make things easier and more 
concise, I will just speak as if the Turing machine and the formal operation are the same thing.  
For our purposes, we do not need D, so we can take any instruction to have, as D, the null-direction 0. 
Usually, I will just omit D all-together. As a rule, every Turing Machine will have printed, in its initial 
state, the input sequence. That is, if the input-sequence is (a, b, c), then on s0, at the start of the 
computation, we find symbol (a, b, c)27. This rule is not necessary, but it makes things easier. The rules 
(1)-(6) above must be replaced by Turing instructions. We will model them as actions on couples of 
〈state, symbol〉. Informally, we will say something like: when in state (s,a), perform action [.]. Atomic 
actions, then, are functions defined over tuples S×Σ, which correspond to arguments and values of δ. 
That is, [..](s,a) = (s’, b) iff δ(s, a) = (s’, b, 0).  Compounded actions are sequences of simple actions. For 
                                                             
27 Note that the input is an ordered n-tuple.  
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example, [.][..](s,a) means: first, apply action [..] to (s,a), obtaining (s’, a’); then, apply action [.] to the 
resulting (s’, a’). For our purposes, the following will be all and only the tests our machine can perform: 
1. [1] (sn, a) = (sn+1, 1). 
2. [0] (sn, a) = (sn+1, 0). 
3. [⊑] (sn, (x,y)) = [1] (sn, (x,y)) iff x ⊑ y, [0] (sn, (x,y)) otherwise. That is, in state n read two 
symbols x and y, move to the next state sn+1 and print 1 iff x ⊑ y, print 0 otherwise. 
4. [⋀] (sn, a) = (sn+1, ⋀ {x/ x ∈ a}). That is, in state n read a = (x, y, …, z) move to the next state 
sn+1 and print the meet of x, y, …, z. 
5. [⋁] (sn, a) = (sn+1, ⋁ {x/ x ∈ a}). That is, in state n read a = (x, y, …, z), move to the next state 
sn+1 and print the join of x, y, …, z. 
6. [¬] (sn, x) = (sn+1, xC). That is, in state n read x, move to the next state sn+1 and print the 
complement of x. 
7. [C] (sn, a) = [⋀] (sn, a) iff ⋀ {x/ x ∈ a} = 0; [1] [⋀] (sn, a) otherwise. That is, in state n read a 
= (x, y, …, z), go to the next state and print their meet. If the meet is not 0, go to the next 
state and print 1.  
8. [input, b] (sn, a) = (sn+1, b), where b is some sequence whose elements are in the input 
sequence or on some state sm with m ≤ n. 
As a rule, the set Σ of symbols a formal TM can write is defined inductively: 
• If z ∈ input-sequence, or z=1 or z=0, then z ∈ Σ 
• If z = ⋀ {x, y…, n} or ⋁ {x, y…, n} or xC, or x⊑z or z⊑x, then z ∈ Σ, where x, y, …, n ∈ Σ. 
Basically, Σ is the closure under meet, join, complementation and containment of the set of elements of 
the input-sequence plus 1 and 0.  
Now, to (re)define formal computability, we just write: 
Formal Turing Machine A Formal Turing Machine is any deterministic Turing Machine whose only 
possible moves are combinations of actions of type (1)-(8). 
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Formal Computability  K is Formally-Computable =df there is an FTM such that there exists a 
function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ K such that:  
a) For every s and s’, Comp(s) = s’ iff K(s) = FTM(s’)  
b) For every s, Comp(s) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)s and 
(bm)m>n = k, where (ax)s is the x-th element of s). 
Some comments on the action-types. Action (7) says that, to register computability between x and y, 
the machine will first write on the next cell the meet of x and y. If it is empty, the machine has nothing 
else to do, since the join is 0, which is also the result of the compatibility test. If it is not empty, then the 
machine writes 1.  
Rule (8) is needed to let the machine work on some element of the input, or to “add” some transformed 
element to some element in the input. To see why we need (8), suppose we want to model the operation 
that checks if two items are contained in each other: call it “symmetric containment”. This is a formal 
operation, in our sense. Yet, without (8) we cannot compute it, for we would need to apply the 
containment test twice: first to (a,b) then to (b,a), where (a,b) is the input sequence. Yet, suppose a and 
b are contained in each other. Then the result of applying [⊑] first to (a,b) will be 1. So, now the machine 
reads 1 and does not know how to reiterate the test: we thus recall the inputs, using an instance of (8), 
and then re-apply the containment test. Symmetric containment is thus formally computable by this 
FTM: 
• Input: sequences (x, y) 
• F = {(s1, 0), s3}. 
• Instructions: 
o [⊑](s0, input). 
o [input, (y,x)] (s1, 1). 
o [⊑] (s2, (y,x)). 
Here, the FTM first checks if x is in y. If not, it halts, printing 0. If yes, it goes on printing (y, x). It then 
checks if y is in x. If not, it halts printing 0; if yes, it halts printing 1. A graph makes this very intuitive: 
49 
 
 
Table 3 
Something similar happens for material implication. A → B is equivalent to ¬A ∨ B. Without (8), we could 
not compute material implication in this way. Here is how we do it: 
• Input: sequences (x, y) 
• F = {s4}. 
• Instructions: 
o [input (x)](s0, input). 
o [¬] (s1, x). 
o [input (¬x, y)] (s2, (¬x)). 
o [∨] (s3, (¬x, y)). 
 
 
x, y
0 1
y, x
0
1
x, y
x
¬x
¬x, y
¬x ∨ y
⊑ ⊑ 
⊑ 
⊑ 
input 
 
s0 
s1 s1 
s2 
s3 
s3 
s0 
s1 
s4 
s3 
s2 
input 
¬ 
input 
∨ 
Table 4 
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2.5 How to model information 
 
Now that we have a formal machinery for modelling formal operations, we need to say what is 
information, in our system, to implement the second requirement: that a formal notion is formally 
computable regardless of the infons it is fed with. The most general and comprising way of modelling 
information is this: we just assume a primitive set of infons ℐ, and define some relations on it. The 
algebra we impose on the set will determine the formal properties of the system. In general, I will 
require a minimal structure on ℐ, because I want to stay as neutral as possible on how to model 
information. The minimal requirements, in the scope of this dissertation, have already been put forward 
in the discussion on formal operations. On ℐ, we define a partial order of “containment”: i ⊑ i’ iff the 
information contained in i is contained in i’. We will also suppose that there is a 0 and a 1, for every 
“type” of information in ℐ: for every type Y, there is a unique element that is such that every i ∈ Y are 
contained in it, and a unique element that is contained in every i ∈ Y. With containment, we can define 
meet and join:  
• ⋀{x, y} = z∈ ℐ/z ⊑ x & z ⊑ y & ∀i∈ ℐ((i ⊑ x & i ⊑ y) → (i ⊑ z)). 
• ⋁{x, y} = z∈ ℐ/x ⊑ z & y ⊑ z & ∀i∈ ℐ((x ⊑ i & y ⊑ i) → (z ⊑ i)). 
The meet of x and y is the biggest infon that is contained in x and y, the join of x and y is the smallest 
infon that contains x and y. We can also let the complement of i be the biggest i incompatible with i. That 
is, iC is the biggest element such that i ∧ iC = 0. I will not assume any other property. In particular, I will 
not assume that, for any two infons, there is a join and a meet. I will not assume that for any infon i,  
i ∨ iC = 1, either. So, I will not settle whether (ℐ, ≤) forms a lattice or a complemented lattice.  
Definition Lattices (Birkhoff 1948). A lattice (A, ≤) is a partially ordered set such that every two 
elements have a join and a meet. A lattice is distributed when join and meet distribute over each 
other. A lattice is complete if any of its subsets has a meet and a join. A lattice is complemented 
when it is distributed and every element has a complement in A (that is, for any i ∈ A, there exists 
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a ic such that i ∨ ic = 1 and i ∧ ic = 0, where 1 and 0 are the maximum and the minimum of A, 
respectively). A complete, distributed and complemented lattice is a Boolean algebra. 
How can the space of information not be a lattice? Well, it may be that two infons do not bear any 
containment relation, and that there is no “super-infon” that contains them, because they are 
different “kinds” of information. I will give such an example in chapter 3, in section 3.1. Depending 
on how we are modelling information, however, each subset of ℐ closed under type membership may 
form a Boolean Algebra, or some weaker algebra. In the Appendix I show that, if one takes these 
classes to be the complete powersets of some sets, then they form a Boolean Algebra. In an interesting 
paper, Barwise & Etchemendy show how to work with a Heyting Algebra of infons (1990). A Heyting 
Algebra is weaker than a Boolean Algebra, because its elements may have only pseudo-complements: 
it is not the case that i ∨ iC = 1, for any i28.  
 
2.5.1 Transformation of infons 
 
Since we want to stay neutral on the nature of infons, there will be no unique way to transform them. 
There will rather be different levels of “transformation” of information, based on how we are modelling 
it. By defining Formal Computability invariance, I will just talk generally of “transformation of 
information”. When I give proofs, I am assuming that permutation invariance ensures enough 
abstraction, and that information is modelled in a way akin to what we have done in the last chapter: we 
build infons as set theoretical construction from the primitives sets W, O and V of worlds, objects and 
truth-values, respectively. So, for example, if an item takes sentences as arguments, then we permute its 
inputs by permuting worlds, thereby inducing a permutation in the set of sentences I discuss this system 
thoroughly in section 3.1, in the next chapter.  
 
                                                             
28 Heyting Algebras were used by Heyting himself to give an algebraic, semantic theory for intuitionistic logic. See, 
for example, Heyting (1966). Heyting was a student of Brower himself: the father of intuitionism. 
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2.6 FORMAL COMPUTABILITY-INVARIANCE 
 
The fact that the behaviour of some item in the language is describable through a formal operation is 
not enough to make it formal: it is only a necessary condition. Take this example: 𝒮 is ˹In every cat-
world˺, where a cat-world is any world in which the proposition ˹There are cats˺ is true. 𝒮 is “fixated” 
with the existence of cats in a non-logical way. Yet, we can show that this item is formally computable: 
Proof 2.2. Define the following FTM [⊒]: 
• Input: sequences (x,y) 
• F = {s2}. 
• Instructions:  
o [input (y, x)] (s0, input) 
o [⊑] (s1, (y, x)). 
Set y = [set of all cat-worlds]. Set x = A, where A is some arbitrary sentential argument of the 
operator. [⊒] computes 𝒮 for A. For 𝒮(A) = 1 iff A is true in all cat-worlds, iff the set of all cat-
worlds is a subset of the truth-set of A29. A was arbitrary, so, for all sentential arguments φ, [⊒] 
computes 𝒮, when given the appropriate sequence (φ, [set of all cat-worlds])30. 
This result shows how little, on its own, formal computability can do. The next step, then, will be to 
ensure that the item is not F-computable “by accident”, so to speak, and just for some specific pieces of 
information, but generally. To ensure the formality of some notion k, k must be formally-computable 
regardless of the specific content it is fed with. This is where permutation-invariance comes in handy. 
The way to implement it, though, will be tricky. In standard invariance tests, we are asking invariance 
of the “identity” of the notion under arbitrary permutations. Suppose we ask identity plus formal 
computability. An item is be logical iff it is invariant and formally computable. In this case, our theory 
                                                             
29 With 𝒮, the output for φ is really the proposition ⌜In every cat-world: φ⌝. However, I take that this proposition 
will be either true in every world or in none. For, if φ is true in every A-world, then this fact will not “change” from 
world to world. So, its truth-set will be either ⊤ or ⊥; that is, 1 or 0. 
30 𝒮 is computable in this way because it is equivalent to a Kripke modal operator defined over an accessibility 
relation R such that R(w, w’) iff w’ is a cat-world. As we will see in the next chapter, any such Kripke modal operator 
is formally computable. 
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would be a contraction of permutation invariance. I do not follow this theory, however, mainly because 
we would have different sets of logical notions in different systems, based on how we are modelling 
information. For, clearly, what is invariant under automorphisms of a system will depend on the features 
of the system. In different systems we will end up with different invariant items (more of this in section 
3.2).  
What if we drop invariance of the “identity” of the item and, instead, we ask invariance under F-
computability? Then, an item k of type Y is formally-computable invariant (FCI or FC-invariant, for 
short) iff:  
i. k is F-computable 
ii. For every admissible permutation of information content σ, the resulting σY(k) is still F-
computable. 
Yet, this will not do, because the requirement is vacuous. It is easy to prove, for instance, that 𝒮 would 
turn out FC-invariant, with this definition. For suppose we use the permutation-invariance system set 
out in the last chapter, and we look at permutations of worlds. Take all σ〈〈W,V〉〈W,V〉〉(𝒮). For some, 𝒮 is 
invariant (that is, σ〈〈W,V〉〈W,V〉〉(𝒮) = 𝒮) . If so, trivially it keeps its formal-computability. When it is not 
invariant, it is because one transformed the set of all cats-words (call it C). Take some σ’ that does that, 
and suppose σ’〈W,V〉(C)=C’. Now the result of the permutation 𝒮’ takes any proposition φ such that ⟬φ⟭ ⊇ 
C’ to ⊤, and everything else to ⊥, where ⟬φ⟭ is the truth-set of φ. By setting inputs (φ, C’), the resulting 
𝒮’ is still F-computable by [⊒], for any sentential argument φ. So, this requirement would make 𝒮 logical. 
We need another way of capturing the blindness to specific pieces of information that items like 𝒮 lack. 
Intuitively, 𝒮 is F-computable only because we have a way of “choosing” the infons before-hand (that is, 
before “passing them” to the formal-computation). Here is a suggestion: take the item whose formality 
we are testing and the formal operation the item is supposed to be performing. Suppose we induce a 
transformation in the inputs the two are receiving. What we do then is look if, under arbitrary 
transformations of inputs, the formal operation and the item still behave in the same way, by printing 
the same output. If so, then we may say that the item is logical, because it keeps its formal computability 
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regardless of how we transform its inputs. For each instance of the computation, each couple of inputs 
“track” each other, under arbitrary transformations. This is the kind of invariance I will try to model, in 
the next sections.  
2.6.1 Formal-Computability Invariance Defined 
 
To get to the technical definition of FC-invariance, however, we first need a definition of sequence-
permutation. The problem is that formal operations are taking as input sequences of infons, and we have 
yet to explain how permutations affect sequences. First, let us add a type for sequences S:  
Sequence An item in S is any sequence of elements x, y, …, z of any type X, Y, …, Z.  
Take an arbitrary permutation σ of information. Call σS the transformation induced in type S by σ. It is 
defined as follows: 
Sequence permutation Take any n-ary sequence S = (a, b, …, n) of elements of types A, B, …, N 
respectively. Take a permutation σ of information. Let σA, σB, …, σN be the transformation induced 
by σ in types A, B, …, N respectively, and σS the transformation of sequences induced by σ. σS(S) = 
(σA(a), σB(b), …, σN(N)). 
We have now all the means necessary to define FC-invariance. I have two suggestions for FC-
invariance. The first takes an item to be FC-invariant if there is a formal operation that computes it under 
arbitrary permutations of inputs. The second defines FC-invariance as preservation of computability 
under arbitrary permutations of inputs. I will call the first FC-invariance, the second strong FC-
invariance. 
FC-Invariance An item k is FC-invariant iff there is a FTM that computes k under arbitrary 
permutations of inputs. 
Strong FC-Invariance An item k is strongly FC-invariant iff it is computable by some FTM, and for 
any FTM that computes k, FTM still computes it under arbitrary permutation 
of inputs. 
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The second implies the first but not vice-versa. For the first, it can be that some (but not all) formal 
Turing Machines compute k, yet do not compute it anymore when we permute their arguments. To 
satisfy the stronger invariance, this cannot be the case: all FTM that compute k must compute it under 
arbitrary permutations of their arguments.  
Using the definition of permutation of sequences, and the definition of computability, we can give a 
precise definition for both kinds of invariance. Start with the second. To be strongly FC-invariant means 
that an item must keep its F-computability for every permutation of the input-sequence induced by 
arbitrary permutations of information. That is: 
Strong FC-Invariance An item k of arity n is strongly FC-invariant =df There is an FTM such that 
there exists a function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ K such that:  
a) For every s and s’, Comp(s) = s’ iff K(s) = FTM(s’). 
b) For every s, Comp(s) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)s and (bm)m>n = k, where 
(ax)s is the x-th element of s. 
c) Let σ be a permutation of information and let σS be the transformation induced in type S 
by such permutation. For every FTM that computes k, for every s and s’, if k(s) = FTM(s’) 
then, for every σ, k(σS(s)) = FTM(σS(s’)). 
Informally, we can describe what is happening with an image. Suppose there are some people in 
different rooms. They all have some instructions to follow, which consist in receiving some inputs, 
performing some tests, and finally printing a specific, unique output. Each person represents the 
behaviour of some operation: person1 is the item K whose formality we are testing and person-2,  
person-3 … person-N are all the formal operations K is supposed to be performing “blindly”, regardless 
of the information it is fed with. To ensure that K is really “blind” to “specificities” of content, we permute 
infons arbitrarily. We then “feed” the transformed infons to all the various people. If, under arbitrary 
permutations, everyone still “tracks” everyone else, by printing the same output given the 
correspondent transformed input, then we say that K is strongly FC-invariant.  
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What is crucial, in the definition, is the scope of the transformations: we do not write “σY(K)” but 
“K(σS(a, b, …, n))”: we are not directly permuting the item we are testing, but only its arguments. That 
is, if an item K is such that {((a, b), b), ((b, c), c) ((c, d), d)} ∈ K, then the permutations will not affect 
this. What we rather do is this: we first check whether the item is formally computable. If so, there will 
be a function “Comp”, as described above. Suppose K is F-computable by some FTM in this way: 
 
This is a partial graph of how the computation works, and it is to be read like this: K takes (a, b) to b, 
and the FTM takes (a, b, k) to b. Accordingly, Comp takes (a, b) to (a, b, k) 
This was the first step. We now permute some objects: we can swap a with c, for example. We then 
look at what permutation is induced in the relevant domain and range of the computation function. In 
this case, σS(a, b) = (c, b) and σS(a, b, k) = (c, b, k). Now we “feed” K with σS(a, b), obtaining b. We feed 
the transformed input-sequence σS(a, b, k) to FTM and we check if FTM, too, prints b. If yes, then the 
formal-computability is preserved for that instance; if not, the item is not FCI. In this case, it is preserved, 
because they both print b, so k(σ(a, b)) = FTM(σS(a, b, k)). I believe this system implements an intuitive 
notion of “blindness to specific information content”. This is what we need for the invariance part of the 
theory.  
We can make this even clearer by proving that the non-logical item 𝒮 above is not strongly-FCI. 
Domain K
• (a, b)
• (b, c)
• (c, b)
FTM(x)
• b
• c
Domain FTM
• (a, b, k)
• (b, c, k)
• (c, b, k)
Table 5 
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Proof 2.3. Define again the same FTM [⊒], that computes 𝒮 for arbitrary arguments φ when we set 
as inputs (φ, C), where C = ˹There are cats˺. Take a φ such that ⟬C⟭ ⊆ ⟬φ⟭ and φ is not 1. Define a 
permutation σ(w) = w’, with w ∈ ⟬C⟭ but w’ ∉ ⟬φ⟭. σ〈W,V〉(C) = C’, and σ〈W,V〉(φ)= φ’, with ⟬C’⟭ ⊆ ⟬φ’⟭ 
but ⟬C⟭ ⊈ ⟬φ’⟭. [⊒](σS(φ, C)) = [⊒](φ’, C’) = 1. Yet, 𝒮(σ〈W,V〉(φ)) = 𝒮(φ’) = 0. So, there is a 
permutation σ for which 𝒮(φ) = [⊒](φ, C) and yet 𝒮(σ〈W,V〉(φ)) ≠ [⊒](σS(φ, C). 
Informally, the two people here are simulating 𝒮 and the FTM [⊒], respectively. When we give a φ that 
is true in every C-world for person1 and (φ, C) for person2, the two can simulate each other’s behaviour. 
Yet, to see if this behaviour is general, we now swap an element w in C with w’, that is neither an C-world 
nor a φ-world. This induce a permutation both in C and φ (because C ⊆ ⟬φ⟭), obtaining C’ and φ’. We 
now give φ’ to person1: she will simulate 𝒮 by checking if φ’ is true in every cat-world, and the test will 
be negative, for in φ’ there is w’, which is not a cat-world. Person2, on the other hand, is following the 
rules above, and will check if C’ is contained in φ’, and the result is positive: she will print 1 as before. 
We have found a permutation for which the two people behave differently, so 𝒮 is not FC-invariant.  
We must note, here, that 𝒮 is not “aware” of the permutation induced in C, and so it does not change 
behaviour. One might complain that, since the permutation changed C, 𝒮 should change accordingly. 
However, again, we have ensured that this does not happen because of the way we set the definition of 
FC-invariance: we are permuting only the inputs the operators take, not the operator itself. This is 
essential: 𝒮 would change its behaviour only had it been in the scope of the transformation. The graph 
we used before can make things more intuitive:  
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𝒮 and [⊒] fail to preserve computability for φ and (φ, C), because the transformed arguments, 
indicated in red, cannot be “linked” by the composition function: the red lines fail to link them because 
they do not give out the same value. 
The way we define simple FC-Invariance is similar: 
FC-Invariance An item k of arity n is FC-invariant =df There is an FTM such that there exists a 
function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ K such that:  
a) For every s and s’, Comp(s) = s’ iff K(s) = FTM(s’). 
b) For every s, Comp(s) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)s and (bm)m>n 
= k, where (ax)s is the x-th element of s. 
c) Let σ be a permutation of information and let σS be the transformation induced 
in type S by such permutation. For every s, s’, if k(s) = FTM(s’) then, for every 
σ, k(σS(s)) = FTM(σS(s’)). 
So, to test the FC-invariance of some item K we do this:  
i. Firstly, we check if there is a FTM that computes it.  
Domain 𝒮
• (φ)
• (φ')
[⊒](s)
• 0
• 1
Domain [⊒]
• (φ, C)
• (φ', C)
• (φ', C')
Table 6 
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ii. We then permute information arbitrarily. For any permutation, we then feed the transformed 
arguments to K and FTM, and register the corresponding results we get. If they are still the 
same, then it means that K is FCI. 
I do not think that I should choose between one of these two definitions, for they both implement my 
general idea of formality. Therefore, I will settle for the weaker version: 
Logicality An item k is logical iff it is FC-invariant. 
This completes the basic exposition of the theory. I will now give some examples of FCI items: 
i. Conjunction, disjunction, negation are instances of meet, join and complementation, both in 
an extensional and in an intensional language. For example, in an extensional language, the 
information a proposition contains is either 1 or 0. In such a case, conjunction calculates the 
smallest infon two propositions both contain: if they are both 1, it is 1; if one is 0, it is 0. In an 
intensional language, conjunction calculates the intersection of the two propositions in the 
modal space.  
ii. The identity function is computed by the FTM whose instructions are empty. That is, by the 
FTM such that F = {s0} and instructions: ∅. Since, by default, the input is written on s0, the 
output is the input. 
iii. N-ary functions that take everything to ⊤ can be computed by the FTM whose instructions 
are [1] (s0, input). Any n-ary function that takes everything to ⊥ is computed by [0] (s0, input). 
Any other function whose output is some constant k not equal to 1 or 0 will never be FCI31.  
iv. The valuation of ≠ is computed by the complementation of symmetric containment. Input: 
sequences (x,y). F = {(s2, 1), s4}. Instructions:  
o [⊑](s0, (x, y)). 
o [1] (s1, 0). 
o [input, (y, x)] (s1, 1). 
                                                             
31 This is easy to prove. Take an n-ary K whose output is k, with k ≠ 1 and k ≠ 0. K(a, b, …, n) = [input (k)] (a, b, …, 
n, k). Yet, k is not invariant: there is a σS(k) ≠ k. So, KσS(a, b, …, n) = k, but [input (k)] σS(a, b, …, n, k) = σS(k) ≠ k. 
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o [⊑] (s2, (y, x)). 
o [0] (s3, 1) 
o [1] (s3, 0). 
 
 
Table 7 
v. Universal and existential quantifiers are FCI, but cardinality quantifiers are not FCI. More on 
this in the next chapter, in section 3.3. 
vi. Logical necessity is FCI32. It is computed by various operations. Examples:  
a. Containment of ⊤ in φ. 
b. the operation that checks if the meet of φ and ⊤ is ⊤. 
c. the operation that checks if the join of φ and ⊤ is ⊤. 
vii. Logical possibility is FCI. For every way logical necessity is computed, there is a computation 
of logical possibility via the transformation rule □φ iff ¬◊¬φ. So, for example, instead of (a) 
we have the complementation of the containment test of ⊤ in the complement of φ.  
viii. Empty necessity and possibility, where “empty necessity” is defined in a Kripke structure 
through an empty R.  
ix. ⊤ and ⊥ are computed by containment, when given input (⊤, ⊤) and (⊥, ⊥), respectively. 
                                                             
32 We are still assuming logical necessity to be S5. As I will show in section 3.4 of the next chapter, these ways of 
computing necessity operators fail for some weaker logics. 
x, y
0
1
1
y,x
1
0
0
1
⊑ ⊑ 
Input 
⊑ ⊑ 
s3 s3 
s1 s1 
s2 s2 
s4 s4 
s0 
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CHAPTER 3: APPLICATIONS OF FORMAL-COMPUTABILITY-
INVARIANCE. 
 
This chapter explores some applications of formal computability invariance. In section 3.1 I apply 
formal-computability invariance to a very plausible model of information, which I call modal/object 
system: information about objects are taken to be set-constructions from the set of objects, and 
propositional information is a built up from the modal space. This system has some interesting features: 
in the Appendix, I show how formal-computability-invariance sometimes collapses into permutation- 
invariance, at least for a class of operations. This happens when we model information in a certain 
way: if the set of infons is made up from the complete powersets of some sets. In the object/modal 
system infons are usually built up from the powersets of W and 𝔇, so we do have the behaviour 
described in the appendix.  
For some systems, like the one just described, if an n-ary operation on the set of infon is formally 
computable invariant, then it is permutation invariant. Yet, when we change our way of modelling 
information we may lose this result. I will show how this may happen in section 3.2, in which I set up a 
model of information in which some non-permutation invariance items are formally-computable 
invariant. This shows something interesting: what is invariant under automorphisms of the space of 
information strictly depends on how we are modelling information. On the other hand, what is formally-
computable invariant is more “stable” and tends to be preserved across different models. This is 
something desirable, because what is logical should ideally be independent of our chosen model. I call 
this feature “persistence”. 
In section 3.3 I prove that the existential and the universal quantifiers are formally-computable 
invariant. I also show how, even if something is permutation-invariant in some systems, there may not 
be any system in which it is formally-computable invariant. I argue that this is the case for cardinality 
quantifiers: they are not formally-computable, at all. Thus, the theory is not a conservative extension of 
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permutation invariance, generally. Cardinality quantifiers are usually regarded as a problematic case of 
logicality, so I do not take this as a bad result. 
In section 3.4 I introduce a relaxed concept of logicality we may call “quasi-logicality”. This concept can 
be applied to the study of the formality of a class of modal operators which I call “world-sensitive”: they 
change behaviour across different worlds. In section 3.5 I try to show how my theory may help shed 
light on the formality of some interesting notions that have never been discussed in the literature, so 
far. My case study will be deontic operators: is Ought logical, or at least quasi-logical? It depends: I argue 
that a radical form of contextualism may make Ought more formal than people guess.  
 
3.1 The object/modal system of information. 
 
My definition of logicality does not specify a particular system of information. I want now to set up a 
very intuitive model of information that can be applied to my theory. We take infons to be set theoretical 
constructions from worlds and objects. Transformation of information is induced by arbitrary 
permutations on W and O. There are philosophical reasons in favour of this solution. Firstly, it is very 
intuitive. Suppose I am in a class, and I want to know which student is male. This “infon” can be modelled 
as the set of all male students in the class. With propositional information, we have a “modal” account: 
the infon of ˹There are dogs˺ is the set of all worlds in which there are dogs.  
When we model a “propositional” infon as a set of worlds, I am following what Floridi calls a “modal” 
approach to information (2011, 31). In a modal approach, an infon x is usually defined as the set of 
possible worlds excluded by x33. For take a logical truth: its truth-set is the biggest possible in the system, 
and yet logical truth are the least informative. So, its information content must be its complement, not 
its truth-set. However, since it is just easier to go the other way around, I will normally take x to be the 
set of possible worlds not excluded by x34. I do this for two reasons: one is that the two accounts are 
                                                             
33 I don’t know who was the first to suggest this way of modelling information. Floridi (2011, 111) says that Popper 
(1935) was “one of the first” to suggest this kind of approach. 
34 For a similar account, see Hanson (1990). Hanson, however, tends to use “situations”, which can be partial 
worlds.  
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equivalent for most systems, because they usually lead to exactly the same conclusions (we have just 
swapped each infon with its complement, in its correspondent type). The second is that it is just more 
intuitive: now the informational content of a proposition is just its truth-set. A good reason for adopting 
a “modal approach to information” lies in its “affinity” with the way we model beliefs in epistemic logic. 
For example, take the information contained in a proposition: the more information it has, the more 
logical space is excluded by the proposition (i.e. the “bigger” its complement is). In epistemic logic: the 
more you know, the less worlds in the epistemic space will be accessible to you. Knowledge is a matter 
of “subtraction” of the epistemic space35. The two limit cases are propositions whose truth-set is W and 
whose truth-set is ∅. In the first case, WC=∅: the proposition carries no information. In the second case, 
∅C=W: the proposition carries maximal information.  
It is worth nothing that this leads to two well-known “oddities”, that I will just mention, here. First, 
since W, for us, is the set of all logically possible worlds, every logical truth will have no information-
content whatsoever. To foster the analogy between modal approaches to information and epistemic 
logic, this first problem is akin to the issue of logical omniscience: if Δ is a set of logical truths, then any 
agent knows each member of Δ. (Hendricks & Symons 2015). Secondly, a contradiction has maximal 
information content: this second issue is usually referred to in the literature as the Bar-Hillel-Carnap 
Paradox, mainly because Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) were one of the first to discuss it. The idea is that 
a contradiction is “too much” to be true. In our system W is 1 and ∅ is 0, since W and ∅ are the maximal 
and minimal element, respectively, of the set of propositions, and so W is ⊤ and ∅ ⊥. However, we must 
keep in mind that, informationally speaking, things are swapped around: W is the minimal element and 
0 the maximal. 
By adopting this system, we do not need to change our type theoretic framework a lot. “Objectual 
information” will be modelled as sets of objects, “propositional information” as sets of worlds: their type 
will be 〈O,V〉 or 〈W,V〉, respectively, since their extension is uniquely determined by a function. However, 
this is not enough, for an infon may be about propositional infons, or about “objectual” infons. Suppose 
I want to model the infon that answers the following question: “Which proposition is about dogs?”. This 
                                                             
35 For an overview on epistemic logic, see Hendricks & Symons (2015) 
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is not a propositional infon, but an infon about propositions. The simplest way to answer this question 
is to show the list of all the sentences about dogs. This “list” is uniquely determined by a function from 
propositions to truth-values: its type is 〈〈W,V〉V〉. Something similar can be raised for properties. Take 
the infon that answers the following question: “Which ice-cream flavour do you prefer?”. This is a 
question about properties: the answer is a list of flavour-properties, and its type is 〈〈O,V〉V〉. One can go 
higher, if she fancies, by asking questions like “Among all the possible ice-cream flavours preferences 
one can have, which are the best?”. The answer will be a list of lists of flavour-properties so, type-
theoretically, the infon is a higher-order unary quantifier 〈〈〈O,V〉V〉,V〉.  
Since we are dealing with the same system of chapter 2, the same results apply: the only permutation-
invariant infons are O and ∅ for 〈O,V〉 and ⊤, ⊥ for 〈W,V〉. For sets of sentences 〈〈W,V〉V〉, invariant infons 
are items like {⊤}, {⊤, ⊥}, {⊥}, {X∈〈W,V〉/ |X| = n}, etc. For short, we will call ⊤ 1 and ⊥ 0. We are also still 
equating W with the set of all logically possible worlds, and we are assuming that such set contains 
metaphysically impossible worlds. We are also assuming that, for any truth-set, there is a corresponding 
proposition. 
Information, usually, is at least a subset of some set, never an element: normally, there is no infon that 
is mapped to some specific object, for example, even though, for any object, there is the infon that is the 
singleton of that object. However, we need single objects and single worlds as pieces of information, for 
otherwise we would never be able to compute any first-level item. So, I will assume that any element of 
level 0 are “special” infons: any such infon contains and is contained only in itself. One could object to 
this assumption, however, so I need to say more to justify it. For one may say that an infon α of type O is 
“contained” in any infon that is mapped to a set X such that X ∈ α. For example, why is Fido not contained 
in “dog-ness”? After all, it is an element of it and a set contains all its elements. The reason is that the 
“containment” we are interested in is “information containment”, and this relation is never modelled as 
the membership relation but, at most, as the subset-relation. This is very important, so I want to argue 
for this in detail. Information-Containment is always a “horizontal” relation: it is between elements of 
the same type. Membership, on the other hand, is “vertical”: it is (or rather it should be) always between 
elements on different “levels” (Russell’s paradox docet). In the object/modal system, a type represents 
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a “kind” of information: e. g. 〈W, V〉 is propositional information and 〈〈W, V〉, V〉 is information “about” 
propositions. We said that an infon contains another iff it conveys all that the other conveys. Since 
elements of different types conveys different kinds of information, two infons of different kinds cannot 
be such that one conveys all the information that the other conveys. In other terms: we assign a type to 
an infon on the basis of the kind of information it conveys. For example, if an infon conveys propositional 
information, this is sufficient to assign it to some 〈W,V〉. Suppose we think containment is sometimes 
modelled by membership. Take a propositional infon α. There is at least an infon β of type 〈〈W, V〉, V〉 
that contains α. Since α ∈ β, then α ⊑ β, then β must have all the information α has, which is propositional, 
so β has propositional information and, therefore, it is of type 〈W,V〉. Yet, it is not, so it cannot be that α 
⊑ β, so ‘membership’ does not model containment. 
The object/modal system has interesting algebraic properties. Since “containment” is never 
membership but at most subset-relation, any two elements of different types are “incomparable”: they 
are not linked by containment. Thus, containment is not a total order. The space of information is not a 
lattice, either. Take a set of worlds and a set of objects: not only they are not comparable, but there is 
also no infon that contains both. Thus, they surely have no join. However, take the subclass of all the 
propositional information of “level 1”: all the subsets of WL. In Appendix A I show that this is a Boolean 
algebra. In general, in the Appendix I show that any system that models information from the complete 
powerset of some set, like this one, will make Formal Computability Invariance collapse into standard 
Permutation Invariance, at least for n-ary operations defined over the Boolean algebra. This behaviour 
may not be preserved under extension of the list of formal operations: if we were to add some operations 
to the list that are not permutation-invariant in this system, we would lose this result. Many formal 
operations like complementation, disjunction, conjunction and containment, are all permutation-
invariant in the object/modal system, as I show in the Appendix: they are all Boolean and therefore 
invariant, via Inverted Benthem’s Proposition. 
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3.2 A simpler system of information. 
 
I will now propose another plausible model of information with different features. This is the simplest 
way to model information I can think of: we start with primitive set of infons ℐ. The types of items in this 
set are contextually determined by the type of items we are testing. So, for example, if we are looking at 
sentential operators, ℐ may comprise the set of all sentences. We add new types if needed. On ℐ, we 
define a partial oder of containment ⊑, with all and only these additional rules: 
• if a ∈ Y and b ∈ Y, then a ⊑ b or b ⊑ a. 
• if a ∈ Y and b ∈ X, with X ≠ Y, then a ⋢ b and b ⋢ a 
We then define the transformation of information inductively. Where Y is a type and σY is the 
transformation induced in type Y, σY = {σX|X ∈ Y}, unless k is such that ∀x∈ Y(x ⊑ k & ∀z∈Y (k ⊑ z → k=z)) 
or ∀x∈ Y(k ⊑ x & ∀z∈Y (z ⊑ k → k=z)). In that case, σℐ(k) = k. So, basically, we look at arbitrary 
automorphisms in each type in ℐ, with the exception of each maximum and minimum, for each kind, 
which remain constant. We need this exception for otherwise the system “crashes”: it is the most 
minimal preservation condition I can think of36.  
In this framework, we have lost “structure”, so to speak. By losing “structure”, the resulting 
transformations are more powerful. This may be counterintuitive, so I will give an example. Take two 
sentences S and S’ such that ⟬S⟭⊂⟬S’⟭ and S and S’ are not ⊥ or ⊤. Suppose we are in the object/modal 
system: propositions are sets of worlds. There is no permutation for which σ〈W,V〉(S) = S’. One way to see 
this is by looking at their cardinality: ⟬S⟭ is strictly contained in ⟬S’⟭, it is finite (if not, pick a finite one), 
and so its cardinality must be strictly less than ⟬S’⟭: since for any permutation, σ〈W,V〉(S) has the same 
cardinality of S, there is no permutation for which σ〈W,V〉(S) = S’. On the other hand, in this simpler 
system, we can swap S with S’, because they are not identical to either ⊥ or ⊤. This has interesting 
                                                             
36 More on this in a few paragraphs. 
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consequences on the system: we can prove that, unlike the previous system, almost all canonical logical 
operations will not be permutation invariant. 
Proof 3.1. Take containment. It is permutation invariant iff (A⊑B iff σℐ(A) ⊑ σℐ(B)), for any σ. 
Define a permutation σℐ(A) = C, with ⋀{C, A} = 0. A ⊑ B and yet it is not the case that σℐ(A) ⊑ 
σℐ(B). Similar proofs work with meet, join, complementation. 
We can swap A with C without “changing” B because we are just taking items in ℐ as primitives, without 
any “internal structure”, apart from the maximum and minimum. If we had modelled sentences as sets 
of worlds, this would not have been possible. In this simpler system, containment is not the subset 
relation. Another interesting feature is that 1 and 0 will not be invariant, unless we postulate it. We need 
them invariant, however, for otherwise we “blow” up the system. For example, take logical necessity: it 
is FCI via [⊒] when set with (φ, ⊤). Yet, if we could swap ⊤ with some other elements of propositional 
information, logical necessity would not be formally computable invariant. 
One might complain that I am cheating, because I am “keeping fixed” the maximum and minimum. 
What I have to say in my defence is that what I care about, here, is just that the resulting system is still 
a reasonable model for information. This fact alone is sufficient to show that our theory does not 
“collapse” into permutation-invariance: some items that will not be permutation-invariant under this 
system will be formally-computable-invariant. The simplest examples are the formal operations 
themselves. In general, if we are applying FCI to any FTM, trivially, FTM(s) = FTM(s) and, for every 
permutation σ, FTM(σS(s)) = FTM(σS(s)). So FTM is logical. Given that meet, join, complementation and 
compatibility-test are all formal operations, trivially they will be FC-invariant, because they compute 
themselves under arbitrary permutations of inputs. Yet, in this simpler system, they are not 
permutation-invariant. Consequently, my theory in this system is not a contraction of PI, and it is clearly 
more extensionally adequate: PI heavily under-generates logical notions, in this model. This also shows 
something interesting. One of the problems with invariance theories we discussed was about the 
“impersistence” of invariant notions: what comes out invariant depends on the features of the system at 
hand. Yet, we said that logical notions should be persistent:  
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Persistence. An item is persistent if and only if its logicality persists across different systems of 
information. 
As I have shown, in the object-modal system we mostly get plausible results, when we apply 
permutation-invariance. Yet, if we switch to simpler systems, like this one, the result may be 
catastrophic: here intensional conjunction, disjunction and negation are not invariant. Yet, they still 
retain their formal-computability invariance. In fact, since they satisfy trivially the FC-invariance 
definition, they will be persistent across any system of information. This suggests that most FC-invariant 
items will be persistent, as opposed to invariant items. However, not all FCI items will be invariant in 
any system of information: if we had not kept the maxima and minima fixed, we could have made logical 
necessity not FCI, in this system. Thus, we may suggest that all FCI items persist across all systems with 
the minimal condition of keeping the maxima and minima fixed, while the FTM themselves are 
persistent across any system whatsoever. This is still better than invariance, even though persistence is 
not perfectly general. 
3.2.1 An objection to persistence 
 
An objection to the persistence of logicality across systems in the FC-invariance theory can be raised 
with identity. Take the identity relation between propositions, for example. Since in the object/modal 
system propositions are functions from W to V, if two propositions have the same truth-set, they are the 
same proposition. In the simple system, on the other hand, we obtain a finer-grained model: 
propositions with the same truth-set can be different. One then could argue that persistence fails for 
identity. For take two different propositions with the same truth-set P and Q. In the simple system, 
identity is computed by symmetric containment. The information in P is different from the information 
in Q because P ≠ Q. Thus, in the simple system, when fed with (P, Q) symmetric containment will give 
out 0. If we switch to the object/modal system, however, P and Q are the same truth-set, and so have the 
same information. Thus, now symmetric containment, when fed with (P, Q), will give out 1, even though 
P ≠ Q, by assumption, and thus, when fed with (P, Q), identity gives out 0. So, symmetric containment 
does not compute identity anymore, and identity is not persistent.  
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I am not deeply troubled by this objection, because this is not a problem with my theory, but rather 
with the definition of a proposition in standard, modal logics. It is well known that, in such systems, 
necessarily equivalent propositions are identical, and this is often taken as an objection to the idea that 
propositions are sets of worlds, or functions from worlds to truth-values. This is an example by 
Merricks: 
Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT) is necessarily true. So, FLT is true in all possible worlds. So, the 
proposition that dogs bark is true in all and only those possible worlds in which the proposition 
that dogs bark and FLT is true is true. So, the set of possible worlds in which that dogs bark is true 
is identical with the set of possible worlds in which that dogs bark and FLT is true is true. So, if 
propositions are sets of possible worlds, the proposition that dogs bark is identical with the 
proposition that dogs bark and FLT is true (Merricks 2015, 88). 
The conclusion is that the proposition that dogs bark and FLT is true is not identical to the proposition 
that dogs bark, therefore propositions are not sets of possible worlds (here, since we are looking at all 
logically possible worlds, to make the same example we would have to switch Fermat’s last theorem 
with some logical truth). Now, this is a matter of debate, and it is not in the business of this dissertation 
to decide whether this is a good objection or not. It is interesting, however, because it does show an 
intrinsic limit to the fine-grained-ness of the object/modal system: in such system, necessarily 
coextensive propositions are identical. Therefore, it is unfair to assume, as the objection to persistence 
does, that there are two different propositions with the same truth-set, in this system. Indeed, symmetric 
containment does his job as it should be: when fed with P and Q, it will give out 1 because P is Q, in the 
modal system, and thus (P, Q) is part of the extension of =, contrary to what the objection says. It is not 
that symmetric containment fails to compute identity when we switch system. What happens is rather 
that identity changes extension through different systems, and symmetric containment changes, 
accordingly.  
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3.3 Quantifiers. 
 
I want now to show how to apply my theory to quantifiers in an extensional language. In fact, we 
already know that this is possible because quantifiers are structurally similar to modal operators: a 
modal operator is like a quantifier that ranges over the modal space. Let us start with extensional, 
universal quantifier. It is FCI. 
Proof 3.2. Start with a set of objects 𝔇. ∀ is a function 𝓅𝔇 → {V, F}. It takes 𝔇 to T and everything 
else to F. Define again this FTM [⊒]: 
• Input: sequences (x,y) 
• F = {s2}. 
• Instructions:  
o [input (y, x)] (s0, input) 
o [⊑] (s1, (y, x)). 
This is a reversed containment test. Here 0 and 1 are True and False. [⊒] computes ∀ when we set 
input (X, 𝔇), where X is the argument of ∀. Feed [⊒] with (𝔇, 𝔇). Following the instructions, we 
obtain this graph: 
 
Table 8 
So, correctly, when fed with (𝔇, 𝔇) the output is True. Now Feed [⊒] with any other (X, 𝔇).  
𝔇, 𝔇
𝔇, 𝔇
1
Input 
⊑ 
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Table 9 
Here, no proper subset of 𝔇 contains it, so the test is doomed to fail, for any X. So, correctly, the 
output is False. So, [⊒] computes ∀.  
Now, for the permutation part, set arbitrary permutations in 𝔇. ∀(X) is either 0 or 1. The only 
invariant elements of the powerset 𝓅𝔇 are 𝔇 and ∅. So, the sequence (𝔇, 𝔇) is invariant as well. 
Since (𝔇, 𝔇) is the only input for which [⊒] has value 1, for every σ, ∀(σ〈O,V〉(𝔇)) = [⊒](σS(𝔇, 𝔇)) 
= 1. Also, obviously, for any other X ≠ 𝔇., ∀(σ〈O,V〉(X)) = [⊒](σS(X, 𝔇)) = 0. For suppose this is not 
the case: then there must be an X such that [⊒]σS(X, 𝔇) = 1 or ∀(σ〈O,V〉(X)) = 1. Yet, this happens 
only if σ〈O,V〉(X) = 𝔇, but then 𝔇 would not be invariant. Thus, for every σ, ∀(σ〈O,V〉(X)) = [⊒](σS(X, 
𝔇)). 
Since ∃ is ¬∀¬ we know it is FCI, as well. Yet, let us prove it anyway. 
Proof 3.3. Define FTM [¬][⊑]: 
• Input: sequences (x,y) 
• F = {s1}. 
• Instructions: 
o [⊑](s0, input). 
o [¬] (s1, x). 
This is the complementation of containment. ∃ is computed by [¬][⊑] when we feed it with (X, ∅): 
∅ contains X if and only if X = ∅, so when X = ∅, the output is 0; 1 otherwise, which is exactly the 
behaviour of ∃. So, again, there is a FTM [¬][⊑] such that, for any argument X of ∃, there exists a 
sequence (X, ∅) such that ∃(X) = [¬][⊑](X, ∅).  
X, 𝔇
𝔇, X
0
⊑ 
Input 
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For the permutation part, set again arbitrary permutations on 𝔇. ∅ is invariant, and so is (∅, ∅), 
which is the only input for which [¬][⊑] is 0. Thus, under arbitrary permutations, ∃(σ〈O,V〉(∅)) = 
[¬][⊑](σS(∅, ∅)) = 0. Since for any other argument, the output is 1, then under arbitrary 
permutations, it will still be 1, for the same reasons as before. Thus, for every σ and every X, 
∃(σ〈O,V〉(X)) = [¬][⊑](σS(X, ∅)). 
I find these proofs interesting, because they give us a peculiar philosophical justification for the logicality 
of ∀ and ∃. They are logical because they reproduce an instance of information-containment and its 
complementation, respectively. The universal quantifier is logical because it can be computed by 
something that checks whether a piece of information contains the maximum. The existential quantifier 
is logical because it is like something that checks if the empty infon does not contain another infon. This 
behaviour is general, because it is preserved under arbitrary automorphisms of the domain and induced 
transformations of inputs that the quantifiers are receiving. 
Here comes the interesting part: cardinality quantifiers are permutation-invariant, and yet I cannot 
think of any way they could be formally-computable. We would need some combination of intersection, 
union, complementation, containment and compatibility that imitates the behaviour of cardinality 
quantifiers, but I cannot see how this can be possible. The only thing sets of cardinality 5 have in common 
with all and only the sets of cardinality 5 is their cardinality, I take it. There is no checking of 
containment, or communality of information these sets share. Being arguably not formally-computable 
at all, cardinality quantifiers cannot be formally-computable invariant, and therefore they are not-
logical. This is not a bad result, I believe, because cardinality quantifiers are one of the main sources of 
criticism for both permutation invariance and bijection invariance theories. As already discussed in 
chapter 2, their logicality has been heavily criticised in Feferman (1999) and Bonnay (2008).  
At any rate, I would like to point out that my theory may score better than permutation or bijection 
invariance regardless of one’s opinion on the logicality of cardinality quantifiers. For these items, even 
when they come out logical, they are mainly seen as “involuntary by-products” of the choice of 
transformation we take. It is not that Sher and Tarski wanted cardinality quantifiers to be logical: they 
just happened to come out that way because, unluckily, they turn out invariant. When we switch to 
73 
 
stricter transformations, like homomorphism invariance, they are not logical anymore (Feferman 
1999). However, we have a price to pay: identity is not logical either! My theory, on the other hand, 
makes clear what it takes for cardinality quantifiers to be logical. The fact that they do not change under 
some transformation does not matter much. Do they or do they not perform an operation that, under 
our general conception of what logic is, counts as logical? No. Then they cannot be logical, no matter 
what invariance feature they might possess. However, if we were to change our underlying theory of 
what logic is, and thus extend or alter our list of basic formal operations, then cardinality quantifiers 
may turn out logical. For example, if we take the sizes of infons to be structural aspect of information, 
then cardinality would arguably be logical structure. We will then have some formal operation that is 
sensitive to cardinality that computes them. Since arbitrary permutations will not change the cardinality 
of an infon, under arbitrary permutations of arguments, this operation will still compute some 
cardinality quantifier. These considerations, I suggest, show that my theory is not on the wrong track. If 
someone wants these items to be logical, she does not need to come up with some choice of 
transformation that makes them invariant. Rather, she needs to show that cardinality matters to logic, 
and that is logical structure: this seems like the right way to go. 
3.3.1 Objection 
 
Take a language ℒ∞∞ whose primitive notions are identity, substitution, disjunction, negation and 
existential quantification. McGee (1996) proved that an n-ary operation is definable in ℒ∞∞ if and only 
if it is permutation invariant. The left-to-right part is not interesting, but the right-to-left is very 
important: it says that any PI operation is definable in that language. Since the language has, as 
primitives, paradigmatic examples of logical notions, and since an operation describable by a 
combination of logical notions is still a logical notion, McGee concludes that all permutation invariant 
items are logical notions. In my theory cardinality quantifiers are not FCI. Yet, there is a language, namely 
ℒ∞∞, whose all primitives are FCI-items, in which we can define cardinality quantifiers. This raises a 
doubt: even if it was true that cardinality quantifiers are not formally-computable, is this a problem with 
cardinality quantifiers or rather with the machinery we have been using? Maybe it is just a technical 
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limitation of our computational system, built in the way we set it up, rather than an interesting feature 
of the theory. 
Maybe so. In the next section I do raise doubts on how I set up the computational system. In fact, I do 
believe that it must be changed to allow for more expressive power (see 3.4.1). So, suppose this 
objection is right: then my theory, at least in the object/modal system, would probably collapse into PI. 
This may not be so bad, after all. My theory would not collapse into PI in any system, so it would not be, 
strictly speaking, just PI in another disguise. Secondly, my theory would still retain its explanatory 
power. For, contrary to permutation invariance, it says more about why conjunction or disjunction are 
logical: they are operations that checks what two infons have in common, and they reflect structural 
aspects of information. If, in the object-modal case, PI is just FCI, then this would give a philosophical 
ground for invariance theorists: permutation invariant items are all and only items which are intuitively 
describable by operations that check only structural aspects of information, and structural aspects of 
information, so I argued, are logical structure. 
However, I am not sure that cardinality quantifiers do not come out F-computable due to quirks of the 
system. Or, better, these “quirks” may not be quirks at all, but sensible limitations. I will give an analogy: 
the sentence ˹ ∃n>3x(Fx)˺, where ∃n>3x is the cardinality quantifier ˹ At least three things˺, can be rewritten 
employing paradigmatic logical notions only as ˹ ∃x∃y∃z(x≠y≠z & Fx & Fy & Fz)˺. Yet, this will not satisfy 
the critics of the logicality of cardinality quantifiers, in the slightest. They will still point out the problems 
related to these notions, which have not been addressed by the fact that we can substitute them with 
some combination of logical notions. This may suggest, by analogy, that something similar is happening 
with ℒ∞∞: maybe it allows too much, even though one is employing logical notions only. The debate, thus, 
may still be open, and I could object that even though a notion is describable in McGee’s language, there 
may be no logical operation that computes it. 
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3.4 World-Sensitivity and Quasi Logicality 
 
 In the discussion on the logicality of modal operators, so far, we have always talked about a certain 
kind of items: items that are not world-sensitive. By that, I mean that their behaviour does not change 
from world to world. For example, take logical necessity: we assumed that it is an S5 modal operator, 
where an S5 modal operator, in a Kripke semantics, is defined through an accessibility relation that is 
transitive, reflexive and symmetric (Garson 2016). In such system, every world valuates modal 
statements the same. For example, if P is possible from some w, it is possible from any w’ of the model. 
If something is world-sensitive, on the other hand, it will show some sort of “indexicality” that S5 
operators lack. By “indexicality” I mean that it shifts behaviour across contexts (I will be more precise 
later on).  
Take a S4 modal operator, for example. In a Kripke semantics, it is defined through an accessibility 
relation that is reflexive, transitive but not symmetric. Thus, it may happen that some w is accessible 
from w’, but w’ is not accessible from w. So, across worlds, the set of accessible worlds changes, and thus 
the operator may change behaviour, as well. For example, so far, we computed Kripke modal operators 
through reverse containment. Call “modal context of w” the set C = {w’/ Rww’}. We compute □P by 
checking if P contains C, and we compute ◊P by checking if the complement of P does not contain C. The 
simplest way to check that S4 is world-sensitive is to look at C: it varies from world to world, so it is 
world-sensitive. Take a model with W = {w, u} and an accessibility relation R = {(w, u), (w, w), (u, u)}. 
R satisfies S4. To valuate necessary statements before, we used [⊒] with inputs of type (φ, C), where C 
was constant. However, now containment fails to account for the S4 necessity just described. This 
happens for at least two, interconnected reasons. Firstly, C is not constant: in w, ⟬C⟭ = {w, u}, but in u, 
⟬C⟭ = {u}. Finally, the value of □φ is neither 1 nor 0, for some formula φ (1 is mapped to ⊤, with ⟬⊤⟭ = 
W, and 0 to ⊥, with ⊥ = ∅). Suppose ⟬φ⟭ = {u}. Then, φ is necessary from u but not from w, so ⟬□φ⟭ = 
{u} ≠ 1 or 0. This is the most powerful way to spot world-sensitivity, since it is applicable to semantics 
that are not Kripkean (like Algebraic semantics, Neighbourhood semantics etc.37). If the operation we 
                                                             
37 As already mentioned, these semantics are useful for modal logics that cannot be captured through Kripke 
frames. For example, logics without necessitation (where P is a theorem, so is □P), or without  
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use to valuate modal statements does not change across worlds, then every world will “agree” on every 
modal statement. Thus, an item is world sensitive in 𝔐 if, for some modal formula ψ, ψ ≠ 1 and ψ ≠ 0. 
So, a Kripke modal operator is world-sensitive if this holds: 
i. Not for all w ∈ 𝔐, Cw ≠ k, where k is some constant and Cw={w’/ R(w, w’)}. 
The general definition however is this: 
World-sensitivity: An n-ary sentential operator 𝒳 is world-sensitive iff, for some 𝔐 for 𝒳,  
𝒳(a, b, …, n) ≠ ⊤ and 𝒳(a, b, …, n) ≠ ⊥, for any n-ary sequence of formulas (a, b, 
…, n) of the language. 
World-sensitivity generalizes (i), since (i) implies the condition set in the definition. Suppose 𝒳 is a 
necessity operator □. Suppose C is not constant. Then there will be two worlds w and u such that Cw ≠ 
Cu. Regardless, there will be at least a proposition P such that □P is true in w but not in u, and thus 
∅⊂⟬□P⟭⊂W (Cw and Cu are either one a subset of the other or not. If they are, then take the P whose 
truth-set is the smaller context. If they are not, take the P whose truth-set is one of the contexts). The 
condition in the definition implies (i) in Kripke semantics, as well.  
The fact that the definition of world-sensitivity is all about the extension of modal statements helps 
clarify what world-sensitivity is. I called it a form of indexicality, yet this was imprecise. An item is 
indexical if it shifts content through contexts (in this case, worlds). In Kaplanian terms, we take these 
items to have both a character and a content. A character is a function from circumstances of evaluation 
to contents, a content is the extension of some term (Kaplan 1989). For example, ˹ Today˺ has a character 
that “takes you” from a context to a day: the day of the context. An item is indexical iff it has different 
contents in different contexts. Yet S4 modal operators are not indexical, in this sense. For take what is 
supposed to be their character: the function from context to contents. Since the modal is the relevant 
variable that makes the content “shift”, we can equate the context with type W. S4 necessity is of type 
〈〈W,V〉,〈W,V〉〉, thus its character is of type 〈W,〈〈W,V〉,〈W,V〉〉〉. Yet, this function takes any w to the same 
                                                             
K: □(P→Q)→(□P→□Q) etc. The definition will apply as long as, if some formula is mapped to 1, then it is necessary 
from every world, and if it is mapped to 0, it is impossible from every world. 
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content: to the same function from propositions to propositions. So, the content of S4 necessity does not 
shift, and it is not indexical. What is changing across worlds is rather the extension of statements that 
contain S4 necessity. MacFarlane has carefully distinguished these two kinds of sensitivity to context: 
Use-sensitive. An expression (or content) is use-sensitive iff its extension (relative to a context of 
use and context of assessment38) depends on features of the context of use. 
Use-indexical. An expression is use-indexical iff it expresses different contents at different 
contexts of use (MacFarlane 2015, 79). 
S4 necessity is use-sensitive, but it is not use-indexical.  
Being not world-sensitive is not a sufficient condition for logicality. For example, take a necessity 
operator defined over an accessibility relation that is such that, for any w ∈ W, Rwa, where ‘a’ is constant. 
This operator is not world-sensitive, but it is clearly not FCI.  In fact, the already mentioned 𝒮: ˹In every 
cat-world˺ is not world-sensitive and yet not logical. As one may suspect already, however, FCI usually 
implies world-insensitivity. This happens for two reasons, mainly. Firstly, the operator that is world-
sensitive cannot be computed by an operation whose output is 1 or 0. The only way to compute it, then, 
would consist in some combination of meet, join and complementation, but this is usually impossible 
for things like necessity operators. Secondly, almost all the FTMs suggested so far for computing Kripke 
modal operators presupposed a fixed “modal context”. To compute a Kripke world-sensitive operator 
we would have to change the final part of the sequence the FTM is taking, and thus the item would not 
fit the requirements for formal computability, for its input-sequences would not be such that (b2) = k. 
Consequently, modal operators in logics weaker than S5 will usually not be FC-invariant. The same 
usually goes for any “context-variable” modal operators. There is an exception, though: take a Kripke 
model such that R(w, w), for any w: it is the “solipsistic” R already mentioned. In such models, necessity 
and possibility collapse into the identity function, which is FCI: to compute these operators we just need 
the empty FCI. 
                                                             
38 MacFarlane thinks some notions are “assessment-sensitive”: they are sensitive to shifts in context of assessment, 
rather than context of “use”.  
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3.4.1 Quasi-Formal-Computability 
 
As already mentioned, Novaes criticizes standard invariance for making S4 modal operators not 
logical:  
The point is not that the S4 modal operators should necessarily be counted as logical; rather, the 
point is what independent motivations would justify that the S4 modal operators do not count as 
logical, whereas their counterparts interpreted on universal frames do. What is the fundamental, 
philosophical difference between these two cases besides the fact that they are interpreted on 
different structures? (2014, 94). 
This is a fair point, which is linked to our discussion of standard invariance theories: they are usually 
not very explanatory, since they fail to specify what is “logical structure” and what is not, and they tend 
to reverse engineer the test so that it gives out the extension they have in mind for reasons independent 
of invariance per se. In such a situation, it is fair to ask: why is S4 accessibility relation not logical? Why 
should it be “below” the lower bound of logical structures, given that we did not specify any? Formal 
Computability Invariance, however, does account for the difference between a S5 modal operator 
defined over the set of logically possible worlds, and an S4 modal operator defined over the same set. 
The first is computable by an operation that checks only structural aspects of information, which are 
“logical structure”, and this behaviour is preserved under transformations of the information the 
operator receives. The second, however, is not computable by any such operation, at all. Thus, S4 modal 
operators are never logical: either they are not defined over the set of all logically possible worlds (and 
thus will never be invariant), or, even if they are, they are not formally computable.   
To be fair, though, Novaes may have a point: maybe our test is too restrictive. Yet in what sense can S4 
operators be logical? We said that there are two problems: the context shifts and the output in neither 
1 nor 0. Well, the second issue is arguably a limitation of our system, rather than a philosophical 
problem. For suppose we want to valuate □φ in w, where □ is S4, and it is defined over WL. We can use 
containment: we just need to check if {w’/Rww’} ⊆ ⟬φ⟭. If yes, the output is True (i.e. 1), otherwise False 
(i.e. 0). We may then design an FTM that “stores” the worlds for which the output is 1, and then print 
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the list of them: this will give you the extension of □φ. This improvement in the FTM will not jeopardize 
its “formality”, I take it. However, I prefer another solution. In section 2.4, we have already established 
that relations are logical iff their “valuation” is, so we may do something similar here. Call the valuation 
of a n-ary sentential operator 𝒳, relative to a model 𝔐 = 〈W, R, V, ⊨〉 the set of instances of some FTM 
needed to evaluate, for each w ∈ W, formulas of the form 𝒳(a, b, …n), where (a, b, …, n) is any n-ary 
sequence of well-formed sentences of the language (not only atomic). This operation will “follow” the ⊨ 
relation of the model: 
1. Valuation of 𝓧 relative to 𝕸 (𝓥𝕸
𝓧 ). Take any n-ary modal operator 𝒳. Where Sn is the set of all 
n-ary sequences of sentences of the language, 𝒱𝔐  
𝒳 is the function W×Sn → V such that, for 
any (P, Q, …N) ∈ Sn, 𝒱𝔐  
𝒳 (w, (P, Q, …, N)) = T iff w⊨ 𝒳(P, Q, …, N); F otherwise. 
This takes care of the first problem. There are other issues, though: suppose we want to compute some 
Kripkean world-sensitive operator through [⊒]. We can’t, for two reasons: (i) the sequences the FTM 
takes as arguments are not such that (bm)m>n = k, since the context shifts; (ii) the sequences would not 
match the input of containment, since the valuation has, as inputs, a world and a sentence, the other a 
set of worlds and a sentence. Yet, suppose we want to stick to our intuition that, in some sense, we are 
using containment to evaluate formulas at each world. We may try to model a notion of weak formal 
computability. A first guess could be this: we relax compatibility by dropping the assumption that 
(bm)m>n = k. Now the context can “shift”, for we are just asking that the FTM takes, as input, a sequence 
that contains the argument of the item we are testing. For the other issue, we can make an exception: 
Quasi-FC.1. An n-ary modal operator 𝒳 defined over WL is quasi-FC =df the valuation of 𝒳 is weakly 
formally-computable. That is, for any model 𝔐 for 𝒳 such that WL ∈ 𝔐, for 
some FTM, there exists a function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ 𝒱𝔐  
𝒳 such that: 
d) For every (w, sn) and s, Comp(w, sn) = s iff 𝒱𝔐
𝒳(w, sn) = FTM(s). 
e) For every (w, sn), Comp(w, sn) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)sn, where (ax)sn 
is the x-th element of sn. 
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As it should be, quasi-formal computability does not imply formal computability39. However, this 
definition will not do because it is too weak. We can show that most unary operators whose output is 0 
or 1 are weakly FC:  
Proof 3.4. Define [⊑]:  
• Input: sequences (x,y) 
• F = {s1}. 
• Instructions: [⊑](s0, input). 
This is a simple containment test. Now define [C]:  
• Input: sequences (x,y) 
• F = {s1}. 
• Instructions: [C](s0, input). 
This is compatibility. Now take any unary sentential operator k whose output is either 0 or 1 and 
such that either for any w of 𝔐,  𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, ∅) = 1 or, for any w of 𝔐, 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, ∅) = 0. 
Suppose the former: in any w ∈ 𝔐, w ⊨ k(∅). When 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 1, take [⊑] and set (φ, W). When 
𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 0, take [⊑] and set (φ, ∅). [⊑] weakly computes 𝒱𝔐 
𝑘 . For take all the φ’s such that  
𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 1. 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = [⊑](φ, W), because every φ is contained in the W, even ∅. On the other 
hand, for any φ such that 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 0, 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = [⊑](φ, ∅), for the only thing that is contained 
in ∅ is ∅, but we have assumed that 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, ∅) = 1.  
Now suppose the latter: 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, ∅) = 0, for any w of 𝔐. When 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 1, take [C] and set  
(φ, W). When 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 0, take [C] and set (φ, ∅). For all φ such that 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 0, 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 
[C](φ, W), for [C](φ, W) = 1 iff ⋀(φ, W) ≠ ∅, and this does not happen only for ⋀(∅, W), but we 
                                                             
39 The reverse may not hold, as well. It holds whenever an item k is computable by an FTM whose output is 0 or 1. 
For then its valuation is weakly computable by the same machine. Yet, if the output of the FTM that computes k is 
not 0 or 1, we cannot use the same FTM to compute k’s valuation, since the range of 𝒱 is 0 and 1. It can be, then, 
that there is no way to compute k’s valuation, even though k is formally-computable, or even FCI. This problem 
suggests that we should change the machine so that it can “store” the results of the valuation, for each world, and 
then print the list of worlds for which 𝒱(w, sn) = 1. I will not do this here, however, for my focus will be Kripke 
modal operators only, for which we do not need such complication. 
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have assumed that 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, ∅) = 0. On the other hand, for all φ such that 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) = 0, 𝒱𝔐
𝑘 (w, φ) 
=[C](φ, ∅), for everything is incompatible with ∅, even ∅ itself and W: ⋀(∅, W) = ∅ and ⋀(∅, ∅) = 
∅. So, in any case, k is weakly formally computable either by [⊑] or by [C].  
So, any unary operator that does not change behaviour across worlds when it takes as input ∅ will be 
weakly formally computable. Should we fix this? Maybe. I think we should, because, intuitively, the 
valuation of a necessity operator in a Kripke structure is almost never checking if some sentence is 
compatible with the empty set. Rather, it checks if the sentence is true in the extension of R for that 
world. How can we strengthen our notion of computation, so that the FTM that computes the valuation 
of 𝒳 really “simulates” it? We may ask that whenever the valuation does something different, so does 
the FTM that computes it. When does this happen? Valuations take, as arguments, a world and some 
sequence of sentences. A change in sequence is not interesting for us, so we will assume that switching 
sequence never changes what the valuation is doing. Changing world, however, may or may not change 
what the valuation is doing: the valuation of a Kripkean necessity operator, for example, does something 
different only when we change the extension of the accessibility relation. This is why logical necessity, 
for example, is not world-sensitive: the extension of the accessibility relation is constant, so the 
valuation is always doing the same thing.  
The problem with Quasi FC.1 is now clearer: what the FTM is doing does not “track” changes in what 
the valuation is doing. For the fact that 𝒱𝔐
𝒳(w, φ) = 𝒱𝔐
𝒳(v, φ) alone does not imply that, in these two 
instances, the valuation of k is doing “the same thing”: it may be that Cw ≠ Cv. To fix this, we ask that, for 
every “change” in what the valuation is doing, there is a correspondent “change” in what the FTM is 
doing. So, suppose we divide the behaviour of some item in “actions”. Actions will partition the domain 
of the item: different kinds of inputs will require a different action. Actions of some K are individuated 
as subsets of the domain of K. Actions for FTMs are finely grained in this sense: suppose an FTM 
computes an n-ary item. Then, actions of the FTM are all the subsets of its domain whose elements are 
identical from n+1 up. For example, with Kripkean necessity operators, actions of the FTM are 
equinumerous with the set of Cw: there is one action for every “shift” in the extension of R.  
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I will call the set of actions of K 𝒜(K). A single action will be labelled by capital letters A, B, C etc. We 
can give this definition of quasi-FC: 
Quasi-FC.2.   An n-ary modal operator 𝒳 defined over WL is quasi-FC =df the valuation of 𝒳 is 
weakly formally-computable. I.e., for any model 𝔐 for 𝒳 such that WL ∈ 𝔐, for some FTM, 
there exists a function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ 𝒱𝔐  
𝒳 such that: 
a) For every sn and s, Comp(w, sn) = s iff 𝒱𝔐
𝒳(w, sn) = FTM(s). 
b) For every (w, sn), Comp(w, sn) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)sn, where (ax)sn 
is the x-th element of sn. 
c) There is an injection between 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝒳) and 𝒜Comp, where  
𝒜Comp = {A ∈ 𝒜(FTM)/ A ⊆ Comp(x)}. 
From now on, when I speak of quasi-FC, I mean quasi-FC.2. Condition (c) looks at the domain and range 
of Comp, and divides them in actions. If there are at least as many actions in the range as there are in the 
domain, then (c) is satisfied. Now, for the most part, it will be impossible to use just [⊑] or [C] for most 
unary operators, as in proof 3.4, because, in both cases, the set of actions of the range has just two 
elements: there are just two 2nd elements of any input of the FTM: either ∅ or W. If the valuation is doing 
at least three different things, there is not injection between the two sets. If not, then we may as well use 
that FTM to weakly compute the valuation.  
It is hard to give a precise definition of quasi-formal computability in this way, since the notion of 
“actions” is somewhat vague. We have, however, a pretty clear definition of different actions for unary 
modal operators in a Kripke structure, which will be enough for our discussion. The set 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝐾) for some 
Kripkean modal operator K is the set of X such that:  
i. X ⊆ W×S1 
ii. If (w, φ) ∈ X then (v, φ’) ∈ X iff (R(w, w’) iff R(v, w’)), for any w, w’, v ∈ W.   
Basically, 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝐾 ) is the set of sets of (w, φ) closed under identity of Cw. Thus, actions of 𝒱𝔐
𝐾  will be 
equinumerous with the set of Cw. In fact, for most Kripkean modal operators, the injection will be a 
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bijection. For, usually, for any way they are weakly-computable, the range of Comp is the set of (φ, Cw). 
Suppose it is so for K. Since 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝐾) is equinumerous with the set of Cw, which is equinumerous with 
𝒜Comp, there will be a bijection between 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝐾) and 𝒜Comp40.  
 
3.4.2 Quasi-Logicality defined. 
 
Now that we have a notion of quasi-formal-computability, we need a relaxed notion of invariance as 
well. However, asking for the invariance of the item’s weakly formal computability may be too stringent. 
For, in this case, we are asking that, if some (w, φ) was computed by (φ, Cw), then the same (w, φ) must 
be computed by the same (φ, Cw) under permutations. They are tracking each other individually, so to 
speak. Yet in this way, most world-sensitive items do not come out quasi-logical, anyway. If our intent 
was to model a relaxed notion of logicality, this would not get us very far. We may relax the notion even 
more in this way: what if we ask that the “tracking” under permutations, rather than applying 
individually, for each argument and value of Comp, it applies “collectively”? Suppose an FTM weakly 
computes the valuation of K, and suppose we list all the instances of the FTM needed to weakly compute 
each instance of 𝒱𝔐
𝐾 . My suggestion is that an item is quasi-logical iff, under arbitrary permutations, the 
whole transformed list of instances of FTM is still enough to weakly compute in the same way the whole 
transformed list of instances of 𝒱𝔐
𝐾 . Before, we were asking that each couple of permuted inputs of the 
item and permuted inputs of the FTM “tracked” each other, by still giving out the same output. Now we 
are just asking that, under arbitrary permutations of inputs, for each permuted inputs of the item, the 
“work” needed to compute the resulting instance of the valuation can still be done by some member of 
the transformed list of instances of the FTM.  
                                                             
40 Interestingly, for modal operators defined over the “solipsistic” R, even though 𝒱𝔐
𝐾(w, φ) = FTM (φ), with the 
empty FTM, this FTM cannot be used to weakly compute these items, because it performs the same action across 
any world, even though the items are world-sensitive. So, here we will need to use reversed containment. 
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Quasi-Logicality.1. An n-ary modal operator 𝒳 is quasi-logical =df it is completely defined over WL 
and for any model 𝔐 for 𝒳, for some FTM, there exists a function Comp: 
FTM-1 ∘ 𝒱𝔐
𝒳 such that: 
a) For every sn and s, Comp(w, sn) = s iff 𝒱𝔐
𝒳(w, sn) = FTM(s). 
b) For every sn, Comp(w, sn) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)sn, where (ax)sn is 
the x-th element of sn. 
c) There in an injection between 𝒜(𝒱𝔐
𝒳) and 𝒜Comp = {A ∈ 𝒜(FTM)/ A ⊆ Comp(x)}. 
d) For every permutation of information σ, for every (w, sn), there exists a (w’, sn’) such 
that Comp(σS(w, sn)) = σS(Comp(w’, sn’)). 
This is a noteworthy behaviour, I believe, which shows an interesting abstraction from content. Not only 
the item is computable by a formal operation but, no matter how we permute information, the 
transformed instances of the formal operation can compute in the same way the transformed instances 
of the item. It is also clear why this is still weaker than “pure” logicality: it may be that some transformed 
instance of the operation is computed by some other transformed instance of the item. The “tracking” 
which invariance consists of is not done for each couple of argument-value of Comp, but on a collective 
scale: the transformed domain of Comp is still computed by the transformed range. 
More generally, since the item we are testing is usually completely defined, something interesting 
happens. By “completely” I mean that, if the item 𝒳 is a “normal” n-ary operator, the valuation function 
will valuate any n-ary sequence of sentences of the language in each world of the model. That is, the 
valuation function will have, as domain, the complete cartesian product WL×Sn. This is as it should be. 
For suppose the item is not completely valuated. Then, somehow, the item is sensitive either to the 
identity of some specific logically possible world, or to the identity of some proposition. This may be a 
good reason to deny it the status of “logical” item, or even “quasi-logical” item.  
The domain of 𝒱𝔐
𝒳 is invariant under arbitrary automorphisms of WL, because WL×Sn is: for any  
(w, sn), for any σ, there will be a (σ(w), σS(sn)) ∈ WL×Sn, simply because σ(w) ∈ WL and σS(sn) ∈ Sn, given 
that permutations cannot switch cardinality (σS(sn) cannot “end up” in some element of Sm, with m ≠ n) 
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and sentences, in the model, are mapped to subsets of WL (so, transforming sentences means ending up 
in some other subset of WL). Since the domain of 𝒱𝔐
𝒳 is the domain of Comp, it must be that, for any  
(w, sn), for any σ, Comp(σS(w, sn)) = Comp(w’, sn’), for some (w’, sn’) in the domain of Comp. So, 
necessarily, Comp (σS(w, sn)) = σS(Comp(w’, sn’) for some (w’, sn’) if and only if σS(Comp(w’, sn’)) is 
“already” in the range41 of Comp; that is iff σS(Comp(w’, sn’)) = Comp (w’’, sn’’), for some (w’’, sn’’). This 
definition of quasi-logicality is thus equivalent to the previous one: 
Quasi-Logicality.2.  An n-ary item 𝒳 is quasi-logical iff  
a) Its valuation is complete and defined over WL. 
b)  Its valuation is weakly FC. 
c) For any permutation σ, for any (w, sn), σS(Comp(w, sn)) = Comp(w’, sn’) for some (w’, sn’). 
Basically, the definition says that K is quasi-logical only if, no matter how you transform a value of the 
computation function, you still “end up” in one value of the range of the computation. More generally, K 
is quasi-logical only if the range of the computation function that weakly computes its valuation is 
invariant. For the range of Comp is invariant iff, for any σ, σS(s) = s’, with s, s’ ∈ Comp (x).  
Now, take a modal operator in a Kripke semantics: for either of them, the arguments any FTM uses to 
compute an arbitrary instance of their valuation is always (φ, Cw), where Cw is the modal context of w. 
Therefore, when we transform (φ, Cw), we transform φ or Cw. If only the former, then we are obviously 
“ending up” in the valuation of the operator in w for σ〈W,V〉(φ). If the latter, then we are switching context, 
and the only way for σS(φ, Cw) not to “end up” outside the range of the computation function is that 
σ〈W,V〉(Cw) is some Cu, where u is some world of the model. Therefore, another way to express condition 
(c) above for these modal operators is to say that, under arbitrary permutations, for any w ∈ WL, there 
exists a v ∈ WL such that σ〈W,V〉(Cw) = Cv. 
 
 
                                                             
41 Again, by “range” I mean the image of the domain in the codomain, and not the codomain as a whole. 
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3.4.3   Quasi Logical Items 
 
We can easily prove that any Kripkean modal operator that is not world-sensitive and not FCI is not 
Quasi-Logical. 
Proof 3.5. Take any □ defined in a Kripke structure. For any model 〈W, R, V, ⊨〉, for any w of the 
model, Cw = C, with C constant and not permutation invariant (otherwise the operator would be 
FCI). The valuation of □ is weakly computed by [⊒], when given (φ, C), for any sentential argument 
φ. Define a permutation such that σ〈W,V〉(C) ≠ C. Now, for any (w, φ) there is no (w’, φ’) such that 
Comp(σS(w, φ)) = σS(Comp(w’, φ’)), for σS(Comp(w’, φ’)) = (σ〈W,V〉(φ), σ〈W,V〉(C)), for all (w, φ), 
Comp(w, φ) = (φ, C), and (φ, C) ≠ (φ, σ〈W,V〉(C)). For any other way □ is computable, a similar 
proof applies. For ◊, a similar proof applies. 
Thus, items like ˹In any cat-world˺ are not logical. This is a good start. We can also prove that any FCI 
unary modal operator we encountered so far is quasi-logical:  
• The valuation of logical necessity is computed by [⊒] with, as domain, the set of (φ, WL). WL 
is invariant, so the range of the computation function is invariant, as well. Thus, logical 
necessity (and possibility, for the same reason) is quasi-logical.  
• The valuation of “empty” necessity is computed by [⊒] with, as range for Comp, the set of (φ, 
∅). Again, this range is invariant, so the item is quasi-logical. 
• The modal operator defined over the solipsistic relation R/R(w, w), for any w ∈ WL is quasi 
logical. For, again, we have that the item is weakly computable by reverse containment and 
the range of Comp is the set of (φ, {w}), for any φ and any w ∈ WL, and this set is invariant.  
What world-sensitive items are quasi-logical? Well, we can come up with some examples of items that 
are not FCI and yet quasi-logical. What we need is (i) that the item is completely evaluated over WL, (ii) 
that this valuation is weakly-computable, and (iii) that the range of the FTM that weakly computes the 
item is invariant. I have some examples of quasi-logical and yet not FCI Kripkean necessity operators: 
a. Take a Kripke necessity operator defined over WL, with an R such that R(w, v) iff w ≠ v. The 
valuation of this item is weakly computable via [⊒], for any (w, φ). Since, by the definition of 
87 
 
permutation, the complement of identity is preserved under arbitrary permutations, if  
w ≠ w’ then σ(w) ≠ σ(w’), for any w and w’. Thus, given that Cw = WL − {w}, which is the 
extension of the complement of identity for w, we have that, for any σ, σ〈W,V〉(Cw) = Cv, for 
some v ∈ WL. In particular, if σ(w) = w, then σ〈W,V〉(Cw) = Cw, and if σ(w) = v, then σ〈W,V〉(Cw) 
= Cv. Interestingly, this necessity operator is world-sensitive (Cw is not constant) and, even 
though R is nothing but the complement of the identity relation, and even though the 
necessity operator defined over the identity relation was FCI, this operator is not FCI, because 
it is not formally computable42.  
b. Take any bijection 𝒷 between WL and itself. Define an accessibility relation R on WL such that 
R(w, v) iff 𝒷(w) = v. The corresponding necessity operator is not worldly-invariant, and is 
probably not FCI, with the exception of one case: the identity bijection 𝒷(w) = {w} (in that 
case, the item is the “solipsistic” operator). Yet, it is weakly computable by [⊒], for every (w, 
φ), when given the corresponding (φ, Cw). In particular, the range of Comp will be invariant, 
because it is the total cartesian product of S1×WL1, where WL1 is the set of all singletons of 
elements of WL and S1 is the set of sentences of the language. Since cardinality is permutation 
invariant, WL1 is permutation invariant; S1 is invariant, as well, being the total 𝓅WL, so their 
cartesian product must be invariant, as well. Therefore, the so defined necessity operator is 
quasi-logical. Since bijections between WL and itself are nothing but permutations of WL, 
there is a different quasi-logical necessity operator for every permutation of WL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
42 The operator is not PI, either. This is interesting: while FCI is preserved under complementation, it is not 
preserved for modal operators under complementation of their accessibility relation. The same goes for 
permutation invariance. 
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3.5 A case study: Deontic Modality and Logicality. 
 
In this section, I want to show an application of my theory to a particular, well-discussed item of the 
language: deontic modality. Are deontic modals formal? And if so, in what sense? This is an interesting 
discussion, I believe, for it shows how the framework we are setting up has potential, under-discussed 
ramifications, given its general applicability. I will show how a contextualist Ought might be quasi-
logical. 
 
3.5.1 Standard Deontic Logic 
 
Deontic modals have been extensively studied in linguistics and philosophy of language. There are 
numerous, very different semantical accounts of their meaning43. However, there is a system that is 
standard, in the literature. In fact, it is called “Standard Deontic Logic” (SDL)44. It is unclear who first 
thought of this application of modal logic to normative systems: SDL was probably heavily influenced 
by Von Wright’s work on the application of modal logic, in the 50’s (Von Wright 1951, 1953).  
More technically, we obtain SDL when we take propositional logic and we add these axioms45: 
(K)  𝒪(p → q) → (𝒪p → 𝒪q). 
(N) if ⊢ p then ⊢ 𝒪p 
(D) 𝒪p → ¬𝒪¬p. 
Sometimes we also to this minimal SDL this additional axiom: 
(4) 𝒪(𝒪p → p) 
The first is K: it says that ‘Ought’ distributes over implication. The second is Necessitation: whatever is 
a theorem, it ought to be the case. The third is the standard axiom D: it says that if something is necessary 
                                                             
43 For an overview of the current debate, see McNamara (2014). For an updated philosophical discussion, see 
Charlow, N., & Chrisman (2016). For a more logic-driven discussion, see Gabbay et al. (2013). 
44 See, for example, McNamara (2014) or Hilpinen & McNamara (2013). 
45 Here I am following McNamara’s axiomatization (2014). 
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it is possible. Axiom (4) is not derivable through the minimal SDL, but it is desirable: it says that it ought 
to be that whatever ought to be the case is realised. 
The semantics for SDL is quite simple: since we have both K and N, it is a normal modal logic, and it can 
be modelled via standard Kripke semantics. Let language ℒ be the smallest set generated from a set of 
atomic sentences plus Boolean connectives, enriched with operators 𝒪. Let 𝒱 be an “atomic” valuation 
function that maps each atomic formula to a subset of WL, where WL is the set of all logically possible 
worlds. 〈WL, R, V, ⊨〉 is a Kripke model for ℒ, where ⊨ is a relation from WL to ℒ defined inductively: 
i. w⊨ A iff w∈𝒱(A), where A is atomic 
ii. w⊨ ¬φ iff w⊭ A 
iii. w⊨ φ∧ψ iff w⊨ φ and w⊨ ψ. 
iv. w⊨ φ∨ψ iff not both w⊭ φ and w⊭ ψ. 
v. w⊨ φ→ψ iff either w⊨ φ or w⊭ ψ. 
vi. w⊨ 𝒪φ iff ∀w’(Rww’, w’⊨φ). 
The conditions on R depends on the system we choose. In minimal SDL, we assume R to be serial: 
Seriality ∀w(∃v(Rwv)). 
Seriality implies that if something is necessary it is possible: it is axiom D. D is satisfied when, from every 
world, you can access some world. This prevents the clause for Ought to be trivially satisfied: if, for some 
w, no world is accessible, the system would make in w every φ a duty. (4), on the other hand, is 
equivalent to this condition: 
Shift-Reflexivity ∀w(∀v(Rwv → Rvv)). 
What is the meaning of Rwv? Generally, it is thought to mean that, from w, v is (one of the) best worlds. 
So, something ought to be the case from w iff it is the case in every best world from w. Something is 
permissible iff it is true in at least one best-world from w. The fact that we are talking about “best” 
worlds suggests that we are implicitly “extracting” the accessibility relation out of an ethical ordering 
between worlds. So, suppose that, for any v of WL, we define an indexed relation ≤v on WL: 
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i. w ≤v w (reflexivity) 
ii. (w ≤v w’ & w’ ≤v w’’) → w ≤v w’’ (transitivity) 
iii. w ≤v w’ or w’ ≤v w (Totality) 
iv. ∃w(∀w’(w’ ≤v w)) (Limit Assumption) 
≤v is thus a pre-order with an upper bound. The limit assumption corresponds to seriality: from any 
world, there is always a best-world, for any world-indexed ethical ordering (McNamara 2014). The idea 
is that it ought to be the case that P, from v, iff in every upper bound of ≤v, P is the case46 (we will discuss 
in the end a system without the Limit Assumption).  
 
3.5.2 Is Standard Deontic Modality Formal? 
 
Now that we have a decent grasp on the standard semantics for deontic modality, we may ask: if this 
was the right semantics for Ought, would Ought be logical? By sticking to standard invariance, the 
answer would just be: “Of course not”. That is, unless R is either empty or if it collapses into logical 
possibility, or if it is the “solipsistic” necessity47, but this is very unlikely: relevant worlds in which we 
evaluate what ought to be the case will arguably be a proper subset of WL, so arbitrary permutations of 
worlds will affect deontic modals. Yet, one may ask: why do we permute worlds arbitrarily? Maybe the 
ethical ordering is logical structure and, if so, we should not “abstract away” from it. How can we 
establish if this is the case? 
Standard invariance does not provide an answer to this, nor does it help providing it, because it does 
not offer an opinionated definition of logical structure we can apply, here. I believe that my theory can 
do a better job in justifying whatever conclusion we reach. Is ethical ordering logical structure? Yes, if 
and only if it is a structural aspect of information. If so, then there will be a corresponding formal 
operation that computes Ought, by being sensitive only to this logical structure. Personally, I do not 
                                                             
46 Even though, at first glance, a translation between SDL and a semantics with such ordering relation should be 
quite straightforward, it is not. An investigation on how to extract SDL out of an “ordering” semantics is in Goble 
2003. 
47 If this was the case, it would be true in every world that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. 
Pangloss would surely be happy to embrace this view without hesitation. 
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believe that ethical orderings are structural aspects of information, though: they do not seem to shape 
the structure of information as such. In any case, if someone wants to, she can try to give some 
arguments in this direction, and then Ought will come out logical. For then, no matter how we permute 
worlds, when we give the resulting input to 𝒪, some FTM will still simulate its behaviour. This is the 
road one should take, I believe: it does not matter much if Ought is invariant, but rather if it behaves 
logically, and if it does so “blindly”. 
This is a first possibility: that the ethical ordering is logical structure. However, it is quite far-fetched. 
What if the ethical ordering is not a structural aspect of information? Then Ought is probably not logical. 
Yet, it may be quasi-logical. An item is quasi logical iff (i) it is completely defined over WL, (ii) its 
valuation is weakly-computable and (iii) the range of the computation function that weakly computes 
its valuation is invariant. We already know that Ought, at least in SDL, is weakly-computable, because it 
is a necessity operator in a normal Kripke semantics. We just need some FTM like reversed containment 
[⊒]: for every 𝒱𝔐
𝒪 , [⊒] computes 𝒱𝔐
𝒪 (w, φ) when given (φ, Cw), where Cw = {w’/Rww’}. We can also 
safely assume that Ought is completely definable over WL. 
Now, for the invariance part, we really need to know more about how we are ordering worlds. For 
suppose that what is ethically the best is not world-sensitive: then the best-worlds is a constant set, and 
does not change from world to world. In this case, unless there is no best world, or any world is the best, 
or in every world the actual is the best, then Ought will not be quasi-logical. This is highly unlikely: it is 
more sensible to suppose that, for any world w, the w-best-worlds are a proper subset of WL. Therefore, 
via proof 3.5, Ought is not quasi-logical: by swapping a world “inside” Cw with one “outside” Cw we will 
upset it. However, things are not that easy: by doing that, we will upset “Ought from w”. Yet, it may still 
be that the valuation of Ought is weakly-FCI: we just need that, when transforming Cw, the resulting 
transformation is a Cv, for some v ∈ WL. That is, for any permutation σ, for any (w, φ), σS(Comp(w, φ)) 
= Comp(w’, φ’) for some (w’, φ’), where Comp is the relevant computation function Comp: [⊒]-1 ∘ 𝒱𝔐
𝒪 .  
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How can this happen? It is hard, but not impossible. Let us give an example. Since we adopted the Limit 
Assumption, our ordering of worlds will have a unique set of best-world, for every w. Therefore, Cv = 
{w/∀w’(w ≮v w’)}48, where <w is the correspondent strict version of ≤w: 
i. w ≮v w (irreflexivity) 
ii. w <v w’ → w’ ≮v w (a-symmetry) 
iii. (w <v w’ & w’ <v w’’) → w <v w’’ (transitivity) 
 We lose totality, for it may be that two worlds are “weighted” the same, so any two words are not such 
that one is strictly better than the other or vice-versa. Since the range of the computation function for 𝒪, 
in this case, is the set of all the tuples (φ, {w’/∀w’’ (w’ ≮w w’’)}), it follows that 𝒪 is quasi-logical only if, 
for any indexed ethical linear order <w, the set of its upper bounds is such that, for any permutation σ, 
σ〈W,V〉({w’/∀w’’ (w’ ≮w w’’) = {u/∀w’’ (u ≮v w’’}, for some v ∈ WL. We can now give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the quasi-logicality of 𝒪: 
Quasi-Logicality of 𝒪 𝒪 is quasi-logical iff:  
a) it is completely defined over WL  
b) It is weakly computable. 
c) for any indexed ethical linear order ≤w, the set of its upper bounds is such 
that, for any permutation σ, σ〈W,V〉 ({w’/∀w’’ (w’ ≮w w’’) = {u/∀w’’ (u ≮v w’’}, 
for some v ∈ WL (Abundance). 
There is no reason to doubt that (a) is satisfied. We also know that 𝒪 satisfies (b). Moreover, for any way 
𝒪 is weakly-computable, the range of Comp is a subset of 𝓅WL×𝓅WL: the set of (φ, Cw), with Cw = 
{w’/∀w’’ (w’ ≮w w’’}. What about (c)? Call this condition Abundance. Since the set of transformations 
induced by arbitrary permutations, for a subset X of WL, is the set of sets of cardinality |X|, we have 
Abundance iff, for any Cw, any X of cardinality |Cw| is some Cv, for some v ∈ WL. Now we can prove that 𝒪 
is quasi-logical iff conditions (a), (b) and (c) are met: 
                                                             
48 {w/∀w’(w ≮v w’)} = {w/∀w’(w’ ≤v w)}, since everything is not strictly better than w iff everything is less-or-
equal-to w. 
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Proof 3.6. Conditions (a) and (b) are part of the definition of quasi-logicality, and we already know 
that 𝒪 meets them. For condition (c), first, suppose Abundance is not met. Then, for some indexed 
ethical linear order ≤v, the set of its upper bounds Cv is not such that, for any permutation σ,  
σ〈W,V〉 ({w/∀w’ (w ≮v w’) = {w’’/∀w’ (w’’ ≮u w’}, for some u ∈ WL. Since the set of transformations 
of Cv are all and only the subsets of WL with cardinality |Cv|, it follows that there must an A ⊆ WL 
of cardinality |Cv|, such that ∄w ∈ WL (Cw = A). 𝒱𝔐
𝒪  is weakly computable by an FTM such that 
Comp has, as range, the set of all (φ, Cw). Define a set of permutation σ1, σ2… such that σ〈W,V〉(Cv) = 
A (we know this is possible because Cv and A have the same cardinality). There exists at least a 
(w, φ) such that σS(Comp(w, φ)) ≠ Comp(w’, φ’) for any (w’, φ’). In particular, this happens for 
any (v, φ). For σS(Comp(v, φ)) = σS(φ, Cv) = (σ〈W,V〉(φ), A), and, for any (w’, φ’), Comp (w’, φ’) ≠ 
(σ〈W,V〉(φ), A), since for no w, Cw = A. Therefore, 𝒪 is not quasi-logical. Ergo, if 𝒪 is quasi-logical, 
then Abundance is met. 
Now for the reverse, suppose Abundance is met. Then for any Cw, any X of cardinality |Cw| is some 
Cw’, for some w’ ∈ WL. We know that 𝒪 is weakly-computable, so there is a Comp [⊒]-1 ∘ 𝒱𝔐
𝒪  such 
that Comp(w, φ) = (φ, Cw). We know conditions (a) and (b) are met. Since Abundance is met, the 
range of Comp is such that, for any permutation, σS(Comp(w, φ) = Comp (w’, φ’), since for any σ, 
σ〈W,V〉(Cw) = Cw’, for some Cw’. So, condition (c) is met and 𝒪 is quasi-logical. 
Now we just have to make sense of the Abundance condition. How can it be possibly met? My guess is 
that, in the framework we have been discussing so far, Abundance is highly unlikely. To see why, let us 
ask first why orders change from world to world. One reason is that, for example, if in w it is true that 
˹𝒪: John saves Maria˺, all the upper-bounds of ≤w must be worlds in which Maria exists, at least. The set 
of upper-bounds for some other world v in which Maria does not exist cannot be the same, then, for 
otherwise in v it would be true that ˹𝒪: John saves Maria˺: the poor John ought to save a non-existent 
person! There can be other reasons why we need more than one order: for example, it may be that we 
have the same domain in w and w’, and yet in w things develop so that it is better to do some action A in 
some situation, while in w’ the same A would have catastrophic effects. So, w and w’ will have different 
indexed orders: one with best-worlds in which A happens, and one with no best-A-worlds. 
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However, even so, it is very hard to make sense of such a plenitude of sets of upper-bounds, as 
Abundance asks. For we are changing the ordering relation across worlds because different things 
happen in different worlds, not because we are changing the criterion of preference with which we are 
building the ordering itself: that is kept constant across worlds, it just has different outputs, in different 
worlds, given different backgrounds of events. Now, suppose that the criterion we take is broadly 
hedonistic: what ought to be the case is what minimizes pain and maximises pleasure. Suppose some Cv 
has cardinality n. Take n worlds in WL with the same domain, but with very different states of affairs. 
One is paradisiac: everyone is happy and we all live in peace; another is hellish: everyone suffers 
strenuously and perpetually, and war is everywhere; another is so and so: more like our world. There 
can hardly be a set of upper-bounds that contains these worlds, given the hedonistic criterion we have 
chosen in the first place. Now, suppose the criterion is more “deontological”: duties are determined by 
compliance to general Laws of morality. Take a world in which everyone is very dutiful, according to our 
set of Laws, and another world in which people do the exact opposite. Hardly will we find a set of upper-
bounds with both these two worlds in. What I mean is that, for any kind of preference criterion one can 
conjure up, it seems to me that we can always find a set of worlds that cannot be in any set of upper-
bounds of the preference relation that we extracted from that criterion. So, there will be a series of 
permutations for any set of upper-bounds, such that the resulting transformed set is not the set of upper-
bounds, for any world. If so, Abundance cannot be met, regardless of the preference choices we make, 
unless our criterion is empty, or a total, irrational mess (in that case, arguably, anything is a best-world 
or none is, respectively). 
The fact that in this framework 𝒪 is not logical does not entail that in no framework is. Suppose we 
take Ought to work in this way: given a certain preference criterion that is usually pragmatically 
determined by the context, 𝒪 takes you to some set of duties Γ, given a certain situation49. 𝒪 has, 
therefore, a character and a content. The character takes you from a preference criterion and a world to 
a content: a function from sentences to sentences. In SDL, the world-variable is apparent, but not the 
preference criterion. Yet, it seems intuitive to me that we need such variable. Take these examples: 
                                                             
49 Kratzer has a similar view on Ought, even though she uses a Neighbourhood modal logic to model it (1977). 
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i. “You ought to go to bed early, if you want to wake up early”. 
ii. Bob and Maria want to rob a bank. Bob says: “We ought to use masks to cover our faces”. 
iii. “You ought to help others” (said by a priest during mass). 
In (i), the preference criterion is made explicit through a conditional. In (ii), the preference condition is 
pragmatically identified by the discourse. In (iii), the preference criterion is probably ethical/religious. 
In fact, for any situation, we can make the preference criterion explicit by prefixing a ˹ In view of X˺ clause, 
as suggested by Kratzer (1977, 340). So, what the priest says in (iii) can be rewritten as something like: 
iv. In view of what the Bible says, you ought to help others. 
I argue that this is a sensible theory of how 𝒪 works. Different contexts will result in different sets of 
duties, given different circumstances. We can associate to each context a preference criterion that 
determines an ordering indexed to worlds. So, in this framework, 𝒪 is determined by a function from 
preference criteria to functions from worlds to orderings of worlds. To make things easier, we can think 
of 𝒪 as changing across couples of 〈pc, w〉, where pc is a variable for preference criterion: the pc 
determines the indexed ordering, the world determines the index of the ordering, to extract the relevant 
best-worlds.  
It seems to me that in this contextualist framework it may be that, for any random bunch of worlds we 
take from WL, there is some possibly very weird preference criterion that makes this random set the 
upper-bound of its ordering relation, for some world. For the set of preference criteria we are taking is 
very big and wide: it is the set of all conceivable preference criteria, however queer they might seem to 
us. This set definitely outstrips the realm of the rational and the sensible, or of the coherent, for what 
matters. After all, what is a preference criterion? It is just a way of ranking different situations. Take any 
bunch of worlds X: they are the meet of some set of propositions. Take the truth of these propositions 
as what counts for the ranking, and you will extract a preference criterion whose sets of best worlds is 
exactly X. If I am right, then this Ought can be quasi-logical, for it is fair to assume that, for any sets of 
upper-bounds, for any transformations of these sets, the result is still a set of upper-bounds, according 
to some (possibly) very weird and yet conceivable preference criterion.  
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This contextual Ought would be quasi-logical even in more complicated systems. For example, one 
very influential alternative to SDL is a logic without the limit assumption:  
∃w ∀w’ w’ ≤v w (Limit Assumption) 
The limit assumption has been subjected to a lot of criticism. For it seems conceivable that there is not 
upper limit to some ordering ≤w: for any world, there could always be one that is slightly better. If so, 
the standard system would have the weird consequence of making seriality fail in w: no world is 
accessible from it, for the extension of R in w is the set of upper-bounds for ≤w, which is empty. So, in w, 
everything is a duty, because the universal clause for 𝒪 is trivially satisfied. To improve the system, 
Lewis (1973; 1974) suggested a new clause for Ought, that can be summarised as follows: 
Lewis 𝓞 w⊨ 𝒪: φ iff ∀w’ u ≤w w’, w’⊨ φ, where u is some constant associated with ≤w. 
The idea is that every order comes with an associated “least respectable” world u from which we can 
start to evaluate the Ought clause. Ought: P iff in every world at least as good as the least acceptable u, 
P is the case. If there is an upper limit, the modified clause collapses into the old one, so this adjustment 
is conservative. If we do accept this adjustment, we can still make a case for the quasi-logicality of the 
contextualist Ought. Indeed, the new framework makes even more sense: for many queer preference 
criteria, there can be no upper-bound to what is the best world associated with that criterion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Standard invariance theories claim that a notion is logical iff it is invariant under some transformation 
of the domain of objects. In this dissertation I first used a categorial grammar to extend standard 
invariance theories to intensional notions: a notion is logical iff it is invariant under arbitrary 
automorphisms of both the domain and the modal space. I then showed what I take to be the limits of 
standard invariance in this extended framework. I tried to sketch a novel theory of logicality, based on 
the idea that logic is about information, in a special way. Logical notions are notions that are sensitive 
only to the structural aspects of information. Something is logical if it performs an information-structure 
operation, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of informational inputs. The new theory 
preserves some desiderata of standard invariance, like the formality of paradigmatic examples of logical 
notions: conjunction, negation, material implication, existential quantifiers etc. Logical possibility and 
necessity are invariant, as well. Thus, the new theory achieves extensional adequacy. However, it is 
somehow more restrictive than permutation invariance: I believe that cardinality quantifiers are not 
logical, on my view. What is more, in my theory logical notions tend to stay persistent across many 
different models of information, while in standard invariance this is hardly the case. Finally, I tried to 
spell out a relaxed notion of quasi-logicality, because I believe that logicality is a kind of formality, and 
formality comes in shades. I concluded this work by applying my theory of quasi-logicality to deontic 
modals, showing how they might be quasi-logical, if a strong form of contextualism is true.  
I am not entirely satisfied with my theory, so far. I hope that, in my future PhD dissertation, I will be 
able to dig a little deeper into the matter. I still believe that my theory may be too fixated on the algebraic 
structure of the system we are choosing to model information, and this may not be ideal. I already 
showed how “persistence” is not perfectly general, in my theory. How can we fix that? What should be 
the link between algebraic structure and logicality? It is also still unclear where my theory is situated. 
For example, my invariance requirement would be something like “invariance of computability under 
transformations of inputs”: it would be interesting to see if there are some similarities between this 
requirement and other novel proposals, like potential isomorphisms invariance (Bonnay 2008) or 
invariance under bisimulations (Van Benthem & Bonnay 2008).  
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I also want to make a final point: the literature on invariance is usually focused solely on “extensional” 
notions. I ended up with a theory that is applicable to any intensional notion, as well. In fact, it is 
applicable to any notion that can be modelled in a Montague grammar. Still, there is much work to be 
done in non-classical frameworks: what about the logicality of non-classical notions, like intuitionistic 
negation and relevant implication? What about non-truth-functional logics, like dynamic logic? I highly 
doubt that standard invariance can be the answer, here. In fact, I suspect it may be catastrophic, if 
applied in non-classical frameworks. Yet, will my theory score any better, in its current form? I hope 
that, in my future work, I will be able to deal extensively on these undiscussed and yet important 
matters.  
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Appendix A: Formal-Computability Invariance in Boolean Algebras of 
Infons. 
 
In this appendix, we will prove that, in a Boolean algebra of infons, “formal computability invariance” 
is a restriction of standard permutation-invariance, for n-ary operations on the set of infons. 
Definition of Boolean Algebra A Boolean algebra is a (A, +, ×, 0, 1), where A is a set, + and × are 
operations on A and 0 and 1 the minimal and maximal elements of A. To be Boolean + and × must 
satisfy these conditions, for any a, b, c, elements of A: 
i. a + b = b + a 
ii. a × b = b × a 
iii. (a + b) × c = (a × c) + (b × c) 
iv. (a × b) + c = (a + c) × (b + c) 
v. (a + b) + c = a + (b + c) 
vi. (a × b) × c = a × (b × c) 
In short, + and × must be commutative, associative, and they must distribute over each other. 
In general, we are interested in cases in which some subclass of ℐ, together with ∧ and ∨, forms a 
Boolean algebra. This generally happens when we are modelling information from the powerset of a set, 
as in the object/modal system of chapter 3. In the following, I will call ℐ the set of all infons, and ℐ1, ℐ2, …, 
ℐn all the “subclasses” of ℐ, where a subclass is any subset of ℐ closed under membership to a type.  
Theorem 1. When ℐn is the powerset of some set X, (ℐn, ⊑) forms a complemented distributive lattice, 
and thus a Boolean Algebra. 
There is no need for a proof for this, really, because these are well known properties of any powerset of 
a set (e.g. Enderton 1977). Where ℐn is the powerset 𝓅X of some set X, information-containment is the 
subset relation ⊆ defined on 𝓅X. Meet and Join are intersection and union: A∩B is the meet of {A,B}, A∪B 
is the join of {A,B}. For every two elements of 𝓅X, there exists their intersection and union. Thus, 𝓅X 
forms a lattice. This lattice is distributive, because union and intersection are distributive and, for any 
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three sets, clearly, A∩(B∪C)=(A∩B)∪(A∩C) and A∪(B∩C)=(A∪B)∩(A∪C). Moreover, for any A in ℐn, 
there is the complement AC such that A∪AC = 1 and A∩AC = 0, where 1 and 0 are the greatest and lowest 
element of the lattice (in 𝓅X, the greatest element is X and the lowest is ∅). In 𝓅X, the complement of A 
is simply X – A. Thus, for every Y in 𝓅X, Y∩(X−Y) = ∅ and Y∪(X−Y) = X, because Y⊆X. So, 𝓅X is a 
complemented distributive lattice. So, (𝓅X, ⊆) is a distributive complemented lattice, and thus a Boolean 
algebra.  
Inverted Benthem’s Proposition. Among n-ary operations on sets, those defined at each tuple of 
arguments by some Boolean combination are permutation-invariant.  
Theorem 2 When ℐn is the powerset of some set X, ∧, ∨ and ¬ are permutation invariant.  
Proof A.1. Suppose ℐn is some 𝓅X. Then, for Theorem 1, (ℐ, ⊑) forms a Boolean Algebra. By Inv. 
Benthem’s proposition, ∧, ∨  and ¬ are permutation invariant, because they are Boolean. 
When ℐn = 𝓅X, for some X, elements of ℐn, are systematically equivalent to functions from X to V. In 
particular, for every i ∈ ℐn, there exists a function f: X → V such that f(x)= T iff x ∈ i. Thus, there is a 
bijection between elements of ℐn and elements of type 〈X,V〉. Let σ be a permutation of X and σY the 
induced transformation in type Y: 
• if Y=X, then for all k∈Y, σY(k) = σ(k)  
• if Y=V, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= k  
• if Y=⟨X,Z⟩, for any types X, Z, then for all k∈Y, σY(k)= σZ ∘ k ∘ (σX)-1. 
An element k of type Y is permutation invariant iff ∀σ, k = σY(k). 
Assumption 1: Suppose Y ∈ 𝓅X. Define a permutation σ(a) = b, with a and b elements of X. σ〈X,V〉Y = 
(Y−{a})∪{b}. 
Theorem 3: When ℐn is the powerset of some X, ⊆ is permutation invariant. That is, Z ⊆ Y iff  
σ〈X,V〉(Z) ⊆ σ〈X,V〉(Y), for any permutation of X and any induced transformation σ〈X,V〉. 
Proof A.2. Take any two Z and Y of 𝓅X and suppose Z⊆Y. Then ∀x∈X (x ∈ Z → x ∈ Y). The only way 
to upset Z⊆Y would be to change some elements in Z so that something is an element of Z but not 
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Y. Define a permutation σX(a)=a’, with a ∈ Z. If a’ ∈ Z, then σ〈X,V〉(Z) ⊆ σ〈X,V〉(Y). If a’ ∉ Z, by 
Assumption 1, σ〈X,V〉(Z)= Z’ = (Z−{a})∪{a’}. Given that Z⊆Y, a ∈ Y. If a’ ∈ Y, as well, then σ〈X,V〉(Y)=Y, 
and Z’ ⊆ Y. If a’ ∉ Y, then, by Assumption 1, σ〈X,V〉(Y) = Y’, where Y’= (Y−{a})∪{a’}. But then Z’ ⊆ Y’, 
since a’ ∈ Z’ and a’ ∈ Y’. Thus, for any permutation σ of X and any corresponding induced 
permutation in 〈X,V〉, if Z⊆Y then σ〈X,V〉 (Z) ⊆ σ〈X,V〉 (Y).  
Now, for the reverse, suppose Z⊈Y. Then ∃x∈X (x ∈ Z ∧ x ∉ Y). The only way to upset this would be 
to change all such x’s, so that no element of Z is not an element of Y. Define a series of permutations 
σX(a) = a’, σX(b) = b’, …, σX(n) = n’, where {a, b, …, n} = {x / x ∈ Z ∧ x ∉ Y}, and {a’, b’, …, n’} is a 
subset of both Z and Y. σ〈X,V〉 (Z)=Z, for all the permutations are nothing but automorphisms of Z 
({a, b, …, n} and {a’, b’, …, n’} are both subsets of Z). The transformation induced in Y is σ〈X,V〉 (Y)=Y’, 
where Y’=(Y−{a, b, …, n})∪{a’, b’, …, n’}, by Assumption 1. But then Z ⊈ Y’, for {a, b, …, n} is a subset 
of Z but not of Y’, by assumption. So, if Z ⊈ Y then σ〈X,V〉 (Z) ⊈ σ〈X,V〉 (Y). Thus, Z ⊆ Y iff σ〈X,V〉 (Z) ⊆ 
σ〈X,V〉 (Y), for any permutation σ. 
The proof itself comes with no surprise, since information-containment, in our system, is the order of 
the lattice, and it can be defined using intersection or union: A⊆B iff A∩B=A and iff A∪B=B.  
Theorem 4 When ℐn is the powerset of some X, Compatibility is permutation invariant. That is, C (x, y) 
iff C (σ〈X,V〉(x), σ〈X,V〉(y))., for any permutation of X and any induced transformation σ〈X,V〉. 
Proof A.3. Take a binary relation of compatibility C defined over sets of elements of X.  
C(Z,Y) =df Z∩Y≠∅. Suppose there are some A and B such that C(A,B) but ¬C(σ〈X,V〉(A),σ〈X,V〉(B)). 
This can be only if the permutations “switch” all the (a, b, …, n) that are elements of both A and B 
with some elements (a’, b’, …, n’) that are not in A nor in B. Yet, via assumption 1, now  
σ〈X,V〉(A) = (A−{a, b, …, n’})∪{a’, b’, …, n’} and σ〈X,V〉(B) = (B−{a, b, …, n’})∪{a’, b’, …, n’}. Since  
{a, b, …, n} ⊆ ⋂{σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)}, we have C(σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)), contrary to our assumption. So, 
for any Z and Y in 𝓅X, if C(Z,Y) then C(σ〈X,V〉(Z),σ〈X,V〉(Y)). 
For the reverse, suppose ¬C(A,B) and yet C(σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)). Then A∩B=∅ and σ〈X,V〉(A) ∩ 
σ〈X,V〉(B) ≠ ∅. Then there must be at least a permutation σ(a) = a’ such that a’ ∈  
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⋂{σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)}. By assumption 1, σ〈X,V〉(A)=(A−{a})∪{a’} and σ〈X,V〉(B)=(B−{a})∪{a’}. But 
then A =(σ〈X,V〉(A)−{a’})∪{a} and B =(σ〈X,V〉(B)−{a’})∪{a}. So a ∈ A∩B and thus C(A, B), contrary to 
our assumption. So, by reductio, ¬C(σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)). So, if C(σ〈X,V〉(A), σ〈X,V〉(B)) then C(A, B). 
Corollary 1: Take any FTM, and the formal operation Ω it describes. When ℐn is some powerset 𝓅X, Ω is 
permutation invariant.  
Proof A.4. By Theorem 1-4, the formal operations of meet, join, information-containment, 
complementation and compatibility are permutation invariant. These are all the basic formal 
operations. Any formal operation is a combination of basic formal operations. Any combination of 
permutation-invariant operations is permutation invariant. Ω, being a formal operator, is a 
combination of permutation invariant operations, so it is permutation invariant, as well. 
Corollary 2: When ℐn is some powerset 𝓅X, an n-ary operator defined on X is FC-invariant only if 
permutation-invariant.  
Proof A.5. Suppose ℐn is some powerset 𝓅X. An n-ary operator K is FC-invariant iff there is an FTM 
such that there exists a function Comp: FTM-1 ∘ K such that:  
a) For every s and s’, Comp(s) = s’ iff K(s) = FTM(s’). 
b) For every s, Comp(s) is the sequence such that (bm)1≤m≤n = (am)s and (bm)m>n = k, where 
(ax)s is the x-th element of s. 
c) Let σ be a permutation of information and let σS be the transformation induced in type S 
by such permutation. For every s, s’, if k(s) = FTM(s’) then, for every σ, k(σS(s)) = 
FTM(σS(s’)). 
Suppose K is not permutation invariant. Then, there exists a series of permutations for which 
K ≠ σY(K), where Y is the type for K. That is, there is a series of permutations σ1, σ2, …, σn such 
that, for some argument (a, b, …, n) and value t of K, K(a, b, …, n) = t but K(σS(a, b, …, n)) ≠ 
σS(t). K is either F-computable or not. If not, then it is not FCI. So, suppose K is F-computable 
by some FTM Ω. Then K(a, b, …, n) = Ω (a, b, …, n, …, k) = t. By Corollary 1, Ω is permutation 
invariant. Thus, Ω(s) = s’ iff Ω(σS(s)) = σS(s’), for any permutation σ of X and any induced σS. 
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In particular, under σ1, σ2, …, σn, Ω(σS(a, b, …, n, ..., k)) = σS(t). Thus, Ω(σS(a, b, …, n, …, k)) = 
σS(t) ≠ K(σS(a, b, …, n)). Hence, even if K is F-computable it is not FCI. So, in any case, if K is 
not permutation invariant, it is not FCI. Thus, K is FC-invariant only if permutation-invariant. 
Here the schema of the proof. FC-invariance is (FC) = F-computability & (I) = persistence of 
computability under permutations. So, what we want is to prove is ⊢ FC&I → PI. 
1, (1) ¬PI. Assumption. 
⊢ (2) FC ∨ ¬FC. Excluded middle. 
3, (3) ¬FC. Assumption. 
3, (4) ¬(FC&I). 3, meaning of &. 
⊢ (5) ¬FC→ ¬(FC&I). 3, 4, Conditional Proof. 
6, (6) FC. Assumption. 
1,6, (7) FC&¬PI. 1, 6, &-introduction. 
1,6 (8) ¬(FC&I). 1, 6, proof explained above. 
1 (9) FC→ ¬(FC&I). 6, 8, Conditional Proof. 
1, (10) ¬(C&I). 2, 5, 9, Disjunction Elimination. 
⊢ (11) ¬P → ¬(C&I). 1, 10, Conditional Proof. 
⊢ (12) C&I → PI. 11, Logical equivalences. 
Thus, in a Boolean algebra of infons, FC-invariance is a “contraction” of permutation invariance, for n-
ary operations defined over the set of infons. However, this does not entail that my theory is a 
contraction of permutation invariance, in general, as I have already discussed in section 3.2. 
QED 
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